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  i
DEUTSCHE ZUSAMMENFASSUNG GEMÄSS § 6 (6) 
DER PROMOTIONSORDNUNG 
Dem ressourcen-basierten Ansatz und der strategischen Netzwerktheorie sind in den 
letzten Jahren zunehmende Beachtung durch die strategische Managementforschung 
geschenkt worden. Im Rahmen dieser Dissertation werden die bis jetzt 
vernachlässigten dynamischen Perspektiven der beiden theoretischen Konzepte weiter 
vertieft. 
Durch sieben Fallstudien über die Partnerschaftsnetzwerke von Unternehmen der 
Informations- und Kommunikationswirtschaft werden mit Hilfe des Grounded-Theory 
Ansatzes Hypothesen zur Weiterentwicklung und Dynamisierung der genannten 
theoretischen Konzepte entwickelt. Die relevanten Forschungsfragen decken hierbei 
drei Themenbereiche ab: Evolution von Partnerschaftsnetzwerken, 
Ressourcenaustausch und -verbindung innerhalb von Partnerschaftsnetzwerken und 
Auswirkungen von Partnerschaftsnetzwerken auf Wettbewerbsvorteile von 
Unternehmen. 
Die Evolution von Partnerschaftsnetzwerken umfasst Fragestellungen von der Sequenz 
von Partnerschaftsaktivitäten und dem Vergleich von Partnerschaften über den 
Zeitablauf in Intensität, Standardisierung, funktionaler Ausrichtung und 
Ressourcenaustausch. Dieser Themenkomplex befasst sich auch mit den iterativen 
Wechselwirkungen von Ressourcenbedarf, Ressourcenbefriedigung durch zukünftige 
Partnerschaften, Ressourcenbildung durch aktive Partnerschaften und gewachsene 
Unternehmensattraktivität für zukünftige Partnerschaften durch erhöhtes 
Ressourcenangebot. Die zweite Themenstellung des Ressourcenaustausches und deren 
Verbindung innerhalb von Partnerschaftsnetzwerken deckt die Fragen der 
Unternehmenskompetenzen zur Führung von Partnerschaftsnetzwerken, der 
Internalisierung von Partnerressourcen durch Lernen sowie Faktoren, die Lernen 
zwischen Unternehmen beeinflussen, ab. Nach dem Erlernen von Ressourcen werden 
auch Fragen nach der zukünftigen strukturellen Weiterentwicklung von 
Partnerschaftsnetzwerken untersucht. In der letzten Fragestellung werden abschließend 
die wechselnden Effekte von dynamischen Partnerschaftsnetzwerken auf 
Wettbewerbsvorteile von Unternehmen untersucht. 
  ii
Aus den sieben Fallstudien werden 16 Hypothesen entwickelt, die sich 
folgendermaßen zusammenfassen lassen: Unternehmen starten mit einfach 
strukturierten Partnerschaften auf operativer Ebene und bauen dann schrittweise ein 
komplexeres Allianznetzwerk auf. Im Rahmen dieses Aufbaus entwickeln 
Unternehmen über die Kumulierung von Partnerschaften die Fähigkeiten zum 
Management ihres Netzwerkes und konzentrieren dann ihre Aktivitäten auf auswählte 
hochwertige Allianzen. Diese Allianzen zeichnen sich durch eine höhere Intensität and 
genauere Definition des Ressourcenaustauschen aus. Die Formierung von 
höherwertigen Allianzen hängt jedoch von der Bereitstellung eigener 
Unternehmensressourcen als ‚Tauschwert’ ab, die durch Informationsaustausch und 
Lernen entwickelt werden können. Das Erlernen von Ressourcen hängt von dem 
Konfliktlevel und der Ähnlichkeit der Ressourcenbasis zwischen den Partnern im 
Netzwerk ab. 
Dieses integrierte System von Hypothesen wird in Rahmen des ressourcen-basierten 
Ansatzes und der strategischen Netzwerktheorie diskutiert. Ein Model auf Basis der 
theoretischen Konzepte ermöglicht den Abgleich mit den entwickelten Hypothesen 
und zeigt weiteren Forschungsbedarf für die dynamische Betrachtung von 
Partnerschaftsnetzwerken auf. Sowohl Hypothesen als auch theoretisches Modell 
erlauben einen Ausblick auf die Handlungsanweisung für das Management von 
Partnerschaftsnetzwerken. 
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1 Introduction 
Interorganizational alliances between firms are of major importance for firms’ 
competitive advantages across a large number of industries (Harrigan 1986). During 
the past two decades, empirical evidence indicates that strategic alliances have grown 
extensively in response to industry deregulation, globalization, technology changes and 
an increasing emphasis on product innovation (Harrigan 1985). Since dependence on 
strategic alliances has grown significantly in recent years, partnership formation with 
external parties for variety of reasons has become a central strategic activity for many 
firms across multiple industries (Badaracco 1991; Nohria and Eccles 1992; Gulati 
1995a; Mowery, Oxley and Silverman 1996). 
On the industry level for example, competitive intensity, market development stage, 
demand and competitive uncertainty affect partnership formation (Harrigan 1988; 
Shan 1990; Burgers, Hill and Kim 1993; Hagedoorn 1993; Eisenhardt and 
Schoonhoven 1996; Chen 1997; Dickson and Weaver 1997). Findings support a 
positive relationship between alliance formation activities and demand changes, level 
of competition, new technological developments, innovation time span reduction, 
market access and convergence of industry segments. On the firm level for instance, 
attributes such as size, age, scope, innovativeness, product diversity, financial 
resources, competitive and technological position and prestige have also shown to 
impact the alliance formation rate (Oliver 1990; Shan 1990; Barley, Freeman and 
Hybels 1992; Powell and Brantley 1992; Burgers, Hill et al. 1993; Hagedoorn and 
Schakenraad 1994; Shan, Walker and Kogut 1994; Chen 1997; Stuart 1998). 
While alliance formation can be observed across multiple industries, the number and 
the average value of partnerships have increased, especially in IT, media and 
communications sectors (Anonymous 1995). In high technology industries, 
characterized by factor described in the previous chapter, firms utilize alliances to 
exchange complementary resources and capabilities, because they can no longer 
develop, manufacture, and market products independently. Therefore, new 
technologies provide both a stimulus to and focus on a variety of alliance formations 
that seek to reduce inherent uncertainties with novel products and markets. Several 
studies have revealed a positive correlation between research and development activity 
and alliance formation intensity, especially in knowledge intensive industries (Freeman 
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1991; Hagedoorn 1995). Empirical findings from these sectors have generated 
evidence that alliances contribute to firm growth (Powell, Koput and Smith-Doerr 
1996), innovation rates (Hagedoorn 1993), facilitate organizational learning (Hamel 
1991) and effect corporate reputations (Stuart, Hoang and Hybels 1999). Apparent 
inducements for interorganizational partnerships in these industries have significantly 
increased alliance formation rates and established cooperative relationships as a routine 
strategic activity (Stuart 1998).  
Consequently, routines of alliance formation activities have developed a web and a 
variety of relationships around firms in high technology industries, in which almost all 
firms are linked to each other by direct or indirect ties (Duysters, De Man and 
Wildeman 1999). The sheer volume of partnerships, the variety of governance forms 
and multiplicity of functional dedications impose considerable complexity for firms at 
the center of these relationships. Besides complexity, a combination of cooperation and 
competition in partner behavior increases the risks of exploiting valuable internal firm 
resources. In this environmental context, the formation of new strategic partnerships 
represents more than the addition of dyadic relationships. Knoke and Kuklinski (1982) 
note that changes in the structure of relationships have behavioral, perceptual and 
attitudinal consequences for all firms involved. Therefore, a recently added cooperative 
relationship shifts an entire alliance network with intriguing and complex implications 
for and alliance management research. Management implications of alliance networks 
in high technology industries originate from the complexity of partnership interests, the 
portfolio of resource contributions and need for dynamic adaptations. 
(1) In their alliance formation activities, firms can no longer make strategic choices 
based exclusively on their self-interest. Strong relationships require feedback 
mechanisms on the interests of strategic partners, because independent and uniformed 
unilateral action could lead to a deterioration or discontinuation of partnerships. In 
considering both current relationships and internal capabilities, firms also have to 
define their reliable role either as integrator or specialist in the network of cooperative 
relationships. Whereas integrators combine products or resources into complete 
offerings, specialists supply a limited variety of products and services for the network. 
(2) The network perspective on the entire alliance portfolio extends the scope of 
collaboration benefits from dyadic relationships to the network of collaboration. Since 
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partnership networks influence the flow of resources and the exchange of information, 
and smart alliance network management aims at access to a combination of 
complementary resources (Duysters, De Man et al. 1999), alliance management on the 
firm level needs to leverage the entire portfolio of relationships to gain the maximum 
advantage. Therefore, partner selection has to consider the fit of potential partners with 
the entire collection of partnerships, which depends on the expected and 
complementary contribution to the entire network. Especially in high technology 
industries, knowledge contributions across a web of partners play a significant role in 
improving the competitive advantage of firms. (Lorenzoni and Baden-Fuller 1995) 
suggest that the diffusion of knowledge across partners improves the quality of the 
entire network and the competitive position of all firms involved in the alliance 
network. Availability, diffusion and utilization of knowledge, however, depends on the 
overall alliance network structure: Centrally located firms with strong ties to multiple 
partners may enjoy a trustful exchange of valuable knowledge, but at the same time, 
they suffer from low knowledge diversity which can only be generated by renewed and 
replaced alliance relationships. 
(3) As environmental factors in high technology industries demand continuous 
adaptations to new technology standards or product applications, changing 
requirements for firm and partnership resources are transformed into dynamically 
evolving alliance networks. Adjustments in alliance networks have an impact on the 
overall relationship structure and in turn the availability of resources, but at the same 
time, they are constrained by interests of partner firms currently involved. 
Constant adaptations of alliance network structures embedded in the interests of 
existing relationships impose tremendous managerial challenges for firms in the high 
technology industry. Both the capability to manage a portfolio of alliances and the 
development of a valuable sequence of alliances into a web of partners may represent a 
differentiating factor for organizations in this industry. By exploring the longitudinal 
evolution of firm resources and the sequence of partnerships, this dissertation study 
aims at developing recommendations that support management in developing 
cooperative structures. 
Studying the longitudinal evolution of alliance networks in the context of firm 
resources extend current theoretical perspectives on alliances, the resource-based view 
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of the firm and the strategic network theory. Although scholars have already covered 
the issues of strategic alliances to some extent, important areas require further 
empirical investigation and theoretical attention, especially from the perspective of 
strategic management research (Osborn and Hagedoorn 1997). 
Scholars have proposed a range of frameworks to analyze strategic alliances or 
networks: As the partnership progresses through a sequence of events, the strategic 
choices cover key behavioral issues such as (1) the decision to enter into an alliance, 
the selection of an appropriate partner, (2) the setup of governance structures and (3) 
the dynamic evolution as collaboration develops over time. Important issues also 
concern the factors that determine performance consequences for (4) the partnership 
itself and (5) the firms entering into it (Gulati 1998). Exhibit 1-1 provides a framework 
and classification of issues in the research of strategic alliances and networks. 
Research issues
Formation ? Firm resource characteristics? Partner selection
Governance ? Ex-ante factors influencing the choice of governance structure
Evolution ? Ex-ante factors and evolutionary processes influencing network development
Performance 
of networks
? Performance measurement indicators
? Factors influencing performance
Performance 
advantages 
for firms
? Social and economic benefits for firms participating 
in networks
 
Exhibit 1-1 Alliance research: Classification of issues 
adapted from Gulati (1998) 
In the well developed literature on alliance formation, scholars have emphasized three 
main firm inducements for the existence of alliances (Hennart 1988, 1991; Chi 1994; 
Ingham and Thompson 1994; Zaheer and Venkataramen 1995; Singh 1997): (1) 
Transaction cost reduction resulting from small numbers bargaining, (2) strategic 
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behavior induced by potential improvements in the competitive position or market 
power (Berg and Friedman 1978) and (3) pursuit of organizational knowledge or 
learning when firms want to obtain critical resources from other partners (Kogut 
1988a). With the dominant dyadic perspective on alliances, the research scope has 
largely remained on strategic behavior and underlying factors, because the empirical 
analysis of inducements from transaction costs or the transfer of organizational 
knowledge has been more difficult to explore. In their studies of underlying factors, 
scholars have widely explored the impact of a broad variety of industry and firm-level 
factors on alliance formation. 
In the specific application of network perspectives to research on alliances, scholars 
have examined the implications of key industry events (Madhavan, Koka and Prescott 
1998). Studies have also linked networks to the extent of R&D and non-R&D alliances 
(Powell, Koput et al. 1996) and the frequency of future alliances by firms (Kogut, Shan 
and Walker 1992; Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven 1996). Empirical evidence of 
biotechnology firms or semiconductor firms suggests that firms with more prior 
alliances and that are more centrally situated in the alliance network, or with more 
focused networks, are more likely to set up new partnerships with higher frequency 
(Shan, Walker et al. 1994; Podolny and Stuart 1995; Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven 
1996; Powell, Koput et al. 1996). Also, the experience with previous partnerships 
strongly supports the establishment of additional ties (Gulati 1995b; Garcia-Pont and 
Nohria 1999). 
All these studies have developed initial insights into the formation of strategic alliance 
networks, but have not concentrated on a dynamic model of evolving networks, 
changing inducements or adapting enabling conditions on a longitudinal basis (Oliver 
1990). 
Applications of the resource dependency theory have covered the inducements for 
dyadic alliance formation on the firm level (Galaskiewicz 1985; Oliver 1990). This 
model of resource procurement suggests that organizations set up alliances with other 
organizations when they observe critical strategic interdependence as well as beneficial 
and non-possessed resources (Levine and White 1961; Aiken and Hage 1968; Pfeffer 
and Salancik 1978). Hagedoorn (1993; 1995) has shown resource complementarities in 
the case of technology partnerships which explains that a large share of joint ventures 
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perform activities outside the firm’s core business. Complementary capabilities can 
later support firm specialization, when resource gaps can be filled by divergent 
partners in multiple alliances (Mowery, Oxley et al. 1996). 
Strategic interdependence may be helpful to explain alliance formation between some 
firms, but not all opportunities for firm relationships are turned into actual partnerships 
and not all resource needs can be satisfied with appropriate partners. Consequently, 
alliance formation is influenced by the previously mentioned important enabling 
conditions of currently available partnerships and resources: 
(1) Information on potential alliance opportunities is not freely available and easily 
accessible, and not all alliance opportunities are presented exogenously. Alliance 
networks channel valuable information for participating firms and reduce the risks of 
moral hazards originating from opportunistic behavior: Integrating firms in alliance 
networks leads to receptivity to changes in market environments and partner goals 
(Granovetter 1985). Active relationships with current partners facilitate familiarity 
with mutual goals and capabilities, which can be leveraged for the setup of additional 
partnerships. However, the very integration of firms in relationship networks can also 
limit the access to information about potential alliances by extensively relying on 
information from current network firms. 
(2) Central location of firms within alliance networks provides status cues: Both 
improved reputation and external visibility extend the firm’s reach to potential alliance 
partners. Conveying status is extremely important in uncertain environments of high 
technology industries where companies turn to highly attractive partners of high status 
with established ties to other firms with higher reputation. Reputation, status and trust 
positively influence partner selection (Shane 1994; Zaheer and Venkataramen 1995; 
Dollinger, Golden and Saxton 1997; Chung, Singh and Lee 2000). 
(3) Alliance formation requires that a firm with its available resource base appears as 
an attractive partner to others (Kogut, Shan et al. 1992; Shan, Walker et al. 1994). A 
firm with greater resource offerings has richer collaboration opportunities (Ahuja 
2000b) available. Partners’ resource availability tends to increase their attractiveness, 
which may have a positive impact on the quantity and quality of presented alliance 
opportunities. At the same time, resource endowed firms may see reduced needs for 
external collaboration. 
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As diversity and flexibility requirements of alliances have increased over time, the 
study of governance structures in alliances has become more critical. The research on 
governance structure between organizations, mainly viewed as mechanisms to manage 
uncertainty, has been largely influenced the by transaction cost theory. Scholars have 
focused to a great extent on the diversity of alliance structures as governance forms 
between the dichotomy of markets and hierarchies. Uncertainty originates from 
appropriation concerns in alliances due to contracting hazards and behavioral 
uncertainty at the time of formation (Pisano, Russo and Teece 1988; Pisano 1989; 
Balakrishnan and Koza 1993). Backing criticism on the transaction cost theory 
approach, studies have shown that emerging processes may lead to learning (Ring 
1996) and coordination costs (Gulati and Singh 1998), which are not fully taken into 
account in the transaction cost theory. The focus on a single and static transaction 
disregards learning and innovative processes distributed across a network of inter-
organizational relationships (Zajac and Olsen 1993; Powell, Koput et al. 1996). 
A range of industry, firm and alliance level factors seem to affect the choice of 
governance structure on the dyadic level (Hagedoorn 1993; Hagedoorn and Narula 
1996; Hagedoorn and Sedaitis 1997; Osborn and Hagedoorn 1997). On the issue of 
knowledge exchange in alliances, this resource transfer can be better facilitated by 
hierarchical control or equity ownership of alliances than by market-based contracts, 
because the knowledge to be transferred and embedded in organizational routines 
cannot be defined easily in unambiguous contracts. Therefore, researchers found that 
equity-based alliances promote more extensive knowledge transfer than contract-based 
alliances (Mowery, Oxley et al. 1996). Partnerships for the development of technology 
components raise appropriation concerns and drive coordination costs, which both 
require more hierarchical structures (Gulati and Singh 1998). 
Surprisingly little empirical research has covered the evolution or the process 
influencing the course of individual alliances or partnership networks. From the dyadic 
perspective, alliances can transform tremendously beyond their initial considerations 
after their initiation. Consequently, case study research has explored factors 
influencing formal and informal processes and intermediate evolutionary stages of 
alliances (Hamel 1991; Larson 1992; Ring and Van de Ven 1994; Doz 1996): 
Alliances do not strictly develop towards a set of objectives based on the earlier 
implementation of initial designs, but they are also not independent from initially 
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defined conditions. Initial ‘static’ or ‘generative’ conditions can block or foster 
learning and adaptation (Doz 1996). Researchers expanded their scope from initial 
conditions to adaptive behavioral processes and their impact on performance in 
alliances (Hamel, Doz and Prahalad 1989; Doz 1996). Learning skills and 
environmental factors seem to impact the development of an alliance, which in some 
cases follows discrete changes due to discontinuous environmental adjustments 
(Hamel 1991; Gray and Yan 1997). Continuous information exchange on the 
incentives to cooperate facilitates the parties’ comprehension of alliance benefits and 
helps to understand options to unilaterally impact the partnership’s outcome (Gulati, 
Khanna and Nohria 1994). The ‘relative scope’ of firms in partnerships, which refers 
to market opportunities outside the alliance, increases the likelihood of competitive 
dynamics and potentially detrimental effects on the partnership (Khanna 1998). 
Regarding the aspect of the learning process, Simonin (1997) has suggested that 
experience from collaboration must be internalized first in order to develop know-how 
and to contribute to additional future collaborative benefits. 
Previous research on alliance network dynamics to date has identified some factors 
like critical industry events, information transfer in the network and firm resource 
changes, that impact or are influenced by relationship structures. Key industry events 
triggered by technological progress, the entry of competitors or a dramatic change in 
consumer preferences can increase the value of current partnerships or force a firm to 
establish new ties that allow access to newly required capabilities (Barley 1986; 
Madhavan, Koka et al. 1998). In this environment, a group of horizontally or vertically 
connected firms with dense connections could also aim at collective strategies in 
conjunction with their individual competitive strategies (Astley and Fombrun 1983; 
Bresser 1988; Nohria and Garcia-Pont 1991; Gomes-Casseres 1994). As network 
structures influence the flow of information, dynamic changes at the network level 
may effect the information content over time. Studies showed that with an increase of 
network institutionalization the nature of transmitted information changes from 
technical to more institutional elements (Westphal, Gulati and Shortell 1997). 
Researchers have also investigated the supply chain of large manufacturing companies 
and examined how vertical partnerships and their networks have shown clearer 
structural patterns over time (Helper 1991; Dyer 1996). In a longitudinal analysis of 
the Italian packaging industry, (Lorenzoni and Lipparini 1999) have found a clear focus 
on a limited number of first tier suppliers and an increase in quality and content of the 
Introduction  
 9
respective relationships. The capabilities of first tier suppliers have been focused on a 
more specialized set of activities and components. High familiarity and trust has 
reduced transaction and coordination cost and has facilitated the transformation of 
relationships. 
Findings from these studies have generated some insights into the evolutionary 
dynamics of firm partnerships. However, behavioral processes in alliance networks or 
decisions for the entire group of firms have not been systematically explored. In these 
processes of alliance network evolution, centrally located firms may intentionally 
utilize their information, control and negotiation benefits by learning from, playing off 
or complementing a network of partners and their competencies. Although alliance 
network research has explored structural changes to some extent, the underlying 
factors influencing growth and development of interorganizational relationships leave 
many research questions open (for a review: Grandori and Soda (1995)). In 
consideration of the limited understanding of network dynamics, alliances as an 
empirical phenomenon offer a valuable area in which action and structure are closely 
intertwined and the dynamic co-evolution can be investigated (Gulati 1999). Exploring 
the dynamic co-evolution, the longitudinal analysis also enables path dependencies of 
alliance formation to be explored. 
The performance of alliances and networks has been researched by scholars to a very 
limited extent due to the insufficient data availability on partnership performance: 
Many empirical studies focused on the termination of alliances (Beamish 1985; 
Harrigan 1985; Levinthal and Fichman 1988), which serves only as a mediocre 
performance proxy, since successful alliances can also be terminated intentionally 
when the objectives are met and its mission is completed. Uncovering other financial 
and non-financial indicators for alliance performance requires detailed surveys and 
careful observations covering multiple objectives, complex indicators and viewpoints 
of all partners involved (Harrigan 1985, 1986; Heide and Miner 1992; Parkhe 1993). 
Previous research results mainly focused on the dyadic alliance level identifying ex-
ante conditions and developing processes that effect performance. 
Regarding ex-ante conditions, partner reputation (Saxton 1997), multilateral resource 
contributions from all involved parties (Hatfield and Pearce 1997), partner similarity 
and related diversification (Harrigan 1988; Saxton 1997) result in higher partnership 
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benefits. On the operational management level, management flexibility, trust between 
partners, regular information updates, constructive feedback mechanisms, continuity of 
personnel at the interface between alliance and firm contribute to alliance performance 
(Kanter 1989; Bleeke and Ernst 1991). 
Although studies have identified some factors for increased alliance performance on 
the dyadic level, few researchers have covered the implications of multiple alliances 
and performance in their analyses. The management of multiple alliances and the 
entire portfolio has raised new questions about the cooperative capabilities of firms. 
The development of beneficial alliance management experience (Barkema, Bell and 
Pennings 1996; Barkema, Shenkar, Vermeulen and Bell 1997) is confronted with the 
challenges of increasing complexity in the alliance portfolio and the challenge of 
possibly conflicting objectives from different alliance partners: A firm in the center of 
an alliance network has to focus its attention on a series of organizational and strategic 
issues (Lorenzoni and Baden-Fuller 1995). Systematic experience with alliances can be 
developed with an increasing number of alliances formation activities (Lyles 1988). 
Anand and Khanna’s study (2000) suggests that firms with greater experience in 
alliances create enhanced capabilities by generating more value from these 
partnerships. This alliance experience has been conceptualized by the capability to 
identify valuable alliance opportunities, use appropriate governance mechanisms, 
develop inter-firm knowledge-sharing routines, make requisite relationship-specific 
investments, initiate necessary changes to the evolving partnership and manage 
expectations of partners (Doz 1996; Dyer and Singh 1998). 
A limited number of studies have explored the performance advantages of strategic 
alliances for firms involved. Since many other effects besides alliance formation can 
also influence the performance of firms, empirically linking alliance activities with 
firm performance faces difficult measurement obstacles. Scholars have looked at a 
variety of direct and indirect ways to test this relationship: 
The likelihood of business survival (Singh, Tucker and House 1986; Baum and Oliver 
1991; Baum and Oliver 1992; Hagedoorn and Schakenraad 1994; Mitchell and Singh 
1996; Zaheer and Zaheer 1997; Baum, Calabrese and Silverman 2000; Rowley, 
Behrens and Krackhardt 2000), firm growth (Powell, Koput et al. 1996) and 
innovation output (Shan, Walker et al. 1994), or abnormal stock market returns (Koh 
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and Venkatraman 1991; Balakrishnan and Koza 1993; Chan, Kensinger, Keown and 
Martin 1997; Das, Sen and Sengupta 1998) have been linked to participation in inter-
firm networks. A more detailed study of stock market reactions to alliance 
announcements suggests that technological alliances under certain conditions of either 
related or unrelated diversification have resulted in higher abnormal returns than other 
cooperative agreements. Research on vertical alliances (Helper 1990; Cusumano and 
Takeishi 1991; Helper 1991; Heide and Miner 1992; Dyer 1996) suggests that close 
vertical alliances supported by rich information exchange, long-term commitments 
with greater cooperation and higher levels of asset-specific investments generate 
performance advantages for the firms that form these partnerships. 
Previous research has paid limited attention to the overarching alliance network 
structure in which firms are embedded. Rather than focusing on the firm’s position in 
the overall structure of multiple differentiated relationships, analytical focus has 
remained largely on the cumulative participation in certain partnerships. The 
demonstrated positive relationships between alliance formation and firm performance 
also raise the question: Why do all firms not use a partnership to enhance 
performance? The variation in alliance formation could be explained by differences in 
partnership opportunities, which in turn depend on the dynamically changing resource 
base as an important enabling condition. 
This multifaceted review of dyadic and alliance network research clearly identifies 
issues for further research. Theoretical and empirical gaps can be identified across the 
whole “cycle” of alliance research issues (Exhibit 1-1) and can be transformed into 
questions for this research study: 
(1) Evolution of inter-firm alliance networks: Alliance formation consequences and 
causes in the great majority have been studied on the dyadic level. The introduction of 
entire inter-firm network structure of strategic alliances – typical for high technology 
industries – in the investigation of alliance formation and development allows for a 
more comprehensive understanding of inducements, opportunities and constraints of 
firm partnerships. 
Despite the intensification of partnership activities, a narrow body of research has 
explored the evolutionary processes in the formation of interfirm ties (Doz 1996). In 
addition to the research contributions mentioned above, theory building is required for 
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network evolution and change (Nohria and Eccles 1992; Lipparini and Sobrero 1997). 
Studying the alliance networks in a longitudinal setting can provide unique insights 
into both endogenous and exogenous factors of a possible path-dependent evolution. 
In what sequence do firms develop their alliance networks over time? 
In the sequence of alliance formation, how do early partnerships compare to later 
partnerships in terms of intensity, degree of standardization, functional dedication, 
resource exchange and strategic relevance? In case of any differentiation between 
partnerships, how can these changes be explained in the longitudinal setting? 
To what extent can a portfolio of relationships be used for complementing resource 
gaps, achieving negotiation leverage or other benefits? 
(2) Resource exchange and combination in alliance networks: As discussed in the 
review of alliance formation, joint capabilities of resource-based interaction between 
interdependent firms have only recently received limited attention by researchers. 
Especially in high technology industries, alliances serve as an important mechanism to 
access, acquire and develop resources that a firm does not already possess. 
Interorganizational partnerships represent a viable option for the creation of sustained 
competitive advantages by idiosyncratic and complementary resource bundling (Kogut 
1991; Kogut and Zander 1992). The emerging theory of strategic alliances from a 
resource-based perspective (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven 1996) requires further 
conceptual extensions: Alliance formation could be driven by the firm’s strategic 
vulnerable position in need for additional resources or the strong position with the 
resources available to attract, know and engage partners. 
Therefore, the future research agenda centers on the analysis and measurement of the 
capability to detect, develop, integrate, and transfer knowledge across different 
network participants. Early empirical investigations on the relational capabilities show 
that their conceptualizations merit further research: Theoretical constructs cover the 
ability to absorb competencies from others (Cohen and Levinthal 1990), to combine 
and coordinate technical dimensions of a large population of firms (Kogut and Zander 
1992), to ‘architecturally’ combine existing competencies in order to generate new 
knowledge (Henderson and Cockburn 1994). 
How do resources including the capability to manage a portfolio of cooperative 
relationships develop within focal firm boundaries? 
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To what extent are capabilities leveraged by the external cooperation with other firms 
or internalized by learning? 
Across a network of partnerships, what factors determine the focal company learning? 
How does quality of operational coordination, functional dedication, intensity of 
partnerships and overall network structure effect firm-level learning? 
After internalization of learning, what feedback mechanisms exist for alliance network 
objectives, subsequent alliance formation and evolution across the entire existing 
portfolio? 
(3) Linkage to competitive advantage: Empirical literature on interfirm alliances has 
highlighted the importance of a firm’s relational capability but has failed to establish 
the link to achieving a sustainable competitive position in full consideration of the 
entire set of relationships (Gulati 1998; Lorenzoni and Lipparini 1999). 
Can both the alliance network and focal company resource evolution be linked to 
performance indicators? If that is the case, what factors determine the performance of 
the alliance networks and can their contribution be differentiated from other sources 
of value creation? 
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2 Case studies and analyses 
This section on case studies and analyses focuses on this study’s research design, case 
study descriptions and analyses. Research design description elaborates on the 
grounded theory approach, which uses qualitative and quantitative data to extend 
emerging theoretical concepts. Extensions depend on the contributions of tentative 
propositions, which suggest new relationships between theoretical constructs. These 
tentative propositions are drawn from case study observations through multiple data 
review iterations. 
Case studies in this dissertation study are drawn from information technology, fixed-
line telecommunication and Internet/mobile service industries. The cases of Intel 
Capital and Sun Microsystems/DLR represent examples of alliance networks for 
business development in the information technology industry. Although both alliance 
networks differ in their maturity, alliance relationships in both cases intend to support 
initial development stages of emerging new technology based firms through financial 
investments and technical support. At the center of a network of fixed-line 
telecommunications providers, Elisa Kommunikation and Tropolys focus on alliance 
network formation to generate economies of scale. Although market liberalization has 
given emerging city carriers the opportunity to provide alternative home access lines in 
Germany, decreasing prices and underestimated investments have made consolidation 
of cost structures a vital requirement. The network formed by Elisa Kommunikation 
and Tropolys organizes a joint path towards best practices, tighter cost structures and 
unified marketing approaches. MSN, Lycos Mobile, E-plus and Sonera Zed provide 
innovative online Internet and mobile services with the help of alliance partners. As 
services are developed and deployed through web of partners, customer feedback is 
continuously utilized to sort out attractive service offerings, which has subsequent and 
immediate feedback on alliance network structures. All four online cases are 
influenced by the changing and uncertain customer preferences, which impose 
significant challenges for the flexibility of cooperative structures. 
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2.1 Research design and method 
This dissertation study focuses on theory building in the area of firm resources and 
alliance networks from the perspective of the integrating focal firm or actor. By 
selecting this specific empirical phenomenon, this research project aims at extending 
existing theory on strategic networks and a resource-based view of the firm through 
novel hypotheses. Both the empirical phenomenon studied and the nature of the 
theoretical contribution define the requirements of an appropriate research 
methodology. As this study covers both motivation and subsequent firm behavior in 
alliance formation activities on a longitudinal basis, an explorative case study 
methodology to develop grounded theory appears to be the most appropriate approach. 
The broad, but clearly defined scope of research questions and the investigation of 
current firm behavior in high technology industries also require an explorative research 
design (Yin 1994). 
In the formal description of the approach to handle and interpret qualitative data, 
Glaser and Strauss (1967) have characterized the grounded theory approach as one 
oriented towards the inductive development of theory from systematic data gathering 
and analysis. During the past decades, the general approach to qualitative data analysis 
and theory generation has been applied in disciplines outside its originating domain of 
sociology. In studies of organization and management, case study analyses cover 
macro, organizational or industry levels of analysis and can be instrumental in 
providing particular insight or in advancing theory (Locke 2001). Much of the 
theoretical focus in management and organizational research concentrates on 
substantive issues around decision-making and change. As in this dissertation study, 
grounded theory approach is very helpful for studying the evolution of alliance 
networks, since large parts of managerial decision-making are usually executed in 
complex organizational settings. In line with this thinking, scholars have frequently 
suggested that the grounded theory is particularly suitable for studying managerial and 
organizational behavior for a number of reasons (Locke 2001). 
(1) Capturing complexity: The grounded theory approach adapts flexibly to capturing 
the complexities of the alliance networks in which firm behavior unfolds. Multifaceted 
accounts across several units of analysis allow for a focus on contextual and process 
elements of the particular substantive issue at hand. 
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(2) Linking well to practice: Concentration on the substantive issues of alliance 
network management resulting in theoretical, but empirically based frameworks adds 
value to managerial implications of the phenomenon studied. With emphasis on 
pragmatic usefulness as quality criterion, grounded theory frameworks are helpful in 
bridging theory and practice, providing executives with options to identify and prepare 
for changes that might lead to higher performance. 
(3) Supporting theory development in new substantive areas: Data gathering and 
theory building orientation allow for the exploration of new substantive areas. Both the 
challenges of managing alliance networks as described in chapter 1 or effects of high 
technology application on managerial and organizational behavior (Eisenhardt and 
Bourgeois 1988; Eisenhardt 1989b) represent good examples of these emerging 
substantive areas. In the domain of strategic management research, zu Knyphausen-
Aufseß (1995) identifies an increasing popularity of rich, contextual and qualitative 
case study based research due to the increasing importance of contingency-based 
paradigms and focus on the firm as the dominant unit of analysis. 
As another example of a novel theoretical domain, management and organization 
scholars have been expressing an increasing interest in process-oriented theories. 
Researchers are describing process-oriented research in various ways – but all relating 
to one common element: time. Researchers with a strong process orientation 
(Pettigrew 1997: 338) define process as ‘a sequence of individual and collective 
events, actions and activities unfolding over time in context’. Pentland (1999) suggests 
that process research is concerned with stories as abstract conceptual models that 
explain the sequence of events. As all these understandings of processual research 
share the focus on changing managerial and organizational realities, the overriding 
objective of a ‘process analyst is to catch the reality in flight’ (Pettigrew 1997: 338). 
(Glaser and Strauss 1967) argue that the grounded theory style of research is especially 
suited to generating theories of social process.  
(4) Reviving mature theoretical areas: Grounded theory approach has been frequently 
used to introduce a new perspective to mature theoretical domains, which has the 
potential to modify already existing frameworks. Applying the perspective of network 
dynamics has the potential to extend the well-developed frameworks on dyadic 
alliance formation. Utilization of the grounded theory approach ensures that theories 
remain up to date with organizational realities they assert to explain. 
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The grounded theory approach is designed to help researchers to make the transition 
from empirical observation, to compose conceptual categories and to derive ways in 
which the categories relate to each other. When researchers in the theory-building 
mode move towards proposed relations between concepts, the plausibility of the 
theorized elements needs to be proven. The framework of conceptual categories 
achieves analytical generalization when it can plausibly account for a larger number 
and range of empirical observations. 
However, grounded theory does not specifically address the qualitative research’s data 
gathering operations. Although the sampling issues that precede data gathering are 
considered at great lengths and are central to the approach’s analytical logic, the 
mechanisms of obtaining data and composing data documents are largely ignored. 
While only limited advice is given on data gathering practices, Glaser and Strauss do 
advocate the collection of data from multiple sources that are relevant to the 
phenomenon studied.  
Covering multiple data sources potentially across several units of analysis through 
multiple iterations in the process, grounded theory approach summarized in Exhibit 
2-1 frequently draws on case studies – a research strategy that concentrates on 
dynamics presented within single settings (Eisenhardt 1989a). The objects to be 
studied can range from single or several organizations, one or more organizational sub-
units to particular organizational practices such as decision-making. 
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Exhibit 2-1 Overview: Ground theory building from case study research 
adapted from Eisenhardt (1989a) 
Since the case studies chosen by the researcher are considered an investigative object, 
issues of sampling are of major importance to this approach. The choice of cases 
reflects purposeful sampling that provides the opportunity to learn a substantial amount 
central to the research. In the process of selecting information-rich cases, several 
approaches such as sampling of deviant cases, sampling for maximum variation or 
sampling for a specific criterion may be useful (Yin 1994). The case study approach 
does not favor either qualitative or quantitative information, but seems to share the 
practice of producing first-hand and fact-based accounts of its units of analysis 
(Eisenhardt 1989a). So far, only limited and loosely integrated empirical work has 
studied and defined the network structure with which to study alliances. As examples, 
alliance networks have been investigated as previous ties (Gulati 1995b), director 
interlocks (Mizruchi 1992), structural holes (Burt 1992), and technology similarity 
(Stuart 1998). Empirical studies of alliance networks in particular industries have 
focused on the automotive (Dyer 1996), biotechnology (Powell, Koput et al. 1996) and 
computer workstation industry (Gomes-Casseres 1996). 
Guided by research questions, the grounded theory approach is committed to 
emerging research and the discovery through directly contacting units of analysis 
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coupled with a rejection of a-priori theorizing. Glaser and Strauss (1967) argue 
vehemently for the rejection of preconceived theories, because these theories have the 
effect of obstructing the development of novel theory by intervening between the 
researcher and the subject. However, case study research should embark on its studies 
with the general guidance provided by some type of orienting theoretical perspective. 
Therefore, grounded theory makes the assumption that researchers are clear as to their 
purpose for the study, the issues to illuminate, and perhaps the practices it might 
influence. In summary, the grounded theory approach assumes that researchers have 
defined their research question. In this study, the analysis research review in chapter 1 
provides the required guidance through clearly defined research questions and some 
preconceived constructs to data gathering and analysis. 
Case selection: Sampling data is an issue throughout the study, as in-process 
analytical categories and preliminary theoretical frameworks directly and iteratively 
shape further sampling activity. In the sense of being integrated in various forms of 
analytical processes, grounded theory sampling is described as being theoretically 
driven. In active search for sampling data, theoretical sampling represents one of the 
foundational processes of this research style that provides the best possible information 
for theorizing a substantive empirical phenomenon (Glaser and Strauss 1967). 
Therefore, sampling in this study is guided by the rationale of gathering information 
that will best develop the theoretical framework and has followed an iterative flexible 
process. Following this process, flexible data gathering in terms of flexible selection of 
case study companies supports the category development to the point of theoretical 
saturation and a stable theoretical framework. 
Although statistical generalization and representation of an entire population are not 
required for case study based research, the number of case studies has an effect on the 
opportunity to generalize from empirical findings. Eisenhardt (1989a) recommends 
four to ten case studies to develop a theory of certain complexity with a convincing 
empirical basis. Doz, Olk and Ring (2000) suggest that a small number of case studies 
is ideally suited to identify emergent processes of alliance network formation and their 
relationships to idiosyncratic outcomes. Given the resource constraints of every study, 
the trade-off between the number of cases and the degree of detail in each case study 
description has been decided in favor of presenting exhaustive information for all units 
of analysis. Eisenhardt (1989a) recommends selecting contrasting case study examples 
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that enable a good description and multiple perspectives on the empirical phenomenon, 
which allow for high potential of meaningful analyses. 
Pettigrew (1990) has also argued for providing a rich context, which has the capability 
of exploring the embeddedness and temporal interconnectedness of longitudinal 
change processes on the alliance network and firm level. He further suggests a 
selection of case studies that promises high levels of proficiency of the studied 
phenomenon. Consequently, firms in both the information technology and 
telecommunications industries have been selected as case study objects. Proficiency in 
forming and managing a portfolio of alliances – common for firms in both sectors – 
generates rich findings on interorganizational collaboration and its subsequent 
evolution due to several reasons: First, firms in both industries face intense 
competition and increasing innovation rates, which generates the need for alliance 
formation. Second, the established interfirm partnerships are of strategic relevance for 
all firms due to increasing requirements for collaborative product development with 
ever shorter time-to-market cycles. 
Within firms of both sectors, different levels of experience in alliance formation, the 
maturity in partnership portfolios and differing business scopes (Exhibit 2-2) generate 
the necessary variation in the sample to derive relationship between emerging 
conceptual categories. 
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Member Executive Board & 
Project Managers
Alliance for technology, content 
and co-marketing 
Company Primary Interviewee (s) Business context
Member Global Visioneer
Council & Project Manager Business incubation for seed start-ups
Manager Venturing/Partnering Launch of i-mode mobile data portal for information and entertainment
Member Executive Board
Investments in regional 
fixed-line city carrier operations
Director Lycos mobile Launch of mobile information channel
Managing Director Launch of mobile services for young user group
Intel Capital Investment Manager Intel Capital investments in Europe
 
Exhibit 2-2 Overview: Case studies and business contexts 
In general, the selection of appropriate additional case study firms which are different 
as well as similar to ones already sampled help in the theory development process 
through a number of mechanisms: 
(1) The analytical process is facilitated by comparing particular features across many 
groups, which increases the awareness for the extent that behaviors under scrutiny are 
similar or different. 
(2) By investigating not only comparative firms but also comparative situations, 
analytical results can uncover how conceptual categories or properties might be 
affected by different conditions. 
(3) Sampling different and similar firms and situations will collect enough information 
to stabilize and saturate conceptual categories in the developing theoretical framework. 
(4) Sampling across diverse groups and situations outlines the boundaries and 
applicability of the theory. 
In the data gathering and interview phase, the information base in this study draws 
on two instruments: archival documents and semi-structured interviews. Providing a 
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variety of perspectives from which to understand a potential conceptual category, the 
utilization of both archival documents and face-to-face interviews enables the 
triangulation of information by depending on the specific advantages of each 
instrument. To increase the reliability of the data, interview results were compared to 
archival data such as press clippings and annual reports. Although not eliminating the 
possibility of a bias, secondary sources lend credence to the interview data’s accuracy 
in describing alliance network formation processes and focal company resources. 
Although retrospective data suffers from the biases in the recollection of company 
executives, comparing multiple qualitative data sources (refer to Exhibit 2-3 for an 
overview) ensures the substance of finding, the validity of developing constructs and 
the generalization of propositions. The archival sources in this study include annual 
reports, articles from business and trade press, and internal documents such as 
presentations and available press releases. Although the amount and relevancy of the 
documents varies from case study to case study, archival sources in their 
comprehensive description have proven to reduce interviewer bias. Based on the 
complexity of studied phenomenon and the availability of secondary sources, a fixed 
number of interviews with case study companies has been requested. 
All interviews, which lasted between 2 and 4 hours, have followed a semi-structured 
interview guide, which facilitates comparison and gives respondents enough flexibility 
to elaborate on the specific areas. In order to collect data on alliance formation 
processes from a focal company perspective, this study surveyed managers involved in 
the historic development of partnership structures. Thus, the data are retrospective and 
have the limitations inherent in such surveys.  
Although the exploratory nature of grounded theory research questions does not allow 
for a focus on specific variables at the beginning of the research effort, the 
complexities of alliance formation on a longitudinal basis and interaction effects with 
focal company resources demand a very targeted and focused approach for interview 
data gathering. To limit the overwhelming volume of data, scholars have also used 
prior specifications of existing theory to narrow and direct the analysis. In a similar 
approach, Eisenhardt and Bourgeois (1988) have also applied a number of constructs 
from literature on decision-making into their research sites, measuring them in 
interview protocols and questionnaires. On the other side, Pettigrew (1990) suggests a 
broad exploration of multiple contexts – namely economic, structural, cultural and 
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political environments – to fully account for and analyze multifaceted processes of 
changes with feedback loops. 
In balancing these two conflicting requirements, the interview questionnaire explores 
the research questions outlined in chapter 1. On the research issue of ‘evolution of 
inter-firm alliance networks’, the process of developing an entire alliance portfolio 
around focal case study firm within the described business contexts has been explored: 
Name of alliance partners, functional dedications of partnerships, nature of resource 
exchange, intensity of relationships, formalization of contractual arrangements, 
redundancy in the alliance network and transitional activities to provide the wider 
context. In the following description of case studies, findings in this area are described 
in two sections: Whereas the section ‘Network structure’ describes the staged and 
sequenced evolution of alliance network structures from an outside perspective 
according to the criteria mentioned above, the section ‘Network adjustment’ covers 
transitional activities between network stages. Findings on transitional activities 
include lead generation for additional partnership opportunities, firms’ due diligence 
processes and criteria, involvement of functional departments as well as network 
firms’ internal transition towards a higher operational integration. 
On the research issue of ‘resource exchange and combination in alliance networks’, the 
interview guide has helped to explore issues of operational coordination and changing 
levels of focal company resources. The nature and quality of operational coordination 
is captured in partners’ similarity of views, focal firm’s dominance and the level of 
conflict regarding certain alliance management issues in the network. Covered alliance 
management issues include overall network goals, targeted network structure, selection 
of future network companies, divestiture of current network companies, probability of 
consortiums success, financial contribution by the focal company, technical 
contribution by the focal company, annual budget levels, appointment of top alliance 
executives, employee/staffing procedures, product development agenda, technology 
transfer policies and market/business development agenda. In more detail, support 
processes to manage alliance conflicts, share knowledge and access partnership 
relevant knowledge have been discussed with management of case study companies to 
complement the perspective on operational and daily coordination. Findings on these 
aspects in the later case study descriptions are covered in the section of ‘Operational 
coordination’. Changing levels of focal company resources with reference to the earlier 
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described and defined stages of alliance network evolution have been explored for all 
case study firms along financial, technological, physical, managerial, human, 
organizational dimensions. However, interview respondents in all case have used own 
qualitative categories appropriate to their case study setting to describe the evolution of 
focal firm resources. Study results on this topic are described in the section ‘Initial 
resource base and development’. 
On the remaining research issue of ‘linkage to competitive advantage’, case study 
firms have provided information on their performance matrices used to assess the 
performance of either an individual alliance or the entire network of partnerships. 
Discussed performance matrices qualitatively assess the overall network performance, 
financial indicators (profit and loss statements, absolute sales, sales increases, market 
share developments), cost reductions (in technical research and development, human 
resources and people development, training), project result improvements (quality and 
timeliness of joint product development, establishment of industry standards) or 
company resource improvements (focal firm’s technical research and development, 
corporate culture, alliance management capabilities) and quality and quantity of 
communication within the alliance network. Besides this multi-factor qualitative 
assessment, quantitative information on the total number of companies, the personnel 
employed in the alliance network and number of products launched have been 
requested, but only the first indicator has generally been available for the case study 
firm. However, due to the diversity of business contexts, firm sizes, time horizons in 
alliance evolution, performance indicators in this study have proved to be very difficult 
to compare between all cases. 
Although emerging strategic moves (Mintzberg and Waters 1985) and changes in 
organizational structures (Miller and Friesen 1982) can be better explored in a 
longitudinal research setting, continuous records of alliance network changes are often 
hard to collect and methods for using longitudinal data are quite complex (Tsai 2000). 
As an additional complication, networks are dynamic structures, which are influenced 
by the alliance structure of prior and current partnerships. When observed in a 
longitudinal analysis, the formation of new partnerships as an example for embedded 
organizational behavior changes the network structure that had an effect on their 
creation. The considerable degree of complexity requires clear focus on and definition 
of empirical phenomenon, especially for the alliance as important unit of analysis: 
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Strategic alliances are partnerships among firms in order to attain specific strategic 
objectives (Berg, Duncan and Friedman 1982; Killing 1983). However, partnerships 
can be driven by a variety of motives and goals, manifest in the range of governance 
forms across vertical and horizontal boundaries. Consequently, alliances have also 
been described by the concept of sharing control and benefits between participants 
(Badaracco 1991; Chi 1994; Gomes-Casseres 1996) and classified on a spectrum 
between short-term contracts and equity investments (Contractor and Lorange 1988). 
Over the evolution of alliance research, the focus of early empirical studies on the 
formation of alliance has been expanded from joint ventures involving shared equity to 
alternative forms such as marketing arrangements, R&D partnerships or licensing. To 
provide a reliable reference point for all interviewees, strategic alliances is this study 
are defined by “voluntary arrangements betweens firms involving exchange, sharing 
and co-development of products, technologies and services”(Gulati 1998) and are 
assumed to be of major importance for resource exchange and performance. 
To further limit the complexity in the data-gathering phase, this study purposely 
focuses only on the firm’s egocentric network, which directly influences the flow of 
resources across interorganizational boundaries. This egocentric network of firms 
consists of a set of direct, dyadic partnerships and relationships between these ties with 
the firm at the center of the network as the focal actor. This type of network 
perspective excludes the indirect or secondary ties to which the firm is connected 
through its direct partnerships. In line with this approach, Ahuja (2000a) found in a 
recent study that indirect or secondary ties only marginally contribute to performance, 
compared to their direct counterparts. 
For the purposes of examining interorganizational egocentric networks, this study 
differentiates tie strength by the frequency of interaction between partners and their 
level of resource commitment to the relationships (Rowley, Behrens et al. 2000). 
Strong alliances such as equity arrangements, manufacturing arrangements or joint 
R&D projects are broader and deeper in terms of the investment and interaction than 
marketing joint ventures and technology licensing, which require less coordination and 
understanding of partners’ organizations. 
Senior level interviewees as interview respondents are all highly involved in the 
formation and ongoing management of cooperative relationships. All conversations 
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were conducted in ‘face-to-face’ meetings in English or German, taped and later 
transcribed. Taping interview content gives the interviewer the advantage of 
concentrating his or her full attention on the conversation and extending the scope of 
interest where necessary. All interview respondents have been given ample opportunity 
to review interview transcripts to increase internal validity and reliability. Changes, 
additions and clarifications have been requested only in one case with direct changes in 
the transcript file. All interview transcripts are included in the case study database. 
Company Primary Interviewee (s) Pri-
mary
Member Global Visioneer
Council & Project Manager 2
Manager Venturing/Partnering 1
Member Executive Board 1
Member Executive Board & 
Project Manager 3
Vice President & 
Director Lycos mobile 1
Managing Director 1
Intel Capital Investment Manager 2
Secon-
dary
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
Press
research 
pages
100
120
50
10
230
70
150
Annual
report
?
?
?
?
Interviews
Total 17 730
 
Exhibit 2-3 Overview: Case studies and database content 
In the subsequent data analysis phase, emerging concepts organize the world 
described in data documents, observations or interviews by highlighting what things go 
together and what things are distinct from each other. The descriptive world captured 
in primary and secondary interviews and archival documents is transformed into an 
organization, a shape and general coherence that can only be achieved through the act 
of conceptualization. Aimed at understanding a particular substantive problem, these 
concepts are developed to account for perceived patterns in the data sets and to assign 
a common ‘meaning’ to a set of empirical observations. 
To stay close to the context under investigation and fully inform the 
conceptualizations, all preconceived notions, expectations and previous theorizing 
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should be suspended. Brainstorming on possible interpretations ensures a broad scope 
of suitable meanings for the specific observation. Subsequent comparing ensures the 
development of a common name for multiple data observations and promotes the 
creation of more general conceptual categories. It also clarifies and sharpens the 
conceptual categories in their interpretation of the data. In the review process of similar 
and different data, incidents as well as respective categories clarify uniformity and 
stability in the data. The comparative process refines and even discards conceptual 
categories, and helps to develop the robustness of the categories with clear properties 
and a limited dependency of other conditions. This process reaches a stage of 
theoretical saturation, when subsequent data observations provide no new information, 
either in terms of refining the categories, its properties or its relationships to other 
categories. 
To handle the diversity, complexity and volume of the data set especially in this 
longitudinal research setting (Van de Ven and Huber 1990), each case study is 
concluded by within-case study analyses. This type of analysis identifies relevant 
conceptual categories for alliance formation, evolution and resource adaptations. Later, 
cross-case analysis is used for the identification of similarities and differences in the 
data set within the previously identified categories. Together with within and cross 
case analyses, drafts of conceptual categories are integrated with all their data 
properties and dimensions. Core and central conceptual categories are then analyzed in 
their relationships and arranged in a consolidated draft theoretical framework. 
With developed content categories and composed theoretical formulations, developed 
hypotheses define boundaries and components of the theoretical framework to clarify 
the meaning of an underlying empirical phenomenon. This comparative process draws 
up the boundaries of the theory development on two levels: on the level of broader 
theoretical framework and on the level of content categories derived from data 
observations. At this stage, highly developed content categories with their properties 
and dimensions seem to account for the data observations indicating that concept. In 
parallel, conceptual reduction on the level of theoretical framework facilitates the focus 
on particularly important aspects of the analyzed phenomenon. Also on the level of the 
conceptual categories, further delimiting ensures the commitment to describe specific 
relevant relationships with the help of robust and relevant categories. In this process, 
earlier naming and comparing results that prove irrelevant in some conceptual 
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categories can be excluded from the final conceptual framework. With the 
understanding that all fragments of the data can be reflected in the conceptual 
framework, theory development as an emergent process can always be taken further. 
However, when substantive explanatory value for the empirical phenomenon has been 
reached, analysis can be concluded with a theoretical framework of both relevant and 
robust conceptual categories. In a final step, theory with focus on important categories 
and relationships will be presented in written format, which guides through the 
extension of discovered categories to higher levels of abstraction, their arrangement 
and relationship to each other. 
Basic analytical guidelines support the development of the theoretical framework: The 
egocentric alliance network as an integral component of this study requires two levels 
of analysis – the network dyads and their compilation into a larger network. 
Simultaneous analysis of both levels explores evolution in the dyadic partnerships and 
its effects on the aggregated network. In addition to these network level effects, 
developing focal firms’ resources supplement substantial co-evolution or feedback 
mechanisms: Co-evolution is set in motion when resource needs require networks to 
adapt, because network adaptation then reduces resource needs, which consequently 
increases the firm’s chances of successfully progressing to more advanced stages. As 
the firm reviews and adapts its network to meet changing requirements, the firm will 
be better positioned to obtain additional resources and asset stocks for continued 
growth. Therefore, resource needs may not only have an effect on network evolution 
but also on future resource needs. 
As the final stage in the research process, literature review concludes with the 
comparison of case study findings with the body of alliance literature. Informed by 
both a review and a discussion, theory building depends on the comparison of tentative 
propositions with existing literature. In this study, theoretical perspectives and findings 
from the resource-based view of the firm and network theory are contrasted with the 
set of tentative propositions and case study findings. Theoretical concepts help to 
substantiate tentative propositions and important contributions are integrated in a final 
set of propositions. 
In evaluating the quality of the developed theoretical framework, Eisenhardt (1989a) 
argues that there are no generally accepted guidelines for assessment of theory building 
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research. Initially, Glaser and Strauss (1965) have offered two terms in the assessment 
of the overall soundness of the theoretical framework: ‘Pragmatically useful’ and 
‘credibility’. 
Reflecting its pragmatic approach, grounded theory results have to fulfill the 
requirement of having practical utility in the course of daily events. Following this 
perspective, grounded theory is tested ‘on the ground’. Glaser and Strauss assess the 
value of the developed theoretical framework using four terms: ‘fit’, ‘understandable’, 
‘general’ and ‘control’. The framework must fit the situation at the center of the 
researched phenomenon by being compatible with empirical data and needs at the 
same time to be readily apprehensible. General theoretical frameworks are relevant to a 
number of different conditions and situations in the practice setting. A good theoretical 
framework also provides the person using it with a degree of control over every day 
issues. These four criteria underline the close relationship between the developed 
conceptual framework and the social situation analyzed. 
Credibility as the second term mainly refers to the research practices during the 
analytical process and can be achieved through sound theoretical sampling of 
comparison groups and a variety of data in order to extend the general applicability or 
analytical generalization of the theory. Yin (1994) has detailed these requirements into 
construct validity, internal validity, external validity and reliability. The research 
design of this study has fulfilled these requirements extensively. Construct validity has 
been ensured through triangulation of data sources. Rich case study descriptions 
provide enough empirical evidence for each construct to allow independent assessment 
of the fit with the theory. Although thorough reporting of information shows 
confidence in the validity of the developed framework, even theory building research 
can hardly achieve a perfect fit with the data. Multiple feedback loops in data gathering 
and analysis increase internal validity. Reliability has been addressed by fulfilling very 
strict documentation and transcription standards. External validity referring to aspects 
of generalization of developed theory is not of integral importance to case study-based 
research. Case studies help generalize empirical results into testable propositions, but 
not represent a sample of an entire population. Therefore, the derived propositions 
contribute to development and their analytical generalization of theories, but cannot 
make assertions on statistical frequencies of entire populations. 
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2.2 Alliance networks for the development of new technology based firms in 
information technology industries 
After stages of extremely high industry growth, information technology providers need 
to remain continuously active in developing new business opportunities. Intel Capital 
and Sun Microsystems/DLR develop new technology-based firms to access business 
opportunities, which in total improve the decreasing margins of their traditional core 
business. 
2.2.1 Industry context 
During the late 1990s, the deployment of information and communication technology 
has made significant contributions to the productivity growth. Despite sharp decline in 
technology shares and demand in technology equipment industry since the late 2000, 
the outlook for the industry remains favorable, as service and product innovations such 
as broadband data transmission continue to drive demand from firms, households and 
governments. Therefore, the economic activity of telecommunications and information 
technology firms accounts for a growing share of manufacturing, employment and 
trade (OECD 2002). 
Technically and economically converging industries of telecommunications services, 
telecommunications equipment, information technology hardware, information 
technology software and audiovisual services (TV, video, cinema) underline their 
relevance with growing market volumes: In the year 2001, market volumes for all five 
segments accounted for a total of € 2,587 billion, which has increased by 13% annually 
since 1995. All industry segments represent 8.6 % of the global gross national product 
– a strong increase from 4.6 % in the year 1995 (Idate 2001). Western European 
market volumes based on regional consumption have grown from € 451.2 billion in 
1995 to € 669 billion in 2001 at an average annual rate of 7%. 
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IT Hardware [Bil. €]  220.0     343.6     367.7     392.4    
Audiovisual services [Bil. €]  167.0     200.3     210.3     220.8    
CAGR and Annual growth rate [%] 15% 9% 9%
1995 1999 2000 2001
 
Exhibit 2-4 Market volumes: Global telecommunication, information, 
media and entertainment industries [Bil. €] (Idate 2001) 
In Germany, the total of all market segments has grown from € 94.2 billion in 1995 to 
€ 134.6 billon in 2001 at compound annual average growth rate of 6%. The combined 
market segments of information technology hardware and software currently expect a 
modest growth of 1 and 2 percent (EITO 2002). Whereas market segments for 
information technology hardware will have to face an expected decline of 6.8 and 1.5 
percent in 2002 and 2003, software products and information technology services 
reverse this trend with growth rates between 2 and 5 percent over the same time 
period. From an economic perspective, service investments in packaged software and 
software related services rank among the most rapidly growing sectors with strong 
increases in value added, employment and R&D-investments. Integration, 
interconnection and compatibility are of major importance. Network computing and 
the availability of the Internet facilitate novel software supply strategies by application 
service providers, also driven by outsourcing activities adopted by user firms of all 
sizes (OECD 2002). Under the term digital convergence, the deployment of digital 
technology has led to the synthesis of telecommunications and information technology. 
Typical for industries with high uncertainty and absence of rules, the forms of digital 
convergence follow constant changes. Digital convergence allows for interactivity, 
integration of media types and access to dispersed source of information over wide-
area networks. Wide-area network integrate the data transmission over wireless, cable 
TV or fixed-line telecommunications infrastructures. 
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With new data transmission channels being available and innovations supported by 
information technology, separated applications will increasingly communicate directly 
with each other: The Internet, increasingly used as a vital infrastructure for 
communication, collaboration and information sharing, contributes to efficiency 
improvements and productivity gains. More widely available computing power and 
information transfer capacity shift the dominant model of information exchange 
towards a decentralized and equally distributed model. Open source software 
development, Internet protocol version 6, wireless and peer-to-peer services are 
examples for a shift in the structure and nature of information exchange. Emerging 
decentralized information flows have only begun to profoundly effect established 
structures. Although many of theses Internet based innovations have been discontinued 
in the stock market meltdown, the volume in electronic commerce transactions – 
although less than initially projected – is increasing gradually: Internet-based sales and 
purchases so far are concentrated on a few industry sectors, where the nature of 
economic activities in these sectors strongly determine characteristics of Internet 
transactions. Major concerns are related to the security in handling payments, the 
uncertainty over contracts, the variety of technical standards and the insufficient 
customer base. Innovative software products for payment, security and verification of 
electronic commerce enhance and upgrade these Internet-based services. 
With most of technology knowledge residing in software, information technology 
hardware for storing and processing digitized content will reach commoditization in 
the near future. Historically high growth rates in information hardware technology 
markets results from technological advances in components such as microprocessors, 
memory, and storage devices rather than from operational changes undertaken by 
hardware manufacturers. These technical improvements can be traced back to the 
simplification of computer architectures and the standardization of components. 
Design simplification, the integration of many analog and digital components into a 
few standardized semiconductors, and higher levels of outsourcing have increased the 
productivity of information technology manufacturers. 
On the supplier side and in particular the semiconductor industry, productivity 
increases have resulted from acceleration in the performance of sold microprocessors. 
Shortened time cycle of Moore’s Law, which originally assumes a doubling of 
transistors on single chip only every 18 months, has led to an increasingly frequent 
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release of affordable chip generations recently and moved the average chip 
performance closer to that of the most cutting-edge ones (Yoffie 1996; Cho 2002). 
Earlier in 1995, microprocessor companies have decided to improve their 
manufacturing processes by exploiting technological advances in manufacturing 
equipment, simulation, and wafer inspection that reduce the number of production runs 
needed to get to a marketable yield. As the production of microprocessors is highly 
sensitive to environmental disruptions, flaws in chip design, and mistakes in the 
fabrication process, improvements in manufacturing processes allow semiconductor 
manufacturers to earlier reach profitable scale. 
Increasing demand for more powerful computers driven by advances in semiconductor 
components represents an important factor for market volume growth. Accelerating 
memory and speed requirements of new application software and of Microsoft’s 
Windows operating systems have raised the frequency of computer upgrades. 
Increasing competition in the supplier markets for memory chips have resulted in rapid 
price declines and upgrades in the amount of memory on more powerful computers. 
Only a smaller fraction of market growth can be traced back to extraordinary events 
such as Year 2000 investments, the growing penetration of personal computers driven 
by Internet access and the creation of corporate networking infrastructures. At this 
stage, fewer software upgrades and the near saturation in PC markets can be identified 
as major causes for declining market volumes in information technology hardware. 
Demand stagnation and reduction in turn leads to strong competitive behavior in both 
information technology hardware and the semiconductor industry. 
Increased competitive behavior between participants in the information technology 
industry can be understood as an attempt to reallocate market shares. In a first step, 
stagnant demand mandated to strong declines in information technology prices. As an 
example, gross profit margins for personal computer manufacturers fell from an 
average of 25.6% in 1998 to 20.9% in 2001, which has created an enormous pressure 
to reduce costs (Dedrick and Kraemer 2002). Although increased rate of innovation in 
key components as described above softens the price impact with extended product 
values, cost pressures triggered significant changes in firm and industry structure.  
Decreasing contribution margins and growing product complexity triggered the 
emergence of the direct sales, build-to-order manufacturing. Under this business 
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model, IT hardware manufacturers especially for personal computer systems assemble 
systems as orders come in, usually allowing customers to choose from a set of 
configurations on basic models, and ship the product directly to the customer without 
the involvement of distributors and retailers. Across the information technology 
industry, business processes were fundamentally altered by the shift from traditional 
supply-driven to this new demand-driven production. As accelerating innovation 
cycles result in rapid product depreciation, these capabilities proved critical, and the 
direct vendors’ market share grew steadily at the expense of traditional indirect 
vendors. At the industry level, build-to-order manufacturing has created a modular 
production and distribution network. For individual information technology providers, 
modular production provides more flexibility in tailoring value chains for different 
products and markets. Interorganizational information networks based on the Internet 
or EDI have played a critical role in the aligning complex business processes across 
company boundaries and along the entire industry value chain. As companies apply 
information technology to develop interorganizational efficient electronic linkages 
with external parties beyond those of earlier proprietary systems, the ubiquity of the 
Internet lowered the cost of interfirm partnerships, which impacts their organizational 
structure. The modular nature of the information technology manufacturing facilitated 
the creation of an industry structure that can be characterized by high degree of 
specialization and separation of functions. Originally, this industry paradigm was 
formed by IBM’s decision to utilize outside suppliers for most of the parts in its 
original PC in 1981. Firms generally compete in selected horizontal value chain 
segments from component manufacturing to technical support (Grove 1996). 
Competition behavior was amplified in 2000-2001, when continuing price wars and a 
precipitous drop in demand staggered the whole industry. As a result, information 
build-to-order technology provider Dell gained market share and became the number 
one personal computer manufacturer in the world in 2001, but saw its profit margins 
and return on equity decline. Other PC makers reported losses and number two PC 
supplier Compaq merged with number three HP in 2002. Meanwhile, Intel and 
Microsoft were able to sustain pricing power and gain an ever-greater share of the 
industry’s total profits. 
As outcome of this industry transition, information technology hardware providers 
reassess their core capabilities: Manufacturing has been the important competency in 
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the past, but managing a portfolio of products and services delivered to the end 
customer is of major importance in the future. Besides managing a network of 
partnerships, information technology hardware manufacturer continuously maintain 
and strengthen the customer relationship. 
As innovation remains an important driver of change and creates new markets, 
incumbent firms in both telecom and information technology sectors have been 
actively involved in market development activities. As required technological and 
managerial competencies are broadly distributed as described above, strategic 
alliances, joint venture and acquisitions focus on reducing know-how insufficiency. 
Technology-oriented M&A and strategic alliances in these industries are mainly driven 
by fast technological change and shortening product life cycles. In addition, increasing 
price competition and the threat of commoditization have motivated vertical alliance 
activity. In an initiative to explore new market potentials, telecommunications service 
providers, IT hardware manufacturers and media companies have engaged vertical 
alliances to ensure traffic for network, utilization of computing power and distribution 
of content. Through technology-oriented M&A and alliances, firms in these sectors 
explore emerging technologies such as IP networking, radio and optical 
communications and broadband data transmission and prepare the market launch 
(OECD 2002). Supporting the establishment of new technologies, especially American 
companies are actively involved in driving the proliferation of so-called ‘de facto’ 
standards, which are created by industry leaders, forums or groups instead of 
institutionalized standardization organizations. These standards for transmission, 
encoding, compression and storage can be established quicker and more efficiently 
than traditional standards originally set by telecommunications companies. The 
establishment of universal standards represents an important step for market 
penetration of multimedia applications. In addition, electronic commerce transactions 
also require a legal framework for regulation on content, security, electronic payments, 
electronic signatures and multimedia copyright selection (Gerpott and Heil 1996). 
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2.2.2 Intel Capital Europe Middle East Africa (EMEA) 
In its long history, Intel Capital’s corporate venture capital program has developed 
clearly defined alliance relationships to its equity investments that follow predefined 
frameworks. Among others, these frameworks and guidelines for Intel’s corporate 
venture capital investments regulate the level of management involvement, technical 
support and financial investment. Clearly defined relationships help to manage 
expectations and limit the required management attention. 
Business Background: 
Intel’s long-term experience in corporate venture capital activities 
Intel’s strategic investment program – initially described as Corporate Business 
Development and founded in 1991 – focuses on equity investments and acquisitions in 
new technology-based firms (NTBFs) (Hurley 2000). From 1999 to 2001, Intel 
Capital’s equity portfolio of $ 3 billion (Brull 2001) was invested in 600 companies 
worldwide. Meanwhile, portfolio gains in 2000 soared to $ 3.76 billion from $ 883 
billion in 1999 contributing nearly one third to Intel’s 2000 earnings of $ 12.1 billion. 
In the 2001 valuation meltdown of NASDAQ shares, Intel Capital’s value of over 475 
portfolio companies decreased from $ 10.8 billion in 2000 to $ 1.5 billion as of June 
30, 2002. Intel Capital typically invests in private companies and typically follows 
them to successful initial public offerings or trade sales. As part of careful management 
of a large portfolio, equity holdings are reduced in some companies over time to 
recoup capital for new investments. However, strategic activities may continue with 
the company after its sale (Intel Capital 2002b). 
Since pure maximization of financial returns is not the primary goal, Intel Capital’s 
main motivation for developing a technology equity portfolio is driven by the goal of 
rapid access to and establishment of innovative technology as well as to help develop 
‘eco-systems’ for Intel products. Developing innovative technology supports the 
establishment of industry standards, drives Internet infrastructure growth and advances 
computing platforms in support of Intel’s strategic interests (Intel Capital 2002b). 
Fulfilling strategic interests finally creates and expands markets for hardware, software 
and services based on Intel technology. Other environmental factors such as coping 
with increasing competitive intensity or achieving economies of scale have only minor 
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influence on investment decision or alliance formation with the new technology-based 
firm (NTBF). 
Integrated in business units’ technical strategy (Wong 2001) and based on the 
technology area, both the Intel research council and Intel Capital determine time-to-
market lags and development and assign responsibilities and business activities (Lai 
2001). 
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Exhibit 2-5 Intel Capital: Responsibilities by technology area and time 
horizon (Wong 2001) 
Depending on the technology area, Intel creates a market ecosystem from end-to-end 
to set standards and optimize the performance of Intel hardware. Ecosystem 
development certainly calls for systematic and extensive investment decisions based 
on a clear definition of technology roadmaps: 
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"You can hardly see an Intel business initiative without an investment 
component […] We're working to create a market ecosystem from end-
to-end, to accelerate its development." 
(Leslie L. Vadasz, President, Intel Capital & Executive Vice President 
Intel, in (Brull 2001)) 
Investment and technology areas range from Internet infrastructure, Internet content 
services to global adoption of the Internet. The area ‘Internet infrastructure’ includes 
client/server products and technology, networking, and communications as well as 
design and manufacturing technology (Intel Capital 2002b). 
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Exhibit 2-6 Intel Capital: Investment and technology areas (Intel Capital 
2002b) 
In addition to Intel Capital’s core financial resources, the Intel 64 fund for solutions on 
Itanium-based servers and the Intel Communications Fund add to the basic financial 
strength (Hurley 2000). The Intel 64 Fund invests in workstation solutions such as 
Internet infrastructure, supply chain management and enterprise resource planning. 
Total funding coordinated by Intel Capital has been provided by co-investments from 
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Compaq, Dell, Hewlett-Packard, Intel, NEC and SGI. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter 
manages other investors from the financial, retail, aerospace, automotive, 
pharmaceutical and media industries. Since 1999, the Intel Communications Fund has 
been investing in technology companies that develop innovative networking and 
communications solutions. Networking and communications solutions utilize Intel’s 
Exchange Architecture, CT Media telephony server, personal Internet client 
architecture and Xscale microarchitecture. 
Intel Capital investments in emerging areas such as the bluetooth wireless protocol are 
regarded as clear commitments to certain technology standards or exchange protocols. 
In a specific case, technical developments have to extend current Intel standards such 
as Intel 802.11 wireless LAN system into new application areas (Nelson 2001). Similar 
patterns can be detected in Intel Capital’s investment in IEEE-1394 Fire Wire 
technology ventures – a technology that initially was only promoted by Apple 
Computer as Fire Wire and by Sony as iLink (Brown 2000). 
In a regional breakdown, 35 percent of all Intel Capital investments on a financial 
basis have provided funds to companies outside the United States of America – mainly 
in the Asian-Pacific region, Europe and Israel. In 2000, Intel invested $ 700 million in 
55 technology companies throughout Europe (Anonymous 2001b). Intel Capital 
EMEA investments span 18 countries including Israel, Belgium, Czech Republic, 
Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, 
Norway, Poland, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, Dubai and the UK. In the long term, 
Intel Capital expects investments outside the United States to reach 50 percent of the 
total investment sum (Brull 2001). 
Network structure: Intel Capital as a central hub in the network of new technology-
based firms 
Relationships after the equity investments in the new technology-based firms are very 
much focused on Intel with its responsible business unit and corporate venture capital 
program as the central and focal actor. Although on a general basis facilitated by an 
alliance program, relationships between individual portfolio companies tend to be 
rather the exception than the rule. However, if concrete synergies between portfolio 
companies (e.g. complementary technologies for solution bundles) can be leveraged to 
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the benefit of all, then these opportunities are systematically exploited with the Intel 
business unit typically initiating and facilitating the effort. 
”Overall, this system of rather centralized relationships can be 
described as “hub-and-spoke” network 
(Heiko von Dewitz, Investment Manager, Intel Capital) 
As part of delivering value and resources beyond limited financial equity investments, 
Intel Capital has developed an alliance program, provides development assistance 
through business unit exchange, provides insights into future technology trends, opens 
up relationships to other sources of venture capital financing and leverages the general 
corporate association with Intel. The alliance program formalizes and structures the 
alliance relationship by offering standardized services, networking and information 
sharing (Intel Capital 2002a): 
1. Interfirm informal networking between portfolio companies through industry 
trade fair as well as targeted educational workshops and conferences 
2. Newsletters and marketplaces for higher visibility within the Intel portfolio to 
post, browse and retrieve product and alliance offerings 
3. Trainings and tools to run and to develop new venture businesses ranging from 
key employee and management training to market research, procurement and 
government relations 
4. Procurement discounts for additional Intel services 
Technological assistance provides portfolio companies with Intel research and 
development lab support on technology issues and the development towards horizontal 
industry standard solutions. This form of cooperation also ensures the compatibility 
with Intel software and hardware solutions. Insights into future trends may include 
sharing the Intel architecture roadmap and anticipated industry developments as part of 
the long-term research and development strategy. Other sources of financing for the 
NTBF are made available through Intel Capital’s relationships with major parties in 
the venture capital industry. The corporate association with Intel helps portfolio 
companies gain higher visibility in the IT industry. The high frequency and number of 
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equity investments contributes to the relational experience, which has been used to 
standardize the relationship with proven frameworks. 
 “The relationships [to NTBFs] are based on a certain framework. 
With different companies the interaction varies based on technology. 
Software companies are treated differently than semiconductor 
companies. But, these relationships are not renegotiated in every case. 
Based on the goal structure and the Intel business unit involved, 
companies are mapped and positioned accordingly in the framework. 
[…] A best-practice model is offered to the venture with room for 
variations being quite limited.” 
(Heiko von Dewitz) 
As part of the experience in defining the relationship to the new venture in Intel’s 
portfolio, the mentioned technological assistance of Intel business units is clearly 
identified, aligned with the start-up’s requirement and specified in a ‘letter-of-intent’ 
like business agreement prior to the equity investment. Milestones, deliverables and 
timetables define the ongoing interaction between Intel and the portfolio company to 
ensure commitment, to reduce technological uncertainty and to warrant contract 
compliance after completion of equity stake investment: 
“From the start, the strategic relationship [to the portfolio company] 
will be clearly defined. Dynamic evolution and growth of the 
relationship beyond the initial scope are desirable but do not occur 
very often […] If we have already established a relationship (e.g. 
supplier-customer), this relationship remains active or [in other cases] 
we make equity investments in the first place.” 
(Heiko von Dewitz) 
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Therefore, in the majority of cases of equity investment, the definition of mutual 
technical contributions remains rather static and is jointly executed with the Intel 
business units as previously defined. Alliance network redundancies in terms of 
ventures with similar technologies or applications can occur in case of undetermined 
and competing standards and regionally focused, market development driven 
investments. Uniqueness of the relationships ensures the commitment of both the new 
venture and the business unit in the alliance. 
“[In each investment decision], we are trying to invest in best-in-class 
technology. Only in rare cases of unclear technological dominance, or 
if the goal is to develop regional markets [for Intel products], would we 
place multiple bets [in software applications and services].” 
(Heiko von Dewitz) 
In addition to a unique relationship, technological assistance and development support 
can be facilitated in the case of technological relatedness of the venture’s technology 
base with Intel’s core technological capabilities in silicon microprocessors (Wong 
2001). 
Network adjustment: Replicating successful relationships 
Intel business unit and technology strategies set the long-term development agenda and 
in this process also identified technology gaps to be filled by internal research and 
development as well as investments with NTBFs. Intel Capital considers it a core 
competency to transform the respective business unit technology strategy in a 
dynamically changing industry environment into consistent equity investments: 
“A strength [of the due diligence process] is the consistent 
implementation of an investment strategy based on defined and 
articulated business unit requirements. This is extremely important in 
dynamic environments, which require frequent investment strategy 
adaptations. Downsides of this approach are its high complexity, 
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possibly conflicting interests of multiple parties, wide geographic 
distances and anonymity of personal interaction.” 
(Heiko von Dewitz) 
As portfolio companies mature over time, Intel business units face changes in 
corporate agendas and transitory pressures on earnings. However, Intel Capital 
remains to some degree tactically independent from corporate center decision-making 
(Brull 2001). As an additional source of independence, Intel Capital investments are 
always accompanied by venture capital co-investments to ensure the financial rigor 
and independent second perspective on the investment proposal without alignment to 
any Intel business unit interests. 
External equity investments to fill Intel’s technology gap involve access to investment 
proposals and a thorough due diligence process for sound decision-making. Although 
in existence for a long time and integrating a strong network of active investments, 
Intel Capital receives the majority of investment proposals as unsolicited applications. 
However, when comparing the years 2000 and 2002, contacts to Intel business units 
and co-investing venture capitalists play an increasingly important role as deal flow 
generators. Over two years of Intel Capital equity portfolio development, channels for 
investment proposal lead generation are broken down as follows: 
Year 2000 2002 
Unsolicited contacts 70 % - 75 % 50 % 
VC Network 20 % - 25 % 35 % - 40% 
Intel Business Units 5 % 10 % - 15 % 
Total 100 % 100 % 
Exhibit 2-7 Intel Capital: Channels for new equity investments 
(Interview: Heiko von Dewitz) 
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Intel Capital screens, evaluates and defines all investment proposals with the support 
of a detailed and well proven due diligence process to select the right targets, to ensure 
stability of the relationship and to maintain business unit commitment after the 
investment decision. 
As a clear prerequisite and important first due diligence criterion, Intel Capital requires 
the large majority of investments to support specific business unit strategies. 
Supporting business unit strategies requires the technology venture to be aligned with 
Intel innovation and to fill the white-spot in specific business unit technology 
strategies. Non-compliance with Intel’s technology standard is only accepted if the 
degree of product innovation is exceptionally high: 
“Standard compliance is almost always a must and a requirement. For 
a technology to prevail globally and for customers to trust a technology 
base, adherence to standards must be the requirement. If not standard 
compliant, the technology has to be superior at least by the factor 5 or 
10.” 
(Heiko von Dewitz) 
Only so called ‘eyes & ears’ investments do not have to directly support business unit 
strategies; with these deals Intel Capital deliberately aims at discovering potentially 
great disruptive technologies beyond current roadmaps and horizons. In addition, the 
fund requires new ventures to meet the criteria of a unique product and technology 
offering, an experienced and successful management team, financial history and 
projection as well as accredited  co-investors.  
With roughly 5 percent of investment proposals being funded, Intel Capital is known 
for a very thorough, systematic and rigorous financial and technical due diligence 
process. Although other venture capital funds co-invest in early financing rounds, they 
mainly provide business advice in terms of management direction, exit strategy and 
board of director input and clearly appreciate Intel’s collaboration in the due diligence 
process. The internal process reviews the venture’s technology, strategy, and finances 
and concludes with deal concept meetings and final presentations to Intel Capital 
business unit, treasury and legal executives (Hurley 2000). In this process, business 
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development, marketing and engineering functions are involved to a large extent. If 
required by the nature of the technology, legal advice for intellectual property 
protection also participates in the due diligence process. The due diligence process 
within Intel Capital is well defined, completely implemented and continuously tracked 
for performance improvements. This detailed due diligence process does not only 
improve the quality of the selection process but also ensures business unit 
commitment, which reduces the level of possible conflict and needed adaptations 
subsequent to the investment decision. 
“Goals of both sides are aligned and expectations are managed and 
consolidated. A business agreement defines scope and content of the 
collaboration. Only in rather rare cases of unforeseen business unit 
strategy adaptations, Intel roadmap changes, reconsiderations of the 
new venture [..] commitment from both sides may be lost.” 
(Heiko von Dewitz) 
Operational coordination and performance:  
Implementation of defined goals and milestones 
In the process of cooperation and joint technical development, continuous mutual 
contributions between Intel business units and the NTBFs represent the basis for 
implementing the strategic investment case. Precise deliverable definition prior to the 
investment decision facilitates the fulfillment of joint and agreed upon milestones and 
goals. As execution and achievement of the joint agenda lies in the interest of both the 
Intel business unit and the new technology-based firm, Intel Capital’s incentive 
structures tie variable compensation to the success of the alliance relationship. 
“Implementation of technical contributions is not guaranteed per se 
from both sides – the venture and Intel. Therefore, we track the ‘voice 
of the portfolio company’ or ‘customer satisfaction survey’ […] as a 
Case studies and analyses  
 
 46
continuous improvement approach, which also has an impact on our 
individual bonus compensation.” 
(Heiko von Dewitz) 
Although technological uncertainties, internal dynamics in NTBFs and a high degree 
of industry competition pose significant challenges for the stability of the cooperation, 
daily operations of contributing technical know-how, setting the product development 
agenda and defining technology transfer policies has reached a certain ‘best-practice’ 
maturity: To ensure good understanding and buy-in from both sides, technical 
contribution, product development agenda, technology transfer policies, the 
market/business development agenda and top alliance executives are negotiated and 
decided together with the management of the NTBF. 
“The model [for daily operations] exists, has been refined and further 
developed, and represents best practice. Basically, the new ventures 
are very satisfied with what they receive. [The joint collaboration] with 
major implementation milestones is always defined in agreement with 
the new venture. [… Investment agreements] are not dynamic 
structures with many open parameters. We try to reduce the potential 
for risk and conflict as much as possible. There is enough of it in the 
system already: High degree of innovation, dynamic changes and 
competition are unknown parameters which I cannot fully assess in 
advance.” 
(Heiko von Dewitz) 
As the portfolio company follows an outlined ‘development lifecycle’, joint 
technology innovation and compliance to the collaboration agreement is facilitated by 
clear intellectual property protection guidelines and additional financial resources 
depending on the successful achievement of milestones. Intellectual property rights are 
defined (e.g. jointly developed IP is owned by both, independently developed IP 
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remains solely owned by the inventing party) and legal clauses regulate future 
commercialization in a win-win-relationship for both. Emerging ventures are 
sometimes concerned that Intel as a big and powerful player is able to completely 
absorb intellectual property. Since Intel would clearly like to avoid this concern, 
property rights are detailed and clarified in unambiguous legal contracts. 
In the exceptional case of potential conflicts, Intel Capital works as a mediator 
between business unit and new venture to reach consensus in negotiations. However in 
the long term, product development results need to be compatible with the previously 
agreed upon business and investment agreements to obtain the incentive of further 
financial support: 
“Joint technology development with business units is typically 
milestone-based which has an effect on additional financial investment 
contributions (e.g. participation in further funding rounds). Reviewing 
the business case, we [as Intel Capital] expect the technology/product 
development to follow our requirements as a prerequisite for the case. 
If [the new venture team] changes direction, shifts and refocuses the 
business model, we would not exercise pressure on the company not to 
do so. That is up to the company to decide. But that, of course, has 
repercussions on Intel’s support: If a shift in product development 
makes the strategic investment case obsolete, we would say that we are 
no longer bound to our resource commitments.” 
(Heiko von Dewitz) 
As one of the largest corporate venture capital investors, Intel Capital looks back on a 
decennial history of successful activities. In spite of necessary write-offs and write-
downs due to stock market devaluations, Intel Capital’s financial success can always 
be described as an absolute success story. In addition to that, complementary cost 
reduction targets in technical R&D, HR development as well as quality and timeliness 
of joint product development meets ambitious internal targets. 
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Initial resource base and development: 
Learning relational capabilities to leverage a stable core technology base 
Besides positive financial results and project-related development successes, Intel 
Capital has generated and developed valuable resources mainly to establish successful 
and dependable relationships to portfolio companies. 
“[The development of resources and core competencies] is an 
important aspect: We certainly understand the eco-system much better 
through Intel Capital activities. In this regard, we are a much better 
sensor for innovations and markets and understand [new venture] 
people better.” 
(Heiko von Dewitz) 
As the clear focus of Intel Capital activities is concentrated on corporate venture 
capital activities, development and refinement of tasks and processes make up the 
majority of learning and capability growth: Detecting and screening new technologies, 
understanding internal changes within NTBFs, conducting due diligence and mediation 
processes and aligning incentives to support execution of the joint agreements. With a 
maturing portfolio, Intel Capital now faces the challenge of extending the relationship 
– if beneficial for both sides – well into the post-investment phase. Since more 
established and advanced companies independently define their product development 
agendas and strategies, relationships between them and Intel Capital do not follow the 
proven and predefined frameworks of the earlier equity investment phase. 
Consequently, the complexity of these relationships and missing experience explain 
learning requirements for extended relational capabilities: 
“During the course of development, an investment manager performs 
more and more lifecycle management […] with a greater exposure to 
supporting the deal well into the post-investment phase. […] [Post-deal 
support] is definitely required and there are new challenges for Intel to 
contribute value-added. In addition to strategic engagement, we try to 
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use the base case scenarios to generate additional synergies with Intel 
and to function as a door opener.” 
(Heiko von Dewitz) 
Minority equity investment relationships to start-up companies depend on a maximized 
level of stability and trustful enhancement of portfolio companies’ technical and 
managerial capabilities. Clearly defined contracts, intellectual property agreements and 
Intel’s reputation in the technology community ensure limited external distribution of 
intellectual property to the potential disadvantage of the portfolio company. 
If Intel wants to complement its capabilities with the start-up company’s technology 
base, then this is typically implemented through a licensing contract. The magnitude of 
technical knowledge contributions and strategic relevance of the overall investment 
case tend to increase with the technological relatedness of the NTBF with Intel’s core 
silicon technology base. In these extraordinary cases, the technology base of the 
venture is more relevant for Intel’s core capabilities and learning can be more 
obviously integrated in an already existing knowledge base. 
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2.2.3 Sun Microsystems GmbH and DLR 
Sun Microsystems and the German Aerospace Research Center and German Space 
Agency join forces to develop new technology based firms from multiple 
technological domains. With a focus on business initiatives from scientific 
backgrounds at very early stages of their development, alliance relationships to these 
new technology based firms are very much tailored to the individual firm. 
Business background: 
Transformation of basic research into new venture business models 
The DLR (German Aerospace Research Center and German Space Agency) and Sun 
Microsystems Germany combine their resources to support the conceptual, 
technological and managerial venture teams and young technology-based firms. After 
years of informal cooperation, both companies jointly incorporated an incubator for 
pre-seed and seed start-up companies at the DLR location in Oberpfaffenhofen. 
Although different in business scope and industry, both organizations are committed to 
attaining a leadership position in their technology domains. 
Since its incorporation in 1982, Sun Microsystems has developed into a leading 
provider of hardware, software and services, driven by its singular vision “the Network 
is the Computer”. From the beginning, the company’s corporate philosophy was based 
on network computing, because Sun’s goal was to produce powerful, open, standard-
based and network-compatible computer systems. Sun is represented in over 170 
countries and currently employs approx. 40,000 people worldwide. 
With a 38 percent share in the German server market in the year 2001, Sun is the 
leading provider of Unix workstation and servers as platforms for SAP R/3’s relational 
databases. Sun’s technological advantage makes the company a leading supplier in 
numerous markets including electronic engineering, mechanical engineering, software 
engineering, print and electronic media, telecommunications and financial services. 
Sun’s total product portfolio includes high-performance UltraSPARC III workstations, 
Internet/intranet, workgroup and departmental servers, server appliances, open and 
intelligent storage solutions, data center servers equipped with up to 106 CPUs, Java 
technologies, the 64-bit Solaris operating environment and Internet security solutions. 
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Development and integration tools as well as comprehensive consulting and services 
complement this product portfolio. 
Sun’s hardware and software solutions are known for reliability, scalability, security 
and openness. Committed to these guidelines, the Sun ONE (Sun Open Net 
Environment) provides on-demand software architecture for stable, successful network 
computing and the secure information exchange within companies and between 
business partners. Software services created with Sun ONE fully use the various 
features offered by open technologies such as the XML and the Java platform. When 
introducing the platform-independent Java technology, Sun has created a de-facto 
standard for network computing applications. Initially designed as a specific 
programming language for the Internet, Java rapidly established itself in the business 
world and the data center environments due to its technical robustness, security, ease 
of use and networking capability. Sun Microsystems offers the implementation of web 
services, including products for service creation, service assembly, service 
deployment, and professional services. 
Openness in software standards is required and complemented by active alliance 
formation. Examples of Sun’s alliance activities include relationships to professional 
service firms, industry-wide consortiums around the liberty alliance and the Sun 
Developer Connection (SDC). As a founding member of the Liberty Alliance, Sun 
works towards establishing industry-wide standards for network identification. The 
rapidly growing Sun Developer Connection supports independent software vendors in 
their development of solutions based on Solaris servers. 
Germany’s Sun Microsystems GmbH, headquartered in Kirchheim-Heimstetten near 
Munich, with local branches across Germany, was founded in 1984. Sun Germany 
employs around 1,600 people. In fiscal year 2001, Sun Microsystems GmbH generated 
revenues of € 862 million. 
The DLR (German Aerospace Research Center and German Space Agency) conducts 
research to explore the earth and the universe for protecting the environment and for 
promoting mobility, communication and safety. As aeronautics, aviations and space 
flight make substantial scientific and technology contributions, DLR facilitates the 
knowledge transfer between basic research, future technologies and innovative 
applications in its four research program sectors: Aeronautics, Space, Energy 
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Technology and Transport Research and Technology. Key industries ranging from 
materials technology to medical equipment and software engineering benefit from their 
technology innovations. DLR’s main objective focuses on basic and fundamental 
research without immediate focus on product applications and developing prototypes 
for subsequent mass production. 
Although a largely publicly funded, non-profit, private research organization, DLR 
aims at applying management tools and at emphasizing performance and goal 
orientation. Financial controlling and external auditing ensure continuous monitoring 
of all projects and achievements. DLR strives towards achieving flexibility in response 
to the demands of clients and partners. As a “research enterprise”, DLR integrates the 
knowledge of its institutes and external partners through multiple networks. These 
networks share workload and exchange knowledge for research and technology 
development on both a national and an international level. On the national level, DLR 
contributes research results and technology innovations in consortium projects and 
leads joint research endeavors with universities and industry participants. DLR forges 
public-private partnerships to achieve cost efficiency, to minimize risks in new product 
development and to integrate aerospace into partners’ value chains. DLR employs 
4,500 people across eight locations and 30 research institutes in Germany. DLR’s total 
budget accounts for € 360 million, of which one third is provided by third parties’ 
research grants. 
Besides its research scope on aeronautics and space flight, DLR’s entrepreneurial 
objectives focus on converting its wealth of knowledge and technology into 
competitive innovations. This innovation model handled by the department of 
‘Innovation and Technology Marketing’ aims at combining scientific research and 
economic exploitation for the creation of marketable products and services to a broad 
range of industries. Embedded in the scientific environment, regional offices at DLR 
locations assist in start-up business development with the objective of rapidly and 
quickly channeling innovative and marketable innovations. The department of 
‘Innovation and Technology Marketing’ contributes to entrepreneurial initiatives, 
supports market entry strategies and develops customized concepts for the 
development of innovations and the foundation of start-up companies. In Germany, 35 
employees coordinate R&D cooperation agreements, steer innovation processes, 
communicate research results, assess the market potential of innovative projects, out-
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license DRL patents and support the transfer of scientific knowledge to product 
applications. Despite unfavorable stock market conditions and a decrease in IPO 
activities in 2001, the support of Innovation and Technology Marketing in Germany 
has established eight new businesses, in which DLR employees have transformed their 
know-how from research into product innovations and enterprises. 
Sun Microsystems, DLR and the Bavarian Ministry of Economic Affairs, Transport and 
Technology sponsor the joint program for the incubation of new technology-based 
firms in selected technological areas: Navigation, Communication, Geographical 
Information and Avionics. The so-called ‘Sun Business Innovation Center’ (BIC) 
provides 1000 m2 office space at DLR’s site in Oberpfaffenhofen and supports services 
for new venture foundation and development for both pre-seed venture teams and seed 
start-up companies. Pre-seed projects are defined by the project partners as a team in 
the process of developing a business plan, whereas seed companies based on already 
established business plans focus on developing products and markets for their 
applications. 
“We target to focus the entire pre-seed or seed [entrepreneurial 
activities and companies]. […] If someone [in the pre-seed phase] 
would like [to provide a service to the telecommunications company], 
then he or she gets access to the required infrastructure to develop this 
service. In this case, you define that as a project without necessarily 
founding a new company. However, the start-up company will also be 
supported in the subsequent seed phase, but we do not know exactly 
what happens after that.” 
(Thorsten Rudolph) 
Affiliated project partners cover supporting management consulting, legal and tax 
advisory services. Sun, DLR and other supporting project partners supervise the 
activities of the Sun Business Innovation Center (BIC) within the legal form of an 
association (‘Verein’). Board memberships include the manager of the DLR site in 
Oberpfaffenhofen, a representative of the consulting organization RKW, a legal and 
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tax advisor, Thomas Groth of Sun Microsystems and Thorsten Rudolph of the DLR. 
Both Thomas Groth and Thorsten Rudolph serve as joint project managers for BIC 
from two main sponsoring organizations Sun and DLR. 
Network structure:  
Establishing a network of seed companies in selected technological areas 
Both DLR und Sun Microsystems have supported fourteen entrepreneurial projects 
from the beginning of 2000 until March 2002. Although September 2001 marks the 
official kick-off date for the incorporation of the Sun BIC as described above, 
cooperation between Sun and the DLR for incubation services and other projects in a 
related industry context started earlier. 
“Contact to Sun was made two and a half years ago through a project 
of ‘High-Tech-Offensive Bayern’ (Bavarian High-tech initiative). 
Funded with five or six million German Marks, Sony, Thyssen Group 
Information System, start-up companies, the Technical University 
Munich, Sun and the DLR as consortium leader have joined forces for 
a project on indoor data transmission via bluetooth. In this 
environment, we have both test beds and showcases for these services 
available […] to demonstrate how bluetooth, local area networks and 
GPRS GSM networks can be integrated.” 
(Thorsten Rudolph) 
Since 2001, 14 entrepreneurial projects have been sponsored by DLR and Sun and can 
be broken down into four pre-seed teams in the process of developing a business plan, 
eight teams with a completed business plan in the process of developing businesses, 
markets and products and two spin-offs of larger organizations. 8 projects out of the 14 
use the services provided by the SUN BIC. Roughly 20% of all projects have been 
founded as spin-offs from DLR research institutes. DLR research uses the opportunity 
of developing patents and technological innovations into potentially marketable 
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products. The remainder – 80 percent of all start-up projects – however, has been 
acquired externally, mainly from out of Bavaria, to relocate to DLR and BIC site in 
Oberpfaffenhofen. 
“With the pull effect in full swing, companies from Baden-
Wuerttemberg and North Rhine-Westphalia relocate to Bavaria to get 
access to the very attractive research infrastructure.” 
(Thomas Groth, Member Global Visioneer Council, Sun) 
As a jointly integrated service offering, the incubator provides teams in the pre-seed 
phase with office space for a 3 to 6 month timeframe and external coaching for the 
process of developing a business plan. The new venture team is expected to commit to 
a timeframe for completion of the business plan and receives 10 consulting days’ 
coaching and office infrastructure for DM 2500 – one daily rate for professional 
consulting services. The remainder of nine days of consulting and advisory services is 
funded by the state of Bavaria. 
More mature seed teams and companies with a completed business plan in the process 
of further developing markets and products have the autonomy to freely source 
services they need for future growth. These more established start-up companies team 
up for expected synergies with DLR institutes or due to prior contact with project 
sponsor Sun Mircosystems. 
“In general, these firms join because they expect advantages from a 
research or industry perspective for their project, or because they have 
had prior contact to Sun. […] Other companies join with three or four 
people on a project basis for half a year or even a full year to develop a 
product or a service with the support of locally offered services.” 
(Thorsten Rudolph) 
Besides cooperation with and technical contribution of DLR institutes in research 
programs, support services of Sun Microsystems or the centrally located DLR site in 
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Oberpfaffenhofen represent inducements for new venture companies and teams to 
establish their business development operations at the Sun BIC. In fulfillment of their 
technical contributions, local DLR institutes in Oberpfaffenhofen cover matching and 
complementary technological areas like navigation, high frequency technology, 
communications engineering and robotics. 
Although neither DLR nor Sun pursue equity holdings in pre-seed or seed start-ups, 
monetary compensation for licensing contracts, research consortiums, and 
development agreements represent the financial incentive for DLR institutes to 
cooperate with BIC’s new ventures. Access to novel product applications, market 
knowledge and industry contacts for additional partnerships represent another 
intangible advantage in cooperating with the NTBFs. 
Network adjustment: Tailored new venture project acquisition and cooperation 
In their demand for external business development support, until the beginning of 
2001, new venture teams in almost all cases directly contacted the DLR. Only a small 
percentage of new project proposals was forwarded to the department of ‘Innovation 
and Technology Marketing’ through other personal contacts of DLR institutes. With 
the launch of the incubator roughly around September 2001, these options to contact 
the DLR have changed completely. The number of new contacts to start-up teams 
established through partner organizations has increased rapidly to 80% of new project 
proposals, as this platform with its service offerings has become more known to the 
general public. Although incubator services are only known by selected and related 
providers, the scope of further contact has to be drawn very carefully to keep the 
number of business development requests and thus the workload for staff members 
within boundaries. Already existing contacts to service providers also serve as a good 
filter for promising business concepts, since they are highly familiar with DLR’s and 
Sun’s technical capabilities and cooperation needs. 
Although in March 2002 no formal due diligence process exists for pre-seed projects, 
further formalization of screening and mentoring new venture teams are under 
development. In the earlier pre-seed phase, the iterative tasks of completing a business 
plan necessitate frequent adjustments of required services for Sun, DLR and service 
providers. At all times, the incubator Sun BIC and the coaches are considered as an 
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independent platform, which only represent the interest of their clients – new venture 
teams and start-up companies – and do not acquire financial stakes in them. On a case-
by-case basis, coaches drawn on Sun’s and DLR’s contact network validate the 
business plan sections such as market potential and financial planning: 
“To provide a customer survey for a business plan, one could [utilize 
the existing partner contact network of SUN and DLR] to receive high 
quality information. [For the future], one could also develop a 
systematic approach for this, at least for a specific industry, by 
identifying available people with excellent industry knowledge. That’s 
how I would envision effective support in the pre-seed phase.” 
(Thorsten Rudolph) 
On the operational level, as a replacement for the formal due diligence process, the 
DLR has outlined a rough ‘check-in’ process that summarizes the cooperation path 
between institutes and the new venture: After the receipt of the business plan or project 
proposal, DLR research personnel from related departments will be consulted to reach 
a decision on whether to invite the new venture for a formal presentation and further 
information gathering. At this early stage, the pre-seed or seed team is expected to 
respond to a set of evaluation criteria on state-of-the-art in the respective technology 
field, technological differentiation, market volume, benefits of product applications, 
the number of potentially created employees and skills of the entrepreneurial team. The 
DLR on its side has to reach an assessment on the novelty of innovation, relevance for 
current research programs, opportunity to embed the company in its local site 
environment and the availability of complementary DLR technology to jointly achieve 
product uniqueness. After a presentation of both concept and team, the DLR 
department ‘Innovation and Technology Marketing’ and involved departments decide 
on the possibility to coach or support. 
In an assessment similar to the ‘check-in’ process outlined above, the research scope of 
the seed start-up company in particular needs to be consistent with DLR institutes’ 
initiatives. A decision on technological complementarity is reached in intranet 
collaboration with DLR technical experts, supported by technology databases and 
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informed by defined questionnaires. In the future, the DLR plans to expand the 
application of this intranet technical due diligence into the earlier pre-seed phase to 
improve idea generation, to assess already exiting product applications, to screen 
partnering options and to accelerate the overall screening process. 
After the decision to partner with either the pre-seed team or the seed start-up 
company, further cooperation and technical exchange is supported and defined on a 
case-by-case basis. DLR’s top management institutes broadly, formalizes and codifies 
a letter-of-intent on the intended research cooperation or licensing agreement.  
“The DLR is focused on supporting new ventures by signing contracts 
on research projects and out-licensing patents to start-ups for 
subsequent commercialization. Patent property rights pertain to the 
DLR and these new venture spin-offs are driven by the people that have 
initially filed for the respective patent and now have the incentive to 
create their own business.” 
(Thomas Groth) 
In close contact with the new venture team and tailored to the start-up’s developing 
capabilities, DLR as the client establishes and potentially extends the relationships to 
teams and start-up companies by subcontracting respective service agreements for the 
development projects. 
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“Within the scope of our responsibilities, we try to activate and 
practice ‘management by walking the talk.’ We know the managing 
directors personally and chat with them regularly. Especially in these 
conversations, we come up with new topics, which can result in new 
projects. But the communication flow between DLR institutes and 
companies runs almost automatically and the cooperation develops 
over time.” 
(Thorsten Rudolph) 
During this time period of approximately two years, the seed ventures may engage in 
additional joint product development with DLR institutes, service providers or firms 
within the BIC incubator. After initial development agreements, as an earlier DLR 
subcontractor the start-up can directly provide further development or maintenance 
services to DLR’s customers. 
Technological complementarity within the defined boundaries is seen as a requirement 
to facilitate cooperation by all incubator project sponsors. At the time of the case study 
interview in March 2002, the concepts of cooperation between organizations and 
complementarity of offered support services remain under continuous development 
and review. Uncertain overlaps in the evolving technology scope and a limited number 
of already established start-up companies in the incubator network pose a challenge for 
achieving sufficient technological complementarity. Although there are some 
relationships between the fourteen new technology-based firms for sub-projects, 
differences in business objectives and products complicate the search for general and 
broad commonalities and partnership opportunities. Regarding the future objective, 
Thorsten Rudolph adds: 
“But this has been the past of new venture incorporation. We intend to 
change that with our incubator project. We have already seen that an 
external company outside of Bavaria has been cooperating with a DLR 
start-up company on a project basis.” 
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In this process of selecting and integrating new venture projects, DLR’s functional 
departments for purchasing to review research contracts, site management to provide 
office space, infrastructure and telecommunication and legal services to frame 
cooperation agreements, and licensing and appropriate research departments are highly 
involved in the selection and partnership formation process. In the future development 
of the BIC, the involvement of marketing and public relations is expected to increase 
with the number of high profile partnerships. All decisions for the incorporation and 
development of new ventures require board review and approval within the DLR. 
On the part of Sun Microsystems, the corporate business development and partially 
also marketing, public relations and legal departments are involved in the development 
of the incubator project. Human resources, purchasing and the R&D department are 
only remotely involved. Over the course of developing the alliance network, business 
units, marketing and the executive boards have become involved to a larger degree as 
driving forces behind the BIC project initiative. 
Operational coordination: 
Providing specialized technical and business perspectives  
For the daily business development support of new venture teams, the assigned or 
selected coach develops a project plan for review of the DLR, which concludes the 
contract with the new technology-based firm. The project plan then represents an 
agreed upon proposal in written from, which commits the coach to execute the 
agreement with the pre-seed team. Coaches review the progress, integrate and 
coordinate service offerings to review financial plans, to facilitate product 
development, to select alliance partners and develop finance options. In case of the 
later incorporation of a company in the seed phase, DLR encourages the seed firm to 
establish operations and office facilities at its site in Oberpfaffenhofen. 
As described above, the DLR provides technological know-how in the form of 
innovative patents, services of the Oberpfaffenhofen site infrastructure and conceptual 
support in new venture business development. To extend financial resources of its 
venture partners, the DLR also supports seed ventures in acquiring purchase orders 
from industry customers or obtaining additional public research grants for their 
development projects: After the launch of the BIC incubator platform, founding teams 
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also have the potential to obtain venture capital direct investments. The growing 
network of supporting project partners has also been extended to these external sources 
of financing with an interest in these specific technology areas. 
“Through the growing network, we have contacts to VC Funds that 
regularly – maybe once a month – visit us to meet with two or three 
start-up teams. They rely on the DLR and that we have made the right 
choice [in selecting the team.] Therefore, more intensive contacts for 
seed capital are in the process of development.” 
(Thorsten Rudolph) 
In addition to the BIC services, Sun contributes valuable industry contacts, sheds light 
on its internal development projects and facilitates the business development process in 
providing insights into industry, market and technology trends. In addition to these 
benefits, alliance programs such as the Sun Developer Connection support all 
worldwide JAVA and Solaris developers which provide discounted hardware products 
and access to beta software technology. 
Between Sun and the DLR as the two major project sponsors, great consensus exists on 
the overall network structure, expected benefits, target technology portfolio, future 
business development agenda and participating new venture companies. Based on 
previous long-term cooperation experience, both sponsoring organizations have 
developed high levels of trust and good understanding of capabilities and mutual 
expectations. Therefore, incubator project management does not require formal 
conflict resolution mechanisms: 
Case studies and analyses  
 
 62
“If we happen to run into severe conflicts, something is off track, we 
have not communicated enough, or we don’t have a sound business 
proposal. Until now we have always received the requested and 
required resources [due to good fit of the new venture with either Sun 
or the DLR].“ 
(Thomas Groth) 
Also, potential conflict resolution between DLR institutes and new ventures is 
performed by the department of “Innovation and Technology Marketing” on a case-by-
case basis with the involvement of a coach as interface for the DLR. As the BIC 
incubator is regarded as an open platform and extends invitations to the wide 
community of ventures with matching technology skills, magnitude and nature of 
financial and research contributions can be the source of some discussion between the 
start-up and DLR. However, DLR closely follows its policy of entering into 
cooperation agreements on the exchange of research and development services 
between new technology-based firms and DLR institutes. Experience has shown that 
this model requires communication and some effort on the side of the new venture 
team to comprehend. Besides achieving this general understanding on the model of 
exchanging contributions, more operational issues on technical know-how exchange, 
patent property rights, technical project scope and technical development can in most 
cases be resolved quickly during initial negotiations along with the discussion of 
financial contributions. 
At the time of the interview, no formal mechanisms exist for the continuous exchange 
of jointly developed technological know-how. New ventures, however, are encouraged 
to establish an advisory board based on its current network to review technology and 
business strategy and to exchange know-how between related knowledge domains. In 
addition to experience exchange on a general level, project sponsor Sun intends to 
shield supported start-ups from any knowledge spillovers and to preserve their 
innovativeness. 
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Network objectives and performance: Targeting new venture incorporation 
Sun and the DLR complement each other in their technical and managerial skills and, 
due to a joint history, have the experience of successful and flexible collaboration. 
Although the incubator is considered to be success story by DLR and Sun in March 
2002, no formal quantitative controlling mechanisms exist to assess the current 
performance of the incubator project from both Sun’s and DLR’s perspectives. On a 
long-term, strategic level, Sun’s project business plan tracks the costs incurred and 
intends to reach profitability within a timeframe of five years. Future revenue for Sun 
are generated from consulting engagements to the liquidation of company stakes, 
although holding equity stakes in new ventures is not considered the standard model. 
Despite missing financial controlling systems, quantification of project results is 
considered an important agenda item for the future development of the project. Since 
an incubator in public-private partnerships – according to the DLR perspective on the 
project results – represents an innovative and unprecedented model of cooperation, the 
joint project is not assessed by quantitative financial indicators such as license 
revenues, cost reductions or overall profits. However, the number of newly 
incorporated companies and staff employed is considered an important criterion to 
assess the impact for the regional economic environment. In quantitative terms, the 
incubator has set a target to carry out ten pre-seed projects per year. 
From 1995 to March 2002, the DLR alone can look back on the foundation of 24 start-
ups with staff of more than 200 employees in total. The establishment of the BIC 
incubator platform has added 8 external ventures to the total 14 companies supported 
by the cooperation with Sun Microsystems. 
DLR’s qualitative performance criteria such as quality and timeliness of product 
development, have been completely fulfilled in most cases of new venture cooperation. 
However, the timeliness of new product development certainly faces the obstacles of 
technological uncertainties associated with the development of new ventures. Since 
Sun also introduces its customers to new venture teams for their respective business 
development, quality and timeliness of delivered products leave room for development 
potential and represent a critical prerequisite for the access to its contact network. For 
Sun, facilitative factors such as development of contact networks and the level of inter-
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firm communication received a moderate assessment in March 2002, with room for 
additional improvement potential. 
Initial resource base and development 
The earlier bluetooth project has initiated contact to Sun Microsystems, which has been 
leveraged to launch subsequent incubation services: As this technology project opened 
up new development and research areas, the DLR was able to attract additional 
scientific personnel and out-license developed patents. Development results have also 
been utilized for new product ideas, which result in the targeted incorporation of 
additional start-up companies for the incubator project. Innovations from this project 
represent the technological basis for external start-up companies with the objective of 
developing mobile services and the need for a testing environment. As an early project 
partner, Sun mediated the contacts to potential and promising co-sponsors, which 
opened up previously unavailable market potential and business contacts. In the 
context of earlier cooperation, earlier founded start-ups now act as partners for the 
incubator project, contributing product development and demonstrating showcase 
projects. 
Both partners realized that the successful selection and development of new venture 
teams depend on ‘bridging the gap’ between technical applications and managerial 
aspects of business and market development. As both Sun and DLR have bridged this 
gap in their initial project, new venture projects supported by the BIC incubator face 
similar challenges. 
“The case of market and business driven people with prior experience 
in founding a new company in cooperation with the DLR team of 
complementary, specialized experts represents a completely new model. 
The joint company is looking for unique value propositions driven by 
their complementary skills set. Insofar, we are currently learning how 
to build, moderate and support in this process.” 
(Thorsten Rudolph) 
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In their self-assessment of the capability to form and develop multiple alliance 
relationships to entrepreneurial teams, DLR and Sun have clearly developed their 
capability in selecting the right pre-seed team and seed start-up companies with the 
experience of 2 to 3 years of cooperation. Similarly, the project partner SUN adds: 
“Our strength is that we quickly identify the team’s ‘state-of-mind’ in 
conversations with the new venture team. To reevaluate the current 
position with its strengths and weaknesses and to build on current 
achievements represents a difficulty for many people. In our 
conversations, these issues will be quickly resolved and respective core 
competencies and gaps will be clearly identified.” 
(Thomas Groth) 
Regarding future development needs in this area, DLR seeks to select active supportive 
service providers with the knowledge on how to work with a research organization and 
to work on eliminating the technological uncertainties of new ventures. Further 
improvement potential can also be seen in selectively limiting or focusing the scope of 
potential new ventures and service providers that participate in the joint project to 
carefully commit personnel resources of both project partners. 
“[The capability to limit the scope of searching for new companies] 
could be a weakness, since we have not gained enough experience in 
this area. At this stage, we have the objective of developing a larger 
office facility, which also requires modified operational models. At the 
moment, we act like we are targeting the quick achievement of partial 
success to prove our concept, idea and strategy of establishing new 
companies here on-site. In this case, it may well be possible that our 
staff is highly active in and busy processing new venture’s support 
requests, that are unable to give thought to the long-term strategy.” 
(Thorsten Rudolph) 
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Along with supporting new technology-based firms, the DLR has also developed 
capabilities of how to establish relationships with an end customer of an applied 
development project: As successful practice, the DLR establishes direct contacts to 
another technical service provider that already has established an industry relationship 
and acts as mediator to the end customer. In the context of the Business Innovation 
Center, this mediator could be a new venture that performs product maintenance, 
covers customer service and communicates DLR research and development results. 
“This relationship framework works particularly well with start-up 
companies that have developed complementarily out of DLR institutes, 
which speak the same language, know customers for years and can 
offer a different service portfolio which the DLR as a research institute 
just cannot provide. […] This has been developing over time and 
previous concerns that employees virtually leave the DLR and cannot 
be replaced have been turned into the acknowledgement that these 
employees remain available and at the same time pursue their 
professional objectives.” 
(Thorsten Rudolph) 
In the process of cooperating with external ventures and industry partners, not only is 
scientific knowledge leveraged, but research institutes also gain insights into their 
alliance partners’ entrepreneurial orientation. 
“From our perspective as a research organization, we get used to the 
[high] level of scientific results. Embedded in international networks, 
researchers work on studies over several years and finally file the 
results. Therefore, it is very interesting and attractive for us, when a 
young entrepreneur approaches us and wants to utilize our research 
results to develop a technology application. This creates a completely 
new momentum! We have actually realized that colleagues who have 
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worked for an applied project for half a year do not want to return to 
their prior classical and basic research.” 
(Thorsten Rudolph) 
To some extent, the technological knowledge base has been developed through the 
cooperation with new technology-based firms. However, due to a high number of 
patents already at the disposal of DLR, the relative growth of technological know-how 
is only marginal. The same applies for project partner Sun Microsystems, which also 
has a large knowledge base at its disposal, but has had influence on the direction and 
utilization of some joint development projects. In the area of sales and marketing 
skills, some new venture contacts and showcase products have facilitated sales 
initiatives and establishment of pilot products with important Sun customers. On a 
limited case-by-case basis, joint development projects with start-up companies have 
been coordinated with and benefited from Sun’s research and development projects. 
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2.2.4 Within-case study analysis 
Although networks of relationships are utilized in both cases to develop new 
technology based firms, the alliance network of Intel Capital – due to its longer history 
and experience – shows more clearly defined structures. In contrast, the alliance 
network of Sun and DLR is characterized by project-based, emerging and highly 
flexible relationships. 
Intel Capital Europe Middle East Africa (EMEA) 
With the high frequency and number of equity investments, Intel Capital has 
developed unique minority equity relationships with technology-based ventures and 
valuable capabilities in selecting and developing NTBFs in cooperation with Intel 
business units. 
Ventures in Intel Capital’s equity portfolio are integrated in an ‘hub-and-spoke’ 
network with Intel at the center of multiple relationships. High specialization of 
technological know-how triggering different product and market development 
approaches results in rare cases of close cooperation between new ventures. Defined 
by the goals of Intel’s corporate venture capital program, relationship intensity to new 
ventures is limited to minority equity co-investments. Although additional financial or 
technical commitment may be desired by the NTBF or theoretically feasible for Intel, 
developing technology-based firms in Intel’s pursuit of long-term strategic goals does 
not seem to require an intensification of inter-firm relationships. 
A sophisticated and well defined due diligence process as the ‘gate keeper’ for 
additional alliance formation ensures a well informed selection process, consultation 
with all involved parties, goal harmonization, and legal codification of the strategic 
investment case. Investment targets are identified with the support of the Intel 
technology roadmap, that forecasts technological development trends and current 
‘white spots’ in capabilities. Missing capabilities are either complemented by internal 
research and development programs or by Intel Capital’s investment programs. 
Business unit strategies also facilitate the identification of screening criteria for 
investment proposals: Non standard-compliant technology has to show highly superior 
performance to receive financial and technological contributions from Intel Capital 
and Intel business units. Ongoing new venture development processes provide 
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standardized services through an alliance program, cover continuous tracking of 
progress and – if necessary – support conflict resolution and performance-based 
compensation. Aiming for economies of scale, the standardized alliance program 
demonstrates a well-developed proficiency in tailoring services for NTBFs and 
availability of a critical mass of equity investments in the portfolio. Tracking of 
development progress is informed by the achievement of milestones and deliverables 
in the joint project. Although technological uncertainties impose major obstacles in 
predicting business progress, Intel’s superior technological know-how and experience 
in setting up milestone agreements facilitate the codification jointly agreed upon in 
cooperation agreements. Experience both in the due diligence process and ongoing 
management creates a highly sophisticated alliance management capability. 
High levels of experience in alliance management result in low levels of conflict 
between the new venture team and business unit management on mutually expected 
contributions. The due diligence process has already harmonized conflicting goals and 
clearly codified milestones in the equity investment agreement. As clearly defined 
incentives, future financial and technology contributions depend on achievement of 
previously defined goals in the product and technology development agenda. Prior 
legal codification of the strategic investment case, defined milestones for the future 
development agenda, and clearly defined incentives ensure a stabilization of the 
relationship to the new technology-based firm. Highly stable relationships cover 
predefined resource exchanges and limit unintended and explorative activities between 
two partners. Although understandable from an efficiency perspective, highly stable 
exchange relationships may limit technological exploration in addition to the already 
jointly identified innovation area. 
Focused on developing an equity portfolio, Intel Capital has first and foremost 
developed alliance management capabilities as described above and has also gained a 
good understanding for dealing with dynamics in young technology-based firms. 
Maturing portfolios now require additional skills for the support of the less structured 
post-investment phase. In the area of other operational resources, Intel business units 
have experienced only marginal learning contributions in their technological skills. 
NTBF’s diverse technological competencies and the clearly defined scope for joint 
development projects may be the cause for the limit in know-how generation. Limited 
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project and investment proposal scopes regulate the knowledge generated in addition 
to jointly defined development deliverables. 
Sun Microsystems and DLR 
Both Sun and DLR are in the unique technological and financial situation to facilitate 
the business development of new venture teams and young seed start-up companies. At 
the same time, leading in their industries and scientific areas, both of them complement 
unique and emerging skills set in their interest of sponsoring entrepreneurial activities. 
After working informally on case-by-case and project basis, both sponsoring parties 
decided to institutionalize a business and technology incubator in September 2001. The 
DLR, in the tradition of a premier research organization, shares research results with its 
scientific community on a regular basis. Similarly, Sun Microsystems with its 
commitment to JAVA, shows openness in software standards and prominent alliance 
activities. Both major project partners seem to support this openness in sharing 
technological know-how and collaborating business practices. In two and a half years 
of emerging cooperation in joint projects, both firms and participating management 
have developed a sense of common values, objectives, trust and informality: A good 
joint understanding of the BIC projects results, consensus on the overall alliance 
network structure, expected benefits, future business development agenda and potential 
future entrepreneurial projects. Both partners intend to establish an open platform and 
to extend invitations to cooperate with broad groups of new ventures with matching 
technological skills. 
Initiated by a project sponsored by ‘High-Tech-Offensive Bayern’, Sun and DLR 
supported 14 entrepreneurial projects – pre-seed, seed and spin-offs – in the areas of 
navigation, communication, geographical information and avionics. Attracted by 
DLR’s capabilities available at the site in Oberpfaffenhofen and Sun’s unique 
technological capabilities, young technology-based companies join the Business 
Innovation Center mainly from outside the state of Bavaria. The large number of 
unsolicited applications and direct contacts to the DLR department of ‘Innovation and 
Technology Marketing’ underlines the attractiveness of this bundled service offering. 
Contacts to start-up projects through third parties almost exclusively utilize the 
involved service providers, which are familiar with BIC’s objectives and technological 
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scope. As processing the number of cooperation requests clearly drives and challenges 
the feasible workload of both Sun and DLR staff members, this filtering function has 
clear advantages. 
Diverse projects of different maturity result in an informal screening and supporting 
process within both major project sponsors. Although in the pre-seed phase 
frameworks for coaching and screening criteria exist as guidelines, codification of 
supporting research and development agreements, transition between new venture 
categories, resource contributions from the DLR and Sun are individually tailored to all 
parties’ requirements: Various forms of licensing contracts, research consortiums and 
development agreements have to cover and balance resource contributions, monetary 
compensation and intellectual property protection. Also resource contributions from 
coaches and other related parties during the early pre-seed phase require frequent 
adaptation due to the unpredictable nature of defining a new venture business plan. 
Although later-stage seed start-ups are encouraged to set up operations in 
Oberpfaffenhofen, these more mature companies have the autonomy to freely obtain 
and tailor needed services for further growth, which adds to the complexity of the 
entire relationship set. Non-specific and successively defined contributions in the seed 
phase include highly intangible intellectual capital in the form of patents, insights into 
internal development projects or equally valuable personal contacts to industry experts 
that help in market assessment or project launch. Consequently, both seed start-up 
management and DLR management develop extensions of cooperation agreements 
opportunistically in a step-by-step process. Since multiple parameters in these 
cooperation agreements such as the nature of financial and research contributions 
represent open issues for negotiations, an agreement on the terms of the agreements 
requires disputing and mitigating a certain level of conflict between new ventures and 
the DLR institutes. 
Although facilitated by a certain technological focus of BIC’s ventures, cooperation 
between all existing entrepreneurial activities is limited to very rare cases. Even though 
cooperation between start-ups could have a structure-reinforcing effect, the 
unpredictable technological scope of active projects poses challenges on the bilateral 
and joint support of ventures. However, the limited number of projects in the portfolio 
and shared project understanding between the two sponsoring organizations as 
described above make this case-by-case approach feasible, although both partners 
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acknowledge personnel resource constraints in performing their duties. As the 
foundation of the Business Innovation Center has led to completely new momentum in 
external project acquisition, further formalization and specialization of processes for 
screening and development of entrepreneurial projects would ensure comparability and 
generate economies of scales. 
Restricted formalization in selecting and supporting entrepreneurs explains a missing 
financial and quantitative performance indicator system. Although costs are tracked in 
Sun’s business plan for the project, both the number of new ventures created and 
employees are the dominant performance indicator. As the BIC project represents a 
novel cooperation model in public-private partnership, measurement of the impact on 
regional economic environment and its prosperous development can be explained with 
the partially public funding. Based on conducting and establishing 14 entrepreneurial 
projects from 2000 until March 2002 at the time of the interviews, setting the target to 
10 pre-seed projects alone in the entire year 2002, represents an indicator for an 
accelerating growth rate. The establishment of the BIC incubator platform also has 
added 8 external ventures to the total 14 companies supported by two project sponsors. 
Improved and increased performance can be linked to a broad collaboration experience 
between Sun and DLR, some formalization in both new venture selection and support 
as well as the development of valuable resources in operating incubation services. 
The initial DLR research consortium with Sun has established an important nucleus of 
new venture creation and support: Development of applied technological knowledge, 
intensified contacts with industry partners in multi-party consortium and acquisitions 
of skilled personnel. Newly developed product ideas represent the inducement for 
additional start-up companies to set up operations and utilize an established testing 
environment. 
Through their repeated activities, both partners have developed broad skills in selecting 
appropriate seed and pre-seed team. The extension of the service provider network 
with a good fit to BIC’s technological and business scope, the anticipation of 
technological uncertainties of new technology-based firms and good understanding of 
long-term direction remain as further growth areas for capabilities and skills. A sound 
long-term strategy on the technological and business scope suffers under the high 
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operational involvement of DLR’s staff to select a sufficient number of current 
entrepreneurial projects as an early proof-of-concept. 
Along with alliance management skills on portfolio level, DLR has established 
supportive organizational arrangements with external industry partners and has built on 
the existing entrepreneurial orientation. In sponsoring entrepreneurial activities, DLR 
leverages the existing technological knowledge base to increase the motivation of its 
staff and to provide an enriching working environment for valuable employees. In 
pursuit of their entrepreneurial objectives, these employees continue to be available for 
the DLR and play a valuable facilitative role for establishing industry contacts. Due to 
very solid technological knowledge bases of both DLR and Sun, and the selected 
number of projects, improvements in technological capabilities are only marginal at 
this stage. Capability gains can be linked to the tailored and individual approach of 
supporting new venture projects. The flexible search for the most beneficial exchange 
of financial and technical resources helped to develop these skills. Trial-and-error 
approach in negotiations and flexible adaptations in the resource exchange according 
to shifting needs and capabilities foster awareness for start-up companies’ capabilities 
and represent good learning opportunities for all parties. 
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2.3 Alliance networks for economies of scales in the fixed-line 
telecommunications industry 
Liberalized fixed line telecommunications markets have opened up multiple 
entrepreneurial opportunities for new entrants into the market. Providing the home 
access to subscribers, so called city carriers offer an alternative to Deutsche Telekom’s 
fixed line services for the ‘last mile’. However, drastically reduced 
telecommunications prices and increasing costs have changed the business cases of 
many new entrants, all integrated in an alliance network formed by Elisa 
Kommunikation and Tropolys. 
2.3.1 Industry context 
Across many European countries and also in Germany, telecommunications services 
have been controlled by the government for several decades: National 
telecommunications markets have traditionally been served by a limited number of 
equipment manufacturers and monopolistic incumbent network operators. With 
increasing deregulation of national telecommunications service markets, new entrants 
capture parts of the fixed-line telecommunications market and cover selected steps in 
previously defined value chain of equipment manufacturers and incumbent network 
operators. An industry value chain describes a combined sequence of activities to 
produce goods and services. Applied to the fixed-line telecommunications industry, the 
respective industry value chain can be structured as follows: 
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Exhibit 2-8 Value chain: Fixed-line telecommunications services 
Manufacturing of telecommunications infrastructure covers development, production 
and distribution of products and systems that allow telecommunication ranging from 
telecommunications networks (basic and switched infrastructure) to terminals. The 
operation of basic telecommunication infrastructure includes the planning, construction 
and operation of land, deep-sea, radio and satellite lines for telecommunications 
purposes. The operation of switched telecommunications infrastructure includes the 
planning, construction and operation of switching centers, which are connected by 
basic telecommunication infrastructure to switches or terminals of telecommunications 
customers. The value chain step of telecommunications services defines 
communications services including technical specifications supported by software 
applications. Sales and distribution of telecommunications services covers the interface 
to the end-customer and customer acquisition activities. 
Within the framework of this value chain, firms are not limited to only one step in the 
entire chain, but can also vertically integrate several steps. As example, the former 
monopoly and incumbent in the German telecommunications market, Deutsche 
Telekom AG, as an integrated firm covers four steps in the value chain from operation 
of basic telecommunications infrastructure to distribution of services. 
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Excluding the initial value chain step ‘manufacturing of telecommunications 
infrastructure’, the relevant industry value chain combines two major sequences of 
activities: A network as well as service and distribution level. The network level 
performs the transfer of information via a fixed-line telecommunications network as 
well as wholesale of information transfer services to other telecommunications 
carriers. A segmentation of network level services can be derived from a 
conceptualization of technical traffic routing within telecommunications networks. 
Information exchange between telecommunications service subscribers can be 
transferred either within the local loop or will be relayed through switching centers to 
long-distance telecommunications networks. Long-distance telecommunications 
networks terminate the subscriber’s telephone call within the requested local loop, 
which connects to home access line of the other party. The information flow utilizes 
only the local loop or additionally long distance telecommunications networks in case 
of communication outside of the local call area of approximately 20 kilometers. Both 
separated network layers constitute the entire telecommunications network, which 
connects subscriber terminals and can be used to structure the network level of fixed-
line telecommunications value chain. 
(1) Local loop telecommunications networks provide connections to terminals of 
service subscribers and therefore forward or terminate communication traffic. 
Telecommunications markets cover both physical network access to the local loop 
through interconnection agreements and marketing of home access lines to fixed-line 
subscribers. In Germany, both market segments show only a limited degree of 
competitive activities by new entrants at this time. Only a limited number of alternative 
network operators has installed fixed-line communications networks to the end 
customers in addition to the already existing local loop access network of the 
incumbent Deutsche Telekom AG. At the end of 2000, 52 alternative carriers operate 
only 1,5% of the roughly 50 million home access lines in the German fixed-line 
networks (RegTP 2001). In October 2000, subscribers in 51% of all German cities 
over 50.000 inhabitant have the opportunity to choose from multiple providers for 
home access lines. Alternative local loop access providers in the majority of cases 
provide physical access to locally installed home access lines and market services of 
local telephone access. As a result, a separation of the value chain steps ‘network 
operation’ and ‘sales and distribution of service’ has not been achieved at this stage of 
Case studies and analyses  
 
 77
market liberalization in Germany: Local access providers install the fixed-lines, 
distribute and also charge for telecommunications service usage. Two thirds of all 
home access lines of alternative local loop access providers are physically provided by 
Deutsche Telekom’s telecommunications channels though interconnection agreements, 
which illustrate the strong dependence on the incumbent operator. 
(2) Long-distance telecommunication networks with fixed lines between switching 
centers link up multiple local loop networks. Long-distance telecommunications 
services can be divided into two segments: Within the national markets, 
interconnection agreements provide access to and allow usage of long-distance 
communication networks. The rights to share networks are provided for fixed and 
minute-rate dependent access fee. In liberalized telecommunication networks, the 
incumbent fixed-line network operator is requested to provide unfettered access to its 
network under the supervision of governmental authorities. The German 
Regulierungsbehörde für Telekommunikation und Post (RegTP) has regulated 
interconnection rates per minute between alternative national fixed-line 
telecommunication networks and networks of incumbent Deutsche Telekom AG. At 
this stage, the rates for fixed-line interconnection cannot be negotiated on the basis of 
minimum contract duration or traffic volumes between parties involved. A second 
market segment for long-distance telecommunications services includes the sharing of 
specific telecommunications transfer volumes. Transfer capacities defined by time, 
distance and transfer bandwidth can be shared on distinct fixed-line network segments. 
In the subsequent service and distribution level of the industry value chain, offered and 
distributed services range from basic services, value-added services to customer 
specific services. Basic services in area of long-distance telecommunications services 
includes the call-by-call selection, pre-selection or direct connection access to fixed-
line communication services and billing for services. Valued-added services cover 
personalized billing, server-based mass fax communication, premium rate numbers, 
voice mailboxes and directory assistance. Value-added services are tailored to 
customer needs and backed by software investments in the switching centers of an 
intelligent fixed-line network. Customer specific services require individual 
investments in telephone terminals and support call center applications or 
videoconferencing. 
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The majority of new entrants in the German fixed-line telecommunications market 
cover the service and distribution level with offerings, based on largely externally 
provided fixed-line transmission capacity. Switched-based new entrants in the fixed-
line telecommunications market not only access fixed-line communication networks 
through interconnection agreements but also operate a limited number of switching 
centers and a basic infrastructure of telecommunications lines. The RegTP considers an 
independently operated switching center and connections to three separate local loops 
an alternative public telecommunications network, that has the right of interconnection 
to the network infrastructure of the national telecommunications incumbent. According 
to legal requirements in Germany, alternative network operators with only one 
independently operated switching center for long-distance telecommunications traffic 
and without independently operated basic infrastructure fulfill the standards of 
alternative network operators. These switch-based resellers as one group of new 
entrants in the German fixed-line telecommunications market generally retail Deutsche 
Telekom AG’s telecommunications services and independently complement this 
portfolio with their value-added services and the deployment of switching centers. 
Switch-based reseller receive transfer capacity from other network operators at 
competitive rates, enhance these services and market the complete offering under their 
brand name. As the interconnection to external transfer capacity represents a major 
cost component, switch-based reseller depend on the availability of transfer capacity at 
competitive rates. Therefore, this access is supervised by the German regulatory 
authorities at the interface between the network and service level of fixed-line industry 
value chain. Enacted in 1998, German law provides only switch-based carriers with 
favorable interconnection rates to Deutsche Telekom’s existing fixed-line network. To 
purchase information transfer capacity, establishing the status of a switch-based carrier 
with limited network investments in one switching center represents a low entry barrier 
easily fulfilled by the majority of alternative network operators. In July 2000, 45 
switch-based und switchless resellers have established operations in Germany. After 
market liberalization, all alternative network operators have initiated drastic price 
reductions in the fixed-line telecommunications market. In 1998, the first year of 
liberalization in the fixed-line market, alternative carriers have offered price reductions 
of up to 30% compared to standard Deutsche Telekom rates. Although falling retail 
prices of 71% for fixed line communication services in 1998 (Heise 2000) have caused 
a strong traffic growth of 60 percent over all three years of market liberalization (Idate 
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2001; RegTP 2001), the prices leadership position could not be sustained. In 2000, 
only marginal price differences exist to the incumbent Deutsche Telekom AG, which 
makes changing the provider attractive only in selected cases. In first quarter of 2000, 
22 percent of the entire information volume has been transferred on networks of 
alternative carriers, which accounts for a 25 percent revenue share in the German 
fixed-line telecommunications market. In the same period, the 45 percent of the 
transfer volume on alternative networks have used a call-by-call selection of the 
provider, which allows a case-by-case selection of the preferred network. The 
remaining information volume has utilized the default pre-selection (42 percent) or the 
direct connection to alternative carrier (13 percent), which also allow for a case-by-
case choice of competitive carriers. The high flexibility of network operator usage 
allows a very low general level of customer loyalty, whose improvement is seen as an 
important priority among all operators of fixed-line telecommunications services. 
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2.3.2 Elisa Kommunikation GmbH 
Following the consolidation cycle of the telecommunications industry, Elisa 
Kommunikation has initially developed a broad portfolio of city carriers, which have 
been later operationally integrated through majority stakes. Cost reductions and 
efficiency improvements require this intensification of relationships to consistently 
search and implement best practices across all equity holdings. 
Business background 
Coordinating providers for fixed-line telecommunication services 
Elisa Kommunikation – the German subsidiary of the major Finnish telecom operator 
Elisa Corporation – develops and consolidates all regional operations and equity 
holdings in Germany. In its internationalization and expansion strategies, Elisa 
Communications Corp. based in Helsinki considers Germany a very promising 
European target market (Elisa Kommunikation 2002). 
“Elisa with its 40 percent market share in Finland has only limited 
growth potential in very saturated markets. However, Elisa’s 
shareholders require continuing growth: Germany was selected as 
Europe’s largest telecom market with deregulation of Deutsche 
Telekom still in progress. Due to open market conditions, all additional 
players face tough competition. […] Elisa Communications Corp. has 
invested substantially in Germany which has led to a conglomerate of 
equity stakes.” 
(Pertti Laukkanen, Managing Director, Elisa Kommunikation) 
Elisa Kommunikation in Germany provides local loop fixed-line access, retails mobile 
communication products and provides long distance communication services for third 
party operators. Fixed-line access is mainly targeted towards small and medium size 
enterprises, large enterprises operating in local markets, public authorities and 
independent business owners (Elisa Kommunikation 2002). 
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Elisa’s activities in Germany have initially been launched with the incorporation of its 
consulting business Helsinki Telecom Deutschland (HTD) in 1995. HTD has provided 
advisory services to a variety of emerging city carriers including filing for an 
operator’s license with the Regulatory Authority for Telecommunications and Posts 
(RegTP), negotiating interconnection fees with Deutsche Telekom AG, defining market 
entry strategies, implementing services and optimizing processes: 
“The HTD consulting business has given us valuable initial insights 
into the German [carrier] market. […] The team from HTD knew 
where and how to invest which enabled us quickly and in the matter of 
months to build up a portfolio of equity stakes.” 
(Pertti Laukkanen) 
After midyear 1998, Elisa Kommunikation extended its consulting services to the 
acquisition of minority equity stakes in local telecommunications companies. In the 
process of a deregulating German fixed-line communications market, municipal utility 
companies have founded regional city carriers as business development initiatives. 
Since the beginning of 2001, Elisa Kommunikation has launched a consolidation 
process and now assumes centralized corporate leadership for multiple city carriers in 
Germany. After February 2002, Elisa’s operational sub-unit and legal entity Tropolys 
holds and integrates 13 mainly majority equity stakes. 
After 1990 with the beginning of deregulation in the German telecommunications 
market, municipal utility providers and local state-owned banks founded the first local 
loop telecommunication providers. In particular, utility companies have started to 
install passive voice and data transmission infrastructure. Although market 
liberalization enabled early market entry, significant subsequent prices later eroded 
revenue potential to an unexpected extent. 
“During liberalization of telecommunications markets, an unexpected 
price decrease has reduced margins substantially. At the same time, 
high investments in active communication technology made it very 
difficult for all city carriers to achieve reasonable profits. With very 
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rare exceptions, all city carriers have accumulated high losses without 
the ability for loss reductions and further business development.” 
(Fritz Rademacher, Manager Strategic Planning, Tropolys) 
Responding to market shifts, Elisa Kommunikation’s and Tropolys’ network of city 
carriers seeks sustainable improvements in cost structure in a consolidating and 
increasingly competitive fixed-line telecom industry. Cost reduction potential can be 
achieved by the installation of jointly used communication platforms for network 
infrastructure, consolidated customer billing or shared administrative services. 
Supported by a consolidating and coordinated infrastructure backbone, local city 
carriers can then leverage their existing strengths of local market identity and presence 
required for sustainable customer acquisition (Elisa Kommunikation 2001a). 
“In early stages of the market, one could realize that city carriers 
cannot survive due to their small scale. Drastically reduced telephone 
rates in terms of price per minute have rendered high investment 
volumes unprofitable. Previous historical business plans of city carriers 
were based on totally different assumptions. Cooperation and 
coordination were a clear requirement.” 
(Pertti Laukkanen) 
To establish and maintain coordination, Elisa Kommunikation has started to raise 
equity stakes in city carriers and to integrate operational processes within the network 
under its sub-unit Tropolys. In this process, equity stakes without a fit to the 
consolidation strategy or the option to hold majority stakes have been divested. 
With the integration of 13 city carriers, Tropolys as the operational sub-unit represents 
the largest city carrier in Germany competing with Deutsche Telekom’s fixed-line 
business. Over 100,000 customers connect directly to network and a bundled service 
offering. Supported by the nationwide and long distance backbone network of 
ElisaNet, all local city carrier customers have access to high quality long distance calls 
at competitive internal rates.  
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Future expansion in additional city carrier operations has been centered on the highly 
populated areas in North Rhine-Westphalia, Rhine-Main/Saarland and East Germany. 
To prevent direct competition with integrated fixed-line operator Arcor in major 
German cities, further expansion builds on acquisitions of city carriers in small and 
medium sized cities with a strong industrial infrastructure (Elisa Kommunikation 
2001a). 
Network structure: Growth, development and selection of network participants 
Following initial equity investments and continuing growth, Elisa has later sorted and 
integrated a portfolio of city carriers. With an initial nucleus of city carriers in North 
Rhine-Westphalia, cash flow shortages of many existing access providers and the 
entire telecommunications industry, the clear needs for consolidation propelled the 
growth of this operational network of local loop access providers. Elisa’s alliance 
network development can be broken down into establishing the initial footprint, 
continuing growth, selective consolidation and operational integration. 
Establishing the initial footprint: In 1998, Elisa Kommunikation developed the first 
footprint with an equity stake in Citykom, which was followed by minority stake 
investments in JelloCom, HTP and Nordcom in 1999. Elisa has complemented the 
emerging portfolio of city carriers with the incorporation of mobile retail chain 
Mäkitorrpa with 100 outlets in Germany (Elisa Kommunikation 2002). Although 
facilitated by market insights of the consulting unit HTD, this first wave of acquisitions 
of city carriers in Germany lacked an overall coordination and focus: 
“In the first phase of acquisitions, additional coordination and 
alignment of operations was lacking and clearly required.” 
(Pertti Laukkanen) 
Continuing growth: In July 2000, Apax Europe as a financial investor, municipal 
utility companies and Elisa Kommunikation have jointly founded Tropolys – a network 
of city carriers in North Rhine-Westphalia integrating direct stakes in CNE, TeleBel 
and the previously directly owned Citykom. At this early stage, Elisa Kommunikation 
has accepted a 29 percent minority stake in Tropolys. 
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In October 2000, Elisa Kommunikation completely acquired the majority stake in 
TIMe start-up management which integrated 12 fixed-line network operators and city 
carriers through minority and majority stakes. Although also initially focused on 
consolidating local loop access providers, TIMe, later renamed Elisa Asset 
Management, lacked the financial resources to independently implement its strategy. 
The foundation of Tropolys and the acquisition of TIMe were complemented in 2001 
by completely acquiring city carriers enco.tel and pulsaar as well as a national 
backbone later renamed ElisaNet.  
“We completed the direct acquisition of enco.tel in Thuringia which 
was not integrated into one of the sub-holdings and has initially been 
kept as a direct stake of Elisa Kommunikation. The rationale behind 
this was our historical minority stake in Tropolys without the 
perspective of gaining the majority stakeholding later on.” 
(Manuela Peris, Manager Corporate Communication, Elisa 
Kommunikation) 
Tropolys independently acquired 100 percent in two additional city carriers, meocom 
and TeleLev without the dilution of the Elisa equity stake. Elisa discontinued 
consulting services and integrated personnel of HTD into Elisa. As a final investment 
in 2000, Elisa purchased a 51 percent majority stake in Internet access provider 
Webmatic. 
Increasing growth momentum and establishing an even wider footprint in the German 
market have dominated the business year 2000. At this stage and at the end of 2000, 
Elisa Kommunikation held mainly (68 percent of all cases) minority shareholdings in 
its operations. Elisa’s management has then set a differing direction for the two 
consecutive years: 
“The business year 2000 has been characterized by strong growth. 
Through numerous acquisitions we have established a position in the 
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German market. This and the following years will be dominated by 
consolidating the legal entities and operational integration.” 
(Pekka Perttula in (Elisa Kommunikation 2001f)) 
For the consecutive consolidation phase starting in January 2001, the management of 
Elisa Kommunikation has set a clear target for its future portfolio development: 
“Majority stake holdings have always been our clear target, 
continuously backed by ongoing negotiations on multiple levels.” 
(Manuela Peris) 
Under the umbrella of renamed Elisa Asset Management, majority holdings have been 
newly established in MAINZ-KOM, Mainova TK and HU Kom in addition to already 
existing majority stakes in DDKom, tnp, HansaCom and Time City Link. The 
extension of majority stakes has been facilitated by limited access to capital markets 
for other industry participants: 
“Following autumn 2000, access to financial market has been closed. 
Multiple additional investment plans have been reduced and reviewed. 
The current market conditions have propelled the consolidation. In the 
event of cash surplus, no interest for consolidation exists and all 
industry players have full flexibility to grow.” (Pertti Laukkanen) 
Elisa’s majority stake in JelloCom and the fully owned subsidiary enco.tel were 
merged into jetz! with an Elisa stake of 53 percent. The creation of jetz! in May 2001 
complemented the total geographic coverage with the largest city carrier in Thuringia 
(Elisa Kommunikation 2001g). Due to missing fit with the consolidation strategy, 
Elisa sold its stakes in CNS, NordCom and HTP. 
“Since Summer 2001, our main focus was centered around building a 
fully operational and consolidated group. There were some carriers 
with no understanding for our strategy: Some local public utility 
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companies – as stakeholder – had a different opinion on how the 
operations should be organized. In the case of htp in Hanover, we 
therefore divested our stake, because we did not want to utilize 
additional resources.[…] We have also divested NordCom, because 
obtaining the majority of the equity share appeared to be infeasible.” 
(Pertti Laukkanen) 
By August 2001, the consolidation strategy reached full momentum and later led to 
Tropolys as the hub and competence center for further consolidation activities. This 
concentration has been preceded by an agreement in May 2001, that Elisa 
Kommunikation and Tropolys combine parts of their technical platforms and respective 
business units supporting nationwide integration of local and regional city carriers 
(Elisa Kommunikation 2001e). 
“Discussions with Tropolys management helped us to understand that 
we were building parallel and redundant structures. As a five carrier 
group, Tropolys has taken similar ideas into account and needed 
centralized personnel resources, billing and customer care. […] And 
building up parallel resources raised our concerns.” 
(Pertti Laukkanen) 
Within its now five carrier group in 100 percent majority ownership, Tropolys has also 
already begun to detect and implement synergies. Early cooperation on technical 
platforms and first consolidation results made Tropolys appear the better choice as a 
hub for further operational coordination. 
Between the two alternatives – discontinuation of Tropolys and 
integration in Elisa or further expansion we decided for the latter: 
Tropolys had a good management and a more stable organization 
[than Elisa]. [Tropolys] also had a German management – a long-term 
strategic objective for Elisa. After multiple reviews, all scenarios 
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illustrated that integrating all carriers into Tropolys will be the easiest 
and fastest way [to reach our objectives].” 
(Pertti Laukkanen) 
Based on this understanding, Elisa’s management has started negotiations with 
Tropolys shareholders about the integration of the majority of Elisa’s remaining 
carriers in August 2001. Elisa’s clear objective was to reach the majority ownership of 
Tropolys by adding other carriers to Tropolys’ portfolio. 
Operational integration: Streamlining Elisa’s portfolio in the second half of 2001, the 
merged FIT and Elisa Net national carriers have been integrated in the Tropolys 
Group, thus increasing Elisa Kommunikation’s stake to 34 percent (Elisa 
Kommunikation 2001c). This integration has been achieved through a legal agreement 
in the form of a subordination contract (“Betriebsführungsvertrag”) with Tropolys 
management. 
In a final step in December 2001, Tropolys integrated Elisa’s direct holding ‘pulsar’ 
and some portfolio elements of Elisa Asset Management – mainly its majority holdings 
Mainz-Kom, Mainova TK, DDkom, tnp, HU-KOM and HLkomm. Along with this 
integration, the stake of Elisa Kommunikation in Tropolys was increased to a majority 
position of 63 percent. Regarding all other Elisa Asset Management holdings, only the 
majority stake in HANSACOM (90 percent stake) and the 50 percent stake in Time 
City Link as well as all other minority stakes KRM, RMN continue to be directly 
owned by Elisa Kommunikation. In October, Elisa has acquired a 25.3 percent stake in 
the city carrier ChemTel. 
Consolidation closure: As a spin-off in 2002, Elisa Kommunikation sells its minority 
position in 3 T as non-strategic asset to its majority stakeholder Energieversorgung 
Offenbach. Elisa has exercised its preemption rights to increase its stake in ChemTel to 
75 percent in January 2002. Within the first quarter of 2002, the majority stakes in city 
carriers – ChemTel and jetz! – are planned to be integrated in the Tropolys group as 
well (Elisa Kommunikation 2001a). 
“In the case of a 53 percent stake in jetz!, Elisa could easily sell the 53 
percent stake to Tropolys and ask [other stakeholders] – the public 
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utility company – if they would exercise their preemption right for the 
stake. We could take this risk, since the local utility companies have no 
money anyway. But this conduct would generate negative sentiments. 
The preferred way is to offer a waiver for the preemption rights prior to 
the transaction.” 
(Pertti Laukkanen) 
At this stage at the end of January 2002, Tropolys holds stakes in 13 city carriers in its 
operational portfolio. With the only exception of HLkomm, all city carriers are owned 
as majority stakes which allows for the implementation of consolidation initiatives and 
further cost reduction. 
Mäkitorppa (100 %)
TimeCity Link (50 %)
HANSACOM (90 %)
RMN (10 %)
KRM (10 %)
ChemTel (75 %)
jetz! (53 %)
Webmatic (51 %)
HU-KOM (51 %) DDkom (51 %)
MAINZ-KOM (51%) HLkomm (23 %)
Mainova-Kom (51 %) tnp (74 %)
Elisa Asset Management (100 %) CNE (100 %) TeleLev (100 %)
pulsaar (100 %) Telebel (100 %)
Citykom (100 %) meocom (100 %)
Elisa Net (100 %)
Tropolys (63 %)
Elisa Kommunikation
 
Exhibit 2-9 Elisa Kommunikation: Portfolio 31/01/2002 
The integration of Elisa Kommunikation’s city carrier into Tropolys has proven a good 
option to achieve majority stakeholding without additional cash investments. 
According to Elisa’s management principles, limited financial resources should be 
only invested in the direct acquisition of city carriers and their operational integration. 
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Direct stake Consolidated stake Direct stake
Consolidated 
stake Direct stake
Consolidated 
stake
Tropolys 29% 29% 34%
Citykom 100% 29% 100% 29% 100% 34%
CNE 100% 29% 100% 29% 100% 34%
Telebel 100% 29% 100% 29% 100% 34%
meocom 100% 29% 100% 34%
TeleLev 100% 29% 100% 34%
Elisa Net 100% 34%
Pulsaar 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
enco.tel 100% 100%
JelloCom 20% 20% 20% 20%
HTP 50% 50% 50% 50%
NordCom 25% 25% 25% 25%
ChemTel 25% 25%
jetz! 53% 53%
Webmatic 51% 51%
Elisa Net 100% 100% 100% 100%
FIT 50% 50% 50% 50%
HTD 100% 100%
Mäkitorppa 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
TIMe, Elisa Asset Management 100% 100% 100%
3T 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10%
MAINZ-KOM 20% 20% 20% 20% 51% 51%
Mainova TK 60% 60% 60% 60% 51% 51%
DDkom 51% 51% 51% 51% 51% 51%
Time City Link 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50%
CNS 40% 40% 40% 40% 0%
tnp 75% 75% 75% 75% 75% 75%
KRM 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10%
RMN 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10%
HansaCom 50% 50% 90% 90% 90% 90%
HU-KOM 10% 10% 10% 10% 51% 51%
HLkomm 23% 23% 23% 23% 23%
Lkomm 100% 23%
3H 100% 23%
TelSA 100% 23%
Number of majority stakes [%, absolut] 28% 7                    32% 8                     43% 10                  
Number of minority stakes [%, absolut] 72% 18                  68% 17                   57% 13                  
Number of majority stakes [%, absolut] 22% 5                    29% 7                     38% 8                    
Number of minority stakes [%, absolut] 78% 18                  71% 17                   62% 13                  
Elisa Kommunikation
21.7.2000 1.12.2000 5.11.2001
 
Exhibit 2-10 Elisa Kommunikation: Equity stakes in percent from 07/2000 to 11/2001
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Network adjustment 
Market insight for equity stake acquisitions and subsequent integration 
Elisa Kommunikation has used its market insights into the telecommunications market 
to develop minority relationships. Early investment decisions have been driven by an 
optimistic market outlook and opportunity of benefit sharing. Price decreases in the 
telecommunications markets and limited access to financial markets force carriers to 
consolidate and cooperate. 
For the early equity investments, HTD’s involvement with consulting services in the 
liberalizing German telecom market have enabled the first company assessments and 
facilitated the due diligence process for them. Support in business plan development 
has initiated early contacts with the city carriers prior to the equity holding. After  
longer and trustful partnerships, minority equity stakes in city carriers represented a 
logical consequence for Elisa. With growing momentum of equity acquisitions Elisa 
Kommunikation was already known in the marketplace as an investor with 
consolidation interests.  
“Under the topic of consolidation, Elisa is known in the marketplace as 
a buyer and has realized after early decisions that other firms have 
approached Elisa for a potential interest in an equity stake in them.” 
(Manuela Peris) 
City carriers to be integrated in the Tropolys group in some cases have also had an 
established relationship with the group. In the case of ChemTel, the carrier has – prior 
to the integration – built up technical know-how and provided a joint technical 
platform in the form of shared switches for the relay of voice services (Elisa 
Kommunikation 2001b). 
Therefore in the case of Tropolys, alliance network growth does not depend on 
referrals to the current network, since only a limited number of companies there 
operate local communication services and industry participants know all of the major 
operators. However, in some cases, the informal network of municipal utility 
companies can also be leveraged to promote Tropolys’ strategy within the industry. 
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Prior to the integration, focus is on the management of local utility providers as major 
stakeholders, which in many cases openly appreciate the integration of city carriers in 
the Tropolys group: 
“The agreed [integration of ChemTel] opens up additional and 
economically significant contacts to our company and the city of 
Chemnitz. At the same time, we increase our options in the interesting 
market for telecommunication services.” 
(Karl Gerhard Degreif, Member of the board, local utility provider, 
Chemitz) in (Elisa Kommunikation 2001b) 
Historically, most of the city carriers were founded as business development initiatives 
of local utility companies. For the duration of Elisa’s portfolio extensions, local utility 
companies in many cases have either held historical majority stakes or continue to hold 
minority stakes in city carriers. For in-depth cooperation with and integration of once 
locally developed and owned city carriers, aligned goals represent a critical 
prerequisite for the achievement of synergies. 
Due to continuing relationships after Elisa’s initial investments, acquisition decisions 
are initiated and completed only in close cooperation with municipal utility companies 
as important stakeholders and local partners. City carriers across Germany are very 
much embedded in the development of regions and local communities: 
“Not everything can be explained by numbers, there are a number of 
mental [and emotional] factors to be considered: [Elisa] wants to 
maintain that city carriers are locally very important. During my visit 
to ChemTel in Chemnitz, [I learned that] the people involved are very 
proud of everything they have built up and know that the municipal 
utility company is involved. 
Case studies and analyses  
 92
[Customers] very much trust ChemTel and want to use their local 
services instead of national telecom services.” 
(Pertti Laukkanen) 
This strong embeddedness of city carriers in regional economic relationships stems 
from majority state ownership, long lasting political ties to constituents, and deep 
involvement with city authorities for construction. Local utility company management 
feels a deep sense of ownership for its locally developed city carrier and considers it 
highly embedded in its local community. 
Sense of ownership and embeddedness in some cases represents the motivation for the 
former stakeholder to continuously keep minority stakes in “their” city carriers even 
after the integration into Tropolys. In these specific cases, the offer to the municipal 
utility companies to receive a direct equity stake in Tropolys after integration has been 
rejected. As utility management with its local ties and responsibilities also has to 
consider interests of other municipal authorities, city councils and politicians, they 
prefer to maintain local, direct ownership. 
Therefore, Elisa management has to take into account the interests of their partners and 
stakeholders. In the case of ‘pulsar’, prior majority stakeholders clearly expect from 
Elisa Kommunikation’s ownership to reach additional customer groups, to push new 
product development, to generate synergies in technical operations such as billing and 
to access a national communication backbone (Elisa Kommunikation 2000). 
But, Elisa also wants to maintain regional links for future business development and 
marketing initiatives. Sales support and operations also remain an important area of 
continuing collaboration, since the regional partners and former majority stakeholders 
can most effectively target local businesses as an attractive customer segment. Both 
disincentives and benefits of strong local ties require active communication and 
coordination to maintain these valuable relationships: 
“The advantage of having many local utility companies as local 
partners turns into a disadvantage due to all activities in supervisory 
boards. Almost half of my time is spent on discussions with 
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stakeholders. Particularly in this phase, one is required to 
communicate extensively to alleviate concerns.” 
(Pertti Laukkanen) 
In the process of future partner selection, Elisa’s due diligence process clearly follows 
predefined legal, technical and business review steps. Elisa’s technical experts assess 
the state of the technical equipment, further investment requirements and capacity 
utilization. Business reviews involve the evaluation of operational processes, 
marketing expenditures and market potentials. An established brand with close ties in 
the regional telecommunications market, established technical infrastructure, a location 
in small or medium-sized cities and satisfactory operating results demonstrated by 
potentially already positive EBITDA are mentioned as positive selection criteria for an 
integration into the Elisa Kommunikation and Tropolys group (Elisa Kommunikation 
2001d). The general paradigm of Elisa’s majority holdings in city carriers imposes 
certain limits for further network growth: 
“In the case of integrating an additional large city carrier without an 
Elisa stake, our equity holding in Tropolys would be diluted. This is an 
important aspect of integration, which we don’t fully appreciate. We 
could reduce the momentum of this acquisition growth, but we do not 
see that as your objective. […] Legal clauses prevent any dilution of 
Elisa’s stake in the event of capital increase.” 
(Pertti Laukkanen) 
Although capital increase requires financial resources, Elisa corporation in Finland or 
Elisa Kommunikation in Germany would most likely be able to meet the requirements. 
Divestiture of minority equity stakes mainly to current majority equity holders has 
freed up cash flows for increasing equity stakes in consolidated sets of city carriers 
(Elisa Kommunikation 2001f). This ensures at any time Elisa’s majority stake in 
Tropolys as the dominating paradigm and very important management principle. The 
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early experience with these minority equity positions held by Elisa has developed and 
affirmed the validity of this management guideline. 
“Our approach has been to learn from Elisa’s mistakes. According to 
our perspective, it has been a mistake to hold minority equity positions 
[…] because it is very difficult to locally determine the business 
direction. Elisa has then faced the result of decentralized units 
operating independently and the impossibility of aligning interest.” 
„Elisa has then clearly changed its strategy: We – as Tropolys – only 
want to hold majority equity positions and the equity stakes that cannot 
be transformed into a majority holding will be sold. […] Four years 
ago, it seemed impossible to buy majority holdings from self-confident 
municipal utility companies. […] But today, if someone does not want 
to give up a majority stake, the company does not represent an 
interesting target for us.” 
(Dr. Fritz  Rademacher) 
Operational coordination 
Identifying and implementing consolidation potential within the carrier network 
Elisa’s subsidiary Tropolys holds the portfolio of city carriers to be integrated 
operationally and coordinates processes to achieve synergies. Synergies can be 
achieved by cost efficient fixed network operation, more integrated shared services, 
marketing harmonization and streamlined sales operations. 
Network operation and shared services: The transfer of ElisaNet in July 2001 from 
Elisa Kommunikation to Tropolys has enabled network operation improvements. The 
24 points of interconnection (POI) to the network of Deutsche Telekom can be used as 
a communication platform for all regional carriers to reduce interconnection costs 
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(Elisa Kommunikation 2001d). Bundling national communication traffic allows for 
routing optimization. For active network equipment, purchasing frame agreements 
with equipment providers generate additional savings in the procurement of technical 
infrastructure. Increased purchasing volumes can be leveraged for volume-based price 
reductions. Shared services for governmental regulation, legal services, financial 
controlling, human resource administration and accounting are currently harmonized 
through common standards. Governmental regulation and legal services are performed 
by cooperating city carriers. Support for human resource administration, financial 
controlling and accounting depends on Tropolys and Elisa resources. 
Marketing harmonization: Small and medium sized enterprises, regional companies 
and public authorities and high volume private customers require a standardized set of 
unified products such as ISDN, international calls, DSL and Internet products at 
comparable prices. Important customer ownership and loyalty, however, can mainly be 
achieved by offering multiple services through one provider. Although harmonization 
and standardization dominates Tropolys’ carriers, Elisa Management does not expect 
product-based network effects for usage of telecommunications services. Only roughly 
15 percent of all calls are made within the national network, although Elisa city 
carriers frequently serve public authorities and municipal utility companies with high 
internal communication requirements. Harmonization of products targets productivity 
improvements through unified billing and customer care, but is kept within defined 
boundaries constrained by the local sense of ownership:  
“Many mixed sentiments and personal preferences among former 
equity stakeholders have to be considered. Labeling [and re-branding] 
the locally embedded entity would raise multiple eyebrows. […] 
Marketing is currently being centralized, excluding the brands, 
however. Cost reductions are mainly achieved by harmonization for 
standard products such as unit alignment for communication services, 
which enables the synchronization of billing systems. […]” 
(Pertti Laukkanen) 
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Since constraints apply for marketing and advertising communication, local city carrier 
brands will remain unchanged to demonstrate local identity and to preserve the 
differentiating factor in comparison to the Deutsche Telekom AG. 
“For communication services, the central marketing provides the basic 
layout, photos and visuals, which is then done only once and 
customized to the local city carrier to a limited extent.” 
(Manuela Peris) 
In addition to this product and marketing communication harmonization, pricing 
structures, regional customer care and billing centers within the three Tropolys focus 
regions Rhine-Main-Saar, North Rhine-Westphalia, New Laender will be harmonized 
as well. 
Streamlining sales operations: As sales operations and direct distribution represent a 
major differentiating factor in the market and at the same time a weakness of many city 
carriers, activities in this area specifically require national alignment: The Tropolys 
group insists on group-wide harmonization of customer groups around a four column 
approach to fulfill their standards: Telecommunication carriers, municipal customers, 
small und medium-sized enterprises and residential customers. 
Responsibility reallocation in marketing and sales faces the obstacle of a strong 
historical sense of ownership for local customers. Key accounts, however, with 
national communication service offerings and unified pricing call for a reallocation of 
responsibility to the holding level. Especially in the case of highly important 
customers, reallocation of responsibilities significantly raises the level of conflict. 
Therefore, marketing executives and their respective departments in the Tropolys 
group had to make the largest adjustments. 
Although integration of city carriers into Tropolys yields significant efficiency 
improvements in the area described in this chapter, both determination and 
implementation of best practices required facilitation: 
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“[Tropolys] has set up workshops to determine strengths and 
weaknesses of carriers and mutual exchange opportunities. […] The 
strong requirement for cost reduction is in many cases inconvenient for 
the local corporation that was once independent.” (Pertti Laukkanen) 
Starting with the launch of Tropolys, the installation of functional boards realizes 
coordination and harmonization between city carriers: Besides managing directors, 
second level executives for sales, marketing, governmental regulation exchange best 
practices and know-how and decide within their functional responsibilities on a very 
regular basis. The vertical exchange of information motivates employees and serves as 
a decision committee for further integration and harmonization. 
Boards have been set up to fill in for missing centralized holding level and Tropolys 
resources not to review but also to make decisions within their functional areas. 
Tropolys executives lead boards with full functional responsibility and a solid 
understanding of Tropolys’ interests and objectives. At this stage of the larger 13-
carrier group, the current structure of boards is under review: With the problem of too 
many committee members, Tropolys has decided to limit participation to fewer and 
more competent individuals. 
Although “guided facilitation” aims at supporting the integration process, the external 
control of business process from marketing to network operation was not always 
welcome by previously independent companies and their senior management. On 
issues such as HR, communication to local management was clear and unambiguous: 
“[Elisa] wants to exercise more control over your business unit [the 
city carrier]. And from now on you don’t need a personnel department 
anymore, because we centralize that and so on.” 
(Pertti Laukkanen) 
Not all changes within the local network carriers have been met with full 
understanding. Local personnel in some cases has not been fully supportive in finding 
and implementing synergy potential: These adaptations across the network of city 
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carriers demanded changes in the leadership team in each of the city carriers, which 
has resulted in the loss of valuable human resources. 
“Either this policy receives understanding and is welcome or one 
would have to replace the responsible managing director. This change 
process has demanded casualties: The local managing directors in 
many cases do not understand that their new duties have changed.” 
(Pertti Laukkanen) 
„In the first year of Tropolys’ five carrier group, we had to replace the 
managing director in almost every city carrier, not due to poor 
performance but due to a lack of understanding for our strategy.“ 
(Dr. Fritz Rademacher) 
Particularly personnel decisions influenced by centralized personnel development 
often remain touchy subjects, as this frequently involves second level executives 
reporting to the local managing director. According to Elisa’s and Tropolys’ policies, 
local managing directors retain the authority to decide, but Tropolys leverages its 
influence if necessary and applicable. 
Since the total city carrier alliance network around Tropolys has been very much 
focused only on detecting and implementing synergy potential, both Tropolys and 
regional local loop access providers lack the competency to innovate and develop new 
service offerings. In the current industry environment, innovations in value-added 
services and high-speed Internet access have been intentionally delayed and are not 
expected as collaboration from the carrier group. 
Network objectives and performance 
Expanding the revenue base and reducing cost base across the enlarged group 
The consolidation under the leadership of Tropolys creates the largest network of 13 
city carriers in Germany with targeted revenues of  € 150 million. With more than 
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100,000 customers, the combined network represents the largest private 
telecommunications provider in Germany (Elisa Kommunikation 2001d). For 2002, 
the enlarged group predicts a 130 percent increase over last year’s revenues. In 2001, 
Tropolys already generated a revenue increase of 50 percent with 55,000 customers. In 
contrast to telecom industry trends, Tropolys expects to break even in 2002 with an 
EBITDA (Earnings before income tax depreciation and amortization) of € 7.5 million. 
(Elisa Kommunikation 2001a) 
On the daily operational level, sales operations as a major differentiator are controlled 
by the Tropolys holding on a daily, weekly and monthly basis: sales channel, type of 
customer, revenue projections. On a monthly basis, sales results are shared between all 
city carriers to evaluate it for internal benchmarking and internal ranking. This system 
allows for continuous tracking and involvement on a management by exception basis. 
To track efficiency improvements in network operations, performance indicators such 
as number of direct customer lines per technical employee, network costs per revenue, 
the investment volume per revenue or others are tracked on a quarterly basis. All these 
indicators demonstrate performance enhancements especially in the area of human 
resource capacity in charge of the network operation. 
Initial resource base and development 
Learning to subsequently grow and coordinate similar network members 
From 1999 until 2001, Elisa and Tropolys developed capabilities to perform due 
diligence processes, to coordinate a network of city carriers through the exchange of 
best practices and to centrally perform selective functions. 
Due diligence skills facilitate the selection of promising city carriers and the transfer 
into the Tropolys portfolio for further integration in the alliance network. Early 
consulting engagements and minority stakes have clearly helped to develop a good 
understanding of city carriers’ operations. A broader understanding of the acquisition 
target represents very valuable input for the decision to invest in majority equity 
shares. The high level of continuous commitment to the city carrier requires an 
extensive due diligence process as described in chapter 0. According to the staged 
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network growth in number of holdings and intensity of the relationship, this capability 
has been built up in sequences. 
With the integration of several city carriers, Tropolys has developed network 
coordination and cost focused consolidation capabilities: 
„We are on track to achieve a homogeneous group of city carriers and 
an improved competitive position. The management of Tropolys has 
demonstrated their consolidation capabilities.“ (Laukkanen, Elisa 
Kommunikation in (Elisa Kommunikation 2001a)) 
Without alliance network management capabilities in the beginning, Tropolys had to 
learn how to initiate and maintain alliance networks during daily operations. In the 
case of not completely owned subsidiaries, important decisions are taken carefully, 
justified and communicated diligently. The capability of implementing decisions 
through consensus, discussion and direct instruction has developed slowly over time. 
Learning processes in this area have been initiated earlier by Elisa and then continued 
later with the incorporation of Tropolys. 
“[Tropolys] has tackled [the integration] vigorously and forced the 
companies to implement something. […] With today’s knowledge, it has 
been very beneficial to participate in this learning curve [of how to 
deal with decentralized units], but now as we do not only have 
decentralized units but also self-confident equity stakeholders we have 
to proceed more cautiously. We are in the middle of a learning process 
that hopefully progresses quickly to reduce the level of conflict. At the 
beginning, we paid little attention to the interests of other stakeholders, 
also due to the fact that we did not know them. 
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Now we know the [interests of our stakeholders], because they have 
clearly brought their objectives to our attention and we are considerate 
of their needs.” 
(Dr. Fritz Rademacher) 
Especially after adding new city carriers, streamlining marketing activities and 
harmonizing product variety, the level of conflict with new network firms increased: 
City carriers endeavor to keep their products with local customer acceptance and feel 
strong ownership of a larger product portfolio. Although management teams have 
accepted the overall revenue and profit goals, influences on operational practices have 
considered an independent area. Combination of pressure, lobbying for a mutual 
understanding and replacement of personnel facilitated integration implementation. 
With these learning effects, Tropolys now has a better understanding of city carriers’ 
interests and of their strengths and weaknesses. In the process of managing the 
conflict, Tropolys has also learned to set up functional boards to detect, implement and 
control activities for consolidation and cost reduction. 
Besides these facilitative skills, Tropolys has developed some centralized and 
functional business capabilities in accounting standards and systems: Former utility-
based cost accounting systems – although detailed and precise – have proven to be too 
slow for controlling and reporting daily operations. Tropolys has developed accounting 
standards, policies and systems that mandate and enable full and compatible P&L cost 
accounting on the 9th of the consecutive month across the complete carrier group. 
Consolidated accounting policies result from Elisa Corporations financial accounting 
and shareholder information obligations of its public listing in Finland. Although 
technical difficulties for up-to-date accounting information initially appeared a major 
obstacle, the reduction of managerial resistance now makes rapid and unified cost and 
public accounting a reality for the whole group. After harmonizing accounting systems 
for historical numbers in 1.5 years, Tropolys is now working on developing 
appropriate group-wide forecasting tools. 
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2.3.3 Within-case study analysis 
As Elisa Kommunikation regards the liberalizing German telecommunications market 
as an important growth opportunity, its partnership and investment history cover 
expansion, selection and intensification of partnerships. In its core business area, Elisa 
and Tropolys provide fixed-line voice and data transmission through a web of regional 
city carriers. Consulting services mainly for municipal utility providers established the 
initial footprint in the German market and a strong knowledge base of industry 
participants, their capabilities, cost structures and market conditions. 
Strong knowledge base and well-developed consulting business contacts facilitated the 
establishment of relationships on the basis of minority equity relationships. Minority 
equity investments helped in the more detailed assessment of city carriers’ capabilities. 
At this stage in November 2001, price decreases in the fixed-line telecommunications 
market have mandated the implementation of efficiency improvements in city carriers. 
After the assessment of potential efficiency improvements and fit to consolidation 
strategy, former mainly minority stakes in 24 city carriers have either been extended to 
majority shareholdings or divested to third party stakeholders. Some resistance to this 
concept of a consolidated group of thirteen city carriers can certainly be explained by a 
clear loss in entrepreneurial autonomy. However, drastic and unexpected price 
reductions as well as underestimated investments in telecommunication hardware as 
external industry factors provided the needed support to convince local management: 
Existing economics in the operation of local loop access providers make the 
independent operation of city carriers unprofitable. 
Centered around the highly populated areas in North Rhine-Westphalia, Rhine-
Main/Saarland and East Germany, the network of city carrier investments has evolved 
gradually from 1998. After a sequence of investments without a clear regional and 
conceptual focus, the foundation of Tropolys in July 2001 introduced the concept of an 
integrated network of city carriers. Only at this early stage, Elisa did accept a minority 
stake in the newly founded entity of three local loop access providers. The later 
acquisition of TIMe start-up management in October 2000 has underlined the 
commitment to a network of fixed-line communication providers. All further 
acquisitions have not been integrated under the Tropolys group, because the long-term 
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objective of achieving majority ownership in this company could not be warranted at 
this early stage of network evolution. 
Due to very limited access to the capital market as the dominating external industry 
factor, the consolidation of the earlier growth strategy achieved its full momentum in 
2001. Elisa’s objective of obtaining and holding majority stakes has been facilitated by 
stakeholders with limited cash without many options for third party financing. 
In August 2001, Tropolys – now a five carrier group through independent acquisitions 
– has been determined as the hub for all consolidation activities: Previously gained 
experience in defining and implementing the consolidation strategy as well as Elisa’s 
opportunity to achieve a majority stake in this company, made this company the new 
‘center of gravity’ for the city carrier network. This decision has been preceded by 
operational integration of technical platforms and the observation that Elisa and 
Tropolys have developed redundant organizational structures. In December 2001, 
negotiations with all remaining city carrier stakeholders have resulted in the highly 
expanded network of twelve city carriers and one national backbone. This major 
consolidation step allowed for Elisa’s 63 percent majority ownership in Tropolys. As a 
final step, the merged city carriers of ChemTel and jetz! are to be integrated in the first 
quarter of 2002 to complement the group of thirteen carriers and one provider for 
national long distance communications services (see dark gray area in Exhibit 2-11). 
With the only exception of the minority stake in HLkomm, Tropolys owns all city 
carriers as direct majority stakes, which enables consolidation initiatives to be rolled 
out across the entire group. 
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Exhibit 2-11 Elisa & Tropolys: Direct minority and majority holdings in 
telecommunications service providers 
Over the course of network evolution from 1998 to 2002, Elisa has gained valuable 
information on the fixed-line telecommunications market and the capabilities of local 
loop access providers. Trustful consulting relationships have later been extended to 
minority equity shareholdings. Since the number of competitors with similar business 
models is fairly limited, Elisa was known quickly as an investor with consolidation 
objectives. Therefore, generating leads for new investment proposals does depend on 
referrals out of the current network and has not represented an obstacle for the further 
evolution of a network of service providers. 
Due to experience gained through the number of transactions and importance of the 
decision to integrate an additional city carrier, the due diligence process prior to the 
investment decision covers extensive legal, technical and business perspectives. As an 
important component, clear and established evaluation criteria guide the assessment 
process. The overall strategic objective of consolidating operations as outlined above 
mandates majority ownership to ensure implementation of consolidation activities. 
Therefore, achieving and maintaining this majority ownership status throughout the 
entire evolution of the city carrier network is of paramount importance and may not be 
diluted by an increased acquisition growth rate. 
Although generating leads for potential investment targets does not represent an 
obstacle, integrating new city carriers in the network of partners imposes significant 
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managerial challenges. Founded as sub-units of municipal utility companies, city 
carriers are highly embedded in the network of local authorities, state-owned 
enterprises and municipalities. Gradually removing city carriers out of these 
dependencies with possibly complex and conflicting objectives requires active change 
management by Elisa’s and Tropolys’ management. This transition process also 
requires internal adaptations to processes, organizational structures and personnel with 
awareness for the beneficial regional relationships that have clear benefits for customer 
acquisition. In all cases, this transition process needs to be induced by benefits for city 
carriers: Access to additional customer groups, development of new products and 
generation of synergies in clerical processes. 
As described in the case study, the achievement of cost reduction potential depends on 
the consolidation of network operations and shared services, harmonization of 
marketing and streamlining of sales operations. Although all of these resources have a 
certain business impact, these ‘commodities’ do not represent the important 
differentiating factor for city carrier selection by end customers: The operation of a 
switched fixed-line communication network requires the application of cost-efficient 
routing through the network and selective sourcing of network components. Customer 
billing and service performs the economical processing of invoices according to 
communication service usage. Shared services in human resources, controlling and 
finance are mainly targeted towards internal customers and support other departments 
in providing customer services. Therefore, only ‘commodity’ and less valuable 
resources are consolidated to achieve economies of scale. Interestingly, other resources 
such as the proud identity of ‘a locally run city carrier’, brands or customer access have 
been kept at local city carrier level. Based on earlier experience and the anticipated 
high level of disagreement between headquarters and their subsidiaries, both Elisa and 
Tropolys concluded that the transfer of these more valuable resources as a clear 
indication for high degree of integration appeared infeasible at this stage. 
Functional boards with the clear directive of Tropolys’ management have facilitated 
the achievement of feasible efficiency improvements. With the launch of Tropolys, 
functional boards bear the responsibility of identifying improvement potential, 
determining appropriate measures and tracking the consolidation results. Although 
complex functional organizational structures, these functional boards establish alliance 
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structures between city carriers on the vertical level. Although the need for cooperation 
is clearly acknowledged, establishment of these functional boards through Tropolys’ 
management seems a clear requirement for their formation. Tropolys as the 
coordinating entity seems to have the responsibility to coordinate the form of 
cooperation and alleviate the obstacles of know-how exchange. Although all city 
carriers through their distinct regions should not have any competitive relationships, 
they do, however, apply a very similar business model. Exchanging knowledge on how 
to improve city carrier operations faces obstacles: With a sense of pride for regional 
development, locally tailored solutions and entrepreneurial independence, local city 
carrier management has problems with taking outside advice on how to alleviate their 
operational problems. Therefore, Tropolys does not only need to facilitate cooperation, 
but also to enforce identification and implementation of consolidation potential. This 
enforcement is backed by majority ownership of any city carrier, which requires 
upfront investment in these stakes, but also provides the opportunity of settings 
objectives for senior city carrier management. 
As Tropolys has finally grown into a larger thirteen-carrier group, the complexity of 
these functional boards has been reduced to include only the most knowledgeable 
representatives of city carrier line management. 
Elisa and Tropolys at the center of this network of integrated city carriers have clearly 
established the resources of conducting a thorough due diligence process. In the area of 
operational integration, Tropolys’ management as the entity responsible for 
coordinating the network has also gone through a learning process. A high level of 
conflict with city carriers’ sales and marketing functions, loss of senior management 
and conflicting interests with still existing minority stakeholders have signaled the 
limits of influence in previously independent organizations. The consecutive learning 
process has outlined the barrier of Tropolys’ external control, fostered awareness of 
stakeholders’ objectives and underlined the value of facilitative coordination in the 
form of functional boards. All these components make up the specific alliance 
management capability of Tropolys. The ‘commodity’ resource shifts mentioned above 
in the context of operational coordination provide learning opportunities on the 
operational resources of city carriers. Besides these operational learning benefits, 
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Tropolys monitors the success of integration efforts through harmonized controlling 
and forecasting tools. 
Although the revenue growth is largely driven by external acquisitions, the 
implementation of consolidation activities seems to have a first impact on EBITDA 
profits. In addition, closely tracked operational indicators illustrate performance 
enhancements in the targeted areas of marketing and network operation. 
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2.4 Alliance networks for providing online services 
Both mobile and Internet communication networks provide the platform for innovative 
online services. Since many services developed and integrated from MSN, E-plus, 
Lycos and Sonera Zed go through their early stages of innovation and face uncertainty 
in customer preferences, respective alliance networks show rapid cycles of change. 
2.4.1 Industry context 
Telecommunications services covering fixed-line voice telephony, leased lines, 
switched data services and mobile telephony service account for € 218 billion or 33% 
of the telecommunications and information technology markets in Western Europe as 
described in chapter 2.2.1. In Germany, telecom service segments account for € 46.6 
billion with a € 14 billion share of mobile telephony services. 
In August 2001, 55.1 million analogue and digital mobile telephony subscribers in 
Germany pushed the penetration rate in Germany up to 67% of the total population. 
Based on the number of service subscribers, the market for mobile communication 
services is dominated by a strong duopoly represented by the incumbent mobile 
network T-Mobile D1 with 40.5% and the close follower Vodafone D2 with 39.7%, of 
the total market. Later entrants E-plus and Viag Interkom – later renamed O2 – occupy 
the combined minority market share of 19.8%. Licenses for the third generation mobile 
standards UMTS (Universal Mobile Telecommunication Standard) have been 
allocated to all four current mobile operators and two new market entrants. UMTS 
operator licenses for the duration of 20 years have been allocated in an auctioning 
process in August 2000 raising € 50.5 billion in fees for the German government 
(Anonymous 2001a). 
After a period of tremendous service subscriber growth in Western Europe, the number 
of mobile connections and subscribers will increase marginally from 330 million at the 
end of 2002 to nearly 350 million at the end of 2005. As subscriber growth rates will 
drop dramatically from 71% in 1999 to 1% in 2005, today’s standard mobile voice 
communication services will turn into commodities and lose their currently highly 
profitable margins. 
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Exhibit 2-12 Subscribers: Mobile communication services in Europe at 
the end of the year (Durlacher Research 2001) 
As clear support for the trend of commoditization, the average revenue per user 
(ARPU) has already dropped significantly, will bottom out in 2003 and then – with 
increasing revenues from new data services and mobile fixed-line substitution – rise up 
to current levels. Current decreases in ARPU are mainly driven by the addition of pre-
paid subscribers with lower per capita revenue and the intense competition between 
mobile network operators (MNOs). 
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Exhibit 2-13 Revenues: Average per user in Europe (Durlacher Research 
2001) 
Decreasing ARPU until 2003 and increasing market saturation will reduce the revenue 
growth rates for mobile communication services to 5 % in 2003. Although the 
significance of voice traffic revenues will decrease, they will remain the largest 
revenue segments in the market. Saturation in mobile voice services is driving this 
decline, caused by increased retail price competition between mobile network 
operators. The overall increase in mobile telephony minute usage does not compensate 
for price pressures, leading to an absolute decline from 2003 onwards (Durlacher 
Research 2001). New mobile and mostly non-voice service offerings based on more 
advanced mobile communication standard are very much needed to drive the market 
volume expansion to 12 % in the year 2005. Therefore, mobile network operators are 
required to screen, select and bundle service offerings such as mobile commerce 
transactions, entertainment or business information and functions as the interface to the 
end consumer. Bundling new service offerings requires that mobile network operators 
select the volume of high quality content and applications through partnerships with 
experienced and trusted providers. 
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Exhibit 2-14 Revenues: Mobile communication services in Europe 
(Durlacher Research 2001) 
Driving these changes in mobile communication service markets, underlying industry 
drivers can be broken down into digitalization, packetization, consolidation and 
technical convergence. With current mobile transmission standards, voice, data and 
video information is being created, transported, and received digitally. Digitalization 
also allows seamless technical convergence. Packetization of networks – the upgrade 
from circuit switching to packet switching – enables the transmission of larger 
volumes of data. Technical convergence facilitated by digitalization and packetization 
of telecommunications, information technology, media and entertainment services and 
products will serve as a major innovator and growth engine. Telecommunications 
service providers will now have the ability and increased incentives to cooperate with 
partners from related industries (Heise 2000). Integration of applications will be 
advanced by platform independent programming languages (e.g. JAVA) or device 
sensitive languages (e.g. XHTML) (Durlacher Research 2001). Facilitated by technical 
convergence, consolidation enables economies of scale, operational efficiencies, 
regional and global reach, stronger negotiation and purchasing power (Gulati 2001). 
Only inadequately supporting the trends of digitalization and packetization, the 
currently operated digital mobile communication standard GSM (Global System for 
Mobile Communications) has been developed for standard voice communication only. 
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Reflecting its insufficiency, data transfers are technically limited to the short message 
service (SMS) and other short data transmissions. Full digitalization and packetization 
requires GSM extensions and upgrades – namely HSCSD or GPRS – or the next 
generation of mobile communication UMTS (Universal Mobile Telecommunication 
Standard). 
Standard HSCSD GPRS UMTS 
Maximum 
transmission speed 56 Kbit/s 115 Kbit/s 2 Mbit/s 
Services Voice, Data, Images Voice, Data, Images Voice, Data,  Images, Videos 
Availability 2001 2002 End of 2003 
Exhibit 2-15 Overview: Standards for mobile communication services 
HSCSD (Highspeed Circuit Switched Data) solves the problem of small GSM 
bandwidths by bundling multiple GSM channels. In addition to GSM and HSCSD, 
GPRS (General Packet Radio Service) uses a package-based transmission technology 
that does not require a constant connection to the base station. The handset remains 
online continuously, and receives only the specifically dedicated data packages. 
Subscribers can therefore share multiple transmission channels and bandwidths can be 
adapted to transmission volumes. The subscriber will be charged for the data volume 
only and not for using multiple channels. Therefore, GPRS is well suited for the 
transfer of emails and Internet applications that require data transfer in packages and 
not in a continuous flow (Heise 2000). 
Representing the next milestone, UMTS as the future mobile communication standard 
enables standard voice communication and also higher bandwidth data transmission: A 
wide variety of business and entertainment applications can be accessed from 
subscribers regardless of their current location or device. Besides standard Internet 
applications, email, online banking, video conferencing, and music transmission are 
also to be supported by UMTS networks. In addition to obtaining the license, UMTS 
requires mobile operators to invest high amounts in core network upgrades and a 
completely extended high-density antenna network. Due to the high number of 
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required antennas, UMTS networks will most likely only cover highly populated areas 
(Heise 2000). With the antenna network growing gradually, transmission rates for the 
network launch in 2003 will realistically reach only 40 kbps (Durlacher Research 
2001). For a full-scale launch, availability of handsets with high capacity batteries and 
color displays will remain a bottleneck for the entire industry. UMTS network 
equipment vendors are expected to have difficulties rolling out 70 networks almost 
simultaneously in Europe over next three to four years. UMTS rollout will not be 
completed until the year 2005 and the geographic coverage will never be as good as 
that of current GSM networks. Greenfield UMTS network operators are expected to 
spend € 8 billion to deploy a UMTS network with 90% coverage of the German 
territory (Durlacher Research 2001). 
For the transition of users to higher bandwidth networks, currently available GPRS 
data transfer rates will be sufficient for basic m-commerce applications and are 
expected to facilitate the launch of UMTS-based services two years later. GPRS is 
therefore considered among operators to be a very important driver for the 
development and deployment of mobile data services (Arthur D. Little 2000). 
Exploring early steps of digitalization and technical convergence, the launch of mobile 
Internet platforms and content, initial investments in the new technology have mainly 
been motivated by experimenting with novel mobile communication technology and 
exhibiting an innovative first mover approach (Exhibit 2-16). 
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Exhibit 2-16 Overview: Objectives for wireless initiatives and 
applications supported by wireless technologies (McCarthy 2000) 
Following this explorative approach, mainly a sub-set of the existing Internet content 
has been made available to establish an initial wireless presence, to develop a new 
channel for customer retention and to gain additional brand exposure. Underscoring 
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the explorative character of initial mobile investment, generating new revenue streams 
has only been given a minor priority (McCarthy 2000). 
In many cases, alliance partners have implemented wireless technology and device 
support for mobile network operators, since the mere technical platform know-how is 
not regarded as a core competency and time-to-launch has been given major attention. 
Although partnering with companies along the value chain has been widely utilized for 
mobile development (Exhibit 2-17), mobile applications are generally hosted in-house 
to keep control over future data service development and to ensure a high quality 
service level. 
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Exhibit 2-17 Value chain: Mobile industry and partnering 
Although first steps in collaboratively developing data services have been taken, 
mobile network operators and their partners face significant technical uncertainty of 
multiple networks, protocols and devices. This lack of standards remains the barrier for 
further adoption and a larger customer base (McCarthy 2000). Challenged by current 
complex and heterogeneous technical systems however, end customers require 
seamless and compatible solutions in multi-network environments (Kviselius 2001). 
Multi-network environments based on Bluetooth, Wireless LAN, GPRS and UMTS 
Case studies and analyses  
 115
trigger the demand for multi-mode devices and development of unified software 
standards. Besides processing power and power supply, the various interfaces to 
mobile devices will act as principal restricting factors in the development of mobile 
data space. Bluetooth allows the synchronization of mobile devices with PC 
applications, data exchange and m-commerce application within a distance of 10 
meters. As a widely accepted and supported technology, it will become the standard 
for short-range, peer-to-peer and home networking of devices manufactured by 
component and device manufacturers. Wireless local area networks (WLAN) are 
substituting cable-based LANs at transmission speeds of up to 10 Mbit/s. Similar to 
cellular systems, terminals communicate with base stations over an air interface on a 
certain frequency band. Mainly, WLAN infrastructure is used indoors for laptop 
equipment and provides increased mobility between cells. 
Although mobile operators are generally in the position to define the basic platforms 
for network access and security, the variety of wireless application service providers 
(WASPs) needed for implementing satisfactory application functionality imposes 
complex coordination issues. Wireless application supplier or developers regard 
technology issues and building a customer base driven by good user experience as their 
top priorities. Not responding to these priorities (Exhibit 2-18), mobile network 
operators as important partners lack the capability of providing technical support and 
are only perceived as a distribution channel, bottleneck and mere infrastructure 
provider. 
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Exhibit 2-18 Overview: Challenges of deploying mobile data services & 
roles of mobile network operators (McCarthy 2000) 
In the year 2001, WASP, service and content section of the value mobile chain 
currently consists of 3,500 companies in North America and Europe. Wireless 
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application development comprises data enablement players as the largest group, 
wireless enterprise application developers, wireless merchants and content players. 
Most of these young companies were founded 2 years ago and currently employ less 
than 40 people. At this stage, only a minority of 25% of wireless application 
development companies will be able to finance growth through sales revenues. Slow 
revenue increases and technical uncertainties due to launch delays of upgraded mobile 
networks leave young enterprises vulnerable and dependent upon venture capital or 
strategic investor financial support. Slow revenue increases are further complicated by 
underdeveloped end-user charging mechanisms: Monthly fees, transaction-based and 
time-based mechanisms are among the explored options (Booz Allen & Hamilton 
2001). 
All types of wireless application developers rely highly on partnerships with 
technology players such as HP, Ericsson and Nokia. As a requirement for further 
business development, both wireless application developers and mobile network 
operators will have to agree on some type of revenue sharing. Not surprisingly, 
acquiring customers and developing partnerships range among the most mentioned 
strategic priorities for application developers. Most wireless application developers 
select strategic alliances over supplier relationships and other cooperative agreements. 
Exclusivity agreements are generally rejected except with restricted time or limited 
geographical area constraints. Innovation and international expansion rank as the third 
and fourth most often mentioned priorities (Booz Allen & Hamilton 2001). 
In order to harness the innovation power of application development, mobile network 
operators need to speed up their decision-making, to focus on clear segments, 
technologies and business models, to communicate the focus clearly and to structure 
the interaction with the wireless application development community. Single points of 
interaction, forums, communities and established corporate venturing facilitate 
interaction with the application community (Booz Allen & Hamilton 2001). In 
practice, however, mobile network operators are generally perceived as competitors 
and difficult to work with. Although they are beneficiaries of newly developed 
applications, wireless application developers perceive operators as slow in committing 
resources. 
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Generally following their traditional paradigms, mobile network operators have 
focused too much on acquiring financial resources for radio network expansion and 
choosing the right technologies. Satisfied by healthy voice revenue growth, MNOs 
have lacked the incentives to look beyond their current business model (Durlacher 
Research 2001). Currently triggered by both necessity and opportunity, mobile 
network operators shift away from offering mostly voice services and become a true 
integrator of various mobile application services, supported by already existing large 
number of users and billing relationships (Müller-Veerse 1999). Although a majority 
of mobile network operators constantly considers ownership of network infrastructure 
a competitive advantage, the same majority anticipates opening of networks to 
competitors and development of further alliances (Arthur D. Little 2000). These trends 
are shifting business focus for the network operation away from end-users to wholesale 
customers with large-scale communication usage (Durlacher Research 2001). 
With more sophisticated applications and the utilization of the described packet-based 
networks, MNOs will increasingly generate revenues from digital content and data 
services, which turns them into content aggregators and an interface to the mobile 
phone subscriber. Innovative new services ranging from downloadable games, Java-
based software applications, telematics to healthcare applications-based technologies 
enable service providers to create both rich and personalized wireless applications 
(McCarthy 2000). Fueling the use of advanced mobile data services will be the only 
way for mobile operators to recoup their investments in licenses and networks. Mobile 
operators need to act quickly to turn their operations around from network 
development, voice-centric and customer acquisition-focused organization to one 
which is essentially a platform business managing numerous relationships next to an 
independent cellular infrastructure operations business. As product lifecycles are 
expected to become increasingly shorter all the time, company survival in the mobile 
market will also depend on how quickly a business and all functional areas embrace 
new paradigms (Durlacher Research 2001): 
Either through partnership or self-development, network operators will have to refine 
their service portfolio by upgrading security of transactions. Analytical tools are also 
needed for the effectiveness assessment of marketing and advertising. At this stage 
partnering capabilities for integrated business development require further 
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development within MNOs. As both license payments and network investments are 
financed with high interest payments, tight financial management will also develop 
into a future necessity. Since the auctioning of additional high-bandwidth licenses 
further has liberalized mobile markets, the management of transmission overcapacity 
represents an additional challenge for some industry players. Outside of peak usage of 
the network capacity, MNOs try to work with mobile portals or other service providers 
as wholesalers to fill up some of this capacity. 
Due to the lack of information on subscriber preferences, network operators do not 
have the right skills set to develop data services with appeal to mobile subscribers. As 
MNOs have traditionally provided homogeneous products and services, they have also 
relied on only one single brand strategy. As customer preferences move towards a 
heterogeneous service environment, MNOs need to develop new brand values that 
represent the attributes of a deep and broad product portfolio. 
In more general terms, skill requirements for large mobile industry players include 
speeding up decisions, accepting a non-linear process, communicating clear visions, 
facilitating cooperative working relationships, creating mechanisms to initiate 
alliances, defining cooperation agreements and providing market insights. BT Expidas, 
Nokia Ventures and HP Mobile e-Services Bazaar are frequently mentioned as best 
practice industry benchmarks (Booz Allen & Hamilton 2001). Alliances between 
applications, content and mobile communication providers should also be facilitated by 
governmental organizations, founded across several industries and supported by 
venture capital funds (Oertel, Steinmüller and Beyer 2001). 
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2.4.2 Microsoft Network Germany 
MSN Germany applies an approach of organic growth to its alliance network. 
Partnerships follow an explorative roadmap without predefined outcomes and rigid 
separation of benefits. However, MSN has its focus on maintaining and extending 
Microsoft’s technology standard usage in joint software development projects with its 
partners. 
Business background 
Providing Internet services as a subsidiary of a software company 
Microsoft network (MSN) Germany – a sub-unit of Microsoft GmbH – provides 
Internet-based communication, information and entertainment services. MSN services 
are provided as an open portal to the total Internet community (Anonymous 1998). 
MSN originally started in 1995 as a proprietary online service, but failed to achieve the 
minimum number of users as critical mass and thus abandoned telephone access 
provision services. MSN signed an agreement with Microsoft to migrate its remaining 
customers to T-Online in September 1998. 
According to MSN’s view of Internet services, customer requirements have 
transformed from providing mere content to delivering interactive solutions and 
services. The provision of exclusive content therefore loses its importance, and web-
based services utilizing interactivity of the Internet are expected to gain much more 
user loyalty. The highly desired interactivity of online communication services 
generates positive network effects through growing user groups. Due to low variable 
costs of added users, Internet service providers achieve strong economies of scale in 
both providing content and distributing interactive services. MSN, like many other 
industry participants, expects further consolidation of Internet portals and therefore 
regards integrating user bases a pivotal requirement for achieving significant market 
share, leveraging a strong negotiation position and generating scale benefits. 
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Network structure 
Transforming alliance portfolio to commercialize MSN’s user base 
According to own press releases (Microsoft 2001b), between the beginning of the year 
2000 and January 2002, MSN has formed 39 alliances in the areas of content provision, 
technology and advertising. Partnerships for content provision provides MSN’s user 
base with information on fitness, automotive and job opportunities. Technology 
alliances upgrade MSN’s online services with improved functionalities to allow for 
online banking or enhanced instant messaging. Contracts for advertising open up 
access to the MSN user base for the promotion of products and services. 
Alliance 
category 
Content Technology Advertising 
Number of 
relationships 14 4 21 
Business 
areas 
? Weather 
? Lifestyle, Fitness 
? Job opportunities 
? Traffic routing 
? Business and 
Company news 
? Personal finance 
? … 
? Account 
aggregation 
? Instant messaging 
? Financial 
transactions 
? … 
? Online retailing 
? Co-marketing 
? Sponsoring of 
online content 
? Online 
marketplaces 
? … 
Examples of 
alliance 
partners 
? Meteomedia 
? JobScout 24 
? FT Marketwatch 
? … 
? Net to Phone 
? Buhl data 
? … 
? Unilever 
? Kellogg’s 
? Otto 
? Volkswagen 
? D2 Vodafone 
? … 
Exhibit 2-19 MSN Germany: Alliance portfolio by category 
MSN has started to negotiate initial alliances in the areas of content and technology to 
test and refine its online services. Advertising relationships have been added in a 
second phase after the establishment of all previous relationships. Advertising 
relationships involve the complex exchange of product catalogs for online shopping or 
partner brands with access to a developing MSN user base. Generated fees for the 
access to the MSN user community represent an important revenue source for MSN. 
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Exhibit 2-20 MSN Germany: Cumulated alliances by category from 
02/2000 to 01/2002 
Based on the partnership and alliance published in MSN Germany’s press releases, so-
called advertising alliances of the total alliance portfolio grew from 33% in April 2000 
to 54% in January 2002. In the same period, content alliance decreased from a 67% 
high to 36% of all relationships. 
Network adjustment 
Project-based relationship with the potential of future extension 
Reflecting Microsoft’s constantly dominating industry position, two thirds of leads for 
alliance opportunities come from MSN’s contact networks. Only the smaller remainder 
is brought to MSN’s attention through current alliance partners. MSN applies an 
opportunistic and trial-and-error approach to the formation of alliances in its network 
without defined due diligence processes. Alliance formation is mainly driven by the 
exploratory formation of developing online solutions or products without clearly 
defined objectives at the start of the partnerships. 
On the aggregated industry level, however, MSN – as a sub-unit of highly integrated 
Microsoft – is certainly framed by major industry coalitions which have to be taken 
into consideration on the lower alliance level. 
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“A telecommunications company – called Deutsche Telekom AG – 
owns a fixed-line network and maximizes profits. [MSN] provides the 
services and the technology itself to utilize and merge [the whole 
system.] All partners involved gain a fair share and complement each 
other. […] On a vertical perspective [a firm like Microsoft] has 
multiple complementing relationships and on the horizontal perspective 
completive relationships if [the firm] is integrated to some extent. The 
core characteristic of this industry is a partially complementary and 
competitive relationship.” 
(Dr. Christian Göttsch, Head of Business Development & Product 
Management) 
Vertically integrated companies in the software and telecommunications industry have 
to cope with multiple relationships and frequently face competition along their value 
chain. Competitive and complementary relationships on the corporate level both define 
and limit alliance formation and evolution on the operational MSN level. 
In line with this argument, Microsoft’s strategy to install software standards or to 
access customer groups therefore has an impact on MSN’s screening of potential 
alliance partners: Technology usage for online identification (‘MSN passport’) and 
backbone systems raises issues of major importance to MSN. After fulfilling some of 
the necessary conditions, alliance partners on the operational level follow a more 
opportunistic approach. 
“On the strategic level, technology issues such as usage of passport or 
Windows platforms or the strong access to customer groups are of 
major importance. When all customers sign up for passports to use 
services [..], this establishes the de-facto standard for online 
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registration. These strategic business alliances always raise technology 
issues and are based on almost religious beliefs.” 
On the operational and tactical level, we approach topics very 
opportunistically. There is only a limited number of [alliances] one 
would need to forge. If the opportunity arises, one needs to act … if 
nothing better is readily available. The decision to work with either 
publishing house X or Y is made absolutely opportunistically.” 
(Dr. Christian Göttsch) 
Due to the exploratory nature of online services, no formal due diligence process or 
predefined criteria for commercial and technical screening of alliance opportunities 
exist in MSN Germany. Therefore, legal and finance functions of Microsoft are 
involved only to a very limited extent, and the marketing function is only selectively 
engaged in the alliance development process.  
An informal personal communication process supports the ongoing alliance 
coordination. MSN seeks pragmatic operational progress in a partnership without 
being very conceptual in completely defining all the alliance goals. Due to their 
exploratory nature, most of the partnerships are defined by project-based boundaries 
with an exclusive tie only to MSN. Alliances for providing content and technology are 
mainly kept at arm’s length: Contracts involving the exchange of some development 
and entertainment services provide the legal basis for project-based, jointly defined 
activities. 
In only a limited number of six cases, earlier alliances developed into a more valuable 
and extensive technological implementation with an extended alliance scope. The 
implementation of the Volkswagen mobility – for example – requires an even more 
intense customer interaction with dynamic changes in scope and objective. Additional 
extensions of relationships require a higher intensity of resource exchange. In 
interacting in more complex co-marketing and advertising services, multiple resources 
such as the MSN’s user base, its technological skills and the partner’s brand and 
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advertising campaign competencies have to be linked for an effective implementation 
of marketing measures. For example, the launch of ‘Car view’ gives users access to 
routing information, maps, traffic reports and clearly illustrates this combination of 
complementary skills: 
“With MSN Car view, we add first-class information and services to the 
MSN portal. Renowned partners from the automotive industry 
guarantee the high quality of the service offering. MSN clearly 
considers itself as a partner of the automotive industry with the 
objective of providing innovative technologies and support for their 
digital marketing strategies.” 
(Gregory Gordon, Director MSN Germany in (Microsoft 2001a)) 
After reaching a certain level of maturity in alliance network growth, MSN now acts 
more and more as mediator in integrating multiple interests across partnerships. As 
MSN is regarded as a focal player with technological and market expertise, enough 
credibility and information about partners’ objectives enable business development 
across the network for new joint service offerings. In one specific case, potential joint 
service offerings for senior citizens have been brought to MSN’s attention by diverse 
group of partners – banks, automotive companies, and many others: 
“For the development of senior citizen service offerings, our industry 
has to come up with solutions. Together we can [generate synergies] 
and deal with distribution of pay-offs later. Provided that content and 
distribution services are available to us, we can directly target senior 
citizens [with a range of services]. [These initiatives] make sense, but 
only work when [MSN] can generate financial benefits from them.  
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Someone has to invest, someone has to recover costs and we have to 
achieve an equilibrium all of which has represented a strong challenge 
over the last few years [due to budgetary constraints].” 
(Dr. Christian Göttsch) 
As the sustainability of internet business models in some cases remains to be proven, 
MSN selectively seeks redundancies in its alliance relationships. Further network 
growth and expansion is mainly limited by MSN’s personnel resources. Additional in-
depth and therefore valuable relationships require not only initiation but also ongoing 
maintenance as well as opportunities for subsequent extension. 
Operational coordination 
Exploratory projects and growing subsequent resource exchange 
Across the majority of alliances, both the alliance partner and MSN initiate explorative 
alliances with unknown outcome due to technical and market uncertainties. Technical 
capabilities, corporate culture and flexibility remain open questions at alliance 
initiation and require mutual understanding of the alliance nature: 
“[In the early phase of alliance development and under ideal 
circumstances], business developers in partnerships negotiate and 
explore the complementary perspective of a deal. We mutually develop 
[this technology] first and distribute benefits later – typical habits of 
people in fast growing industries.[…] In these new [business] areas, 
initial roles and responsibilities are highly unclear and new services 
are developed later.“ 
(Dr. Christian Göttsch) 
Therefore, alliance relationships are not standardized in areas of product development, 
transfer of intellectual capital, marketing and further business development. Technical 
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and industry dynamics do not allow for clearly assigned and predefined roles and 
responsibilities. As a result, operational decisions within the alliance network in most 
cases are made jointly with partners, but remain the responsibility of MSN and 
Microsoft in the case of the discussed technology standards. Although MSN is clearly 
the focal actor for bundling online products, it does not have the leverage of strong 
relationships or the power to clearly assign roles and responsibilities across the alliance 
network. 
The majority of inital partnerships are defined by project activities for the co-
marketing between MSN’s Kellogg’s, the mere integration of weather information 
from Meteomedia or the availability of traffic routing from Teleinfo. However, later in 
2001 more intense alliances in financial services, for example, require the extensive 
combination of complementary resources and a more detailed interaction: Buhl data 
software enables customer handling and interfaces to banks on the MSN Money portal 
to users’ consolidated bank accounts. 
“[Buhl data] provides specialized financial software – a technical 
resource. MSN knows how to build and develop the existing money 
portal and its rich features. Buhl data also leverages the installed base 
of their former product users, MSN adds its user base and offers 
customer access for the distribution of financial software licenses.” 
(Dr. Christian Göttsch) 
Both share complementary and complex resources and skills for additional business 
development. In limited cases as described above, initial project-based partnerships 
have grown into long-term relationships to automakers such as Volkswagen. 
“Volkswagen represents a major marketing customer for us. [MSN] 
provides exclusive and high-quality marketing for large revenues and 
volumes in the automotive sector with the potential of key account 
management. [In the extension of the Volkswagen relationship], MSN 
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has supported the development and the operation of a VW branded 
portal offering weather reports, news feeds, SMS and routing.” 
(Dr. Christian Göttsch) 
As additional example for more extensive cooperation in advertising alliances, MSN 
Shopping, launched in November 2000 and enhanced in October 2001, bundles 
product offerings of mainly German retailers allowing for easier browsing, comparing 
and purchasing. Transactions with retailers require a tailored and customized approach 
with exchange of multiple product catalogs. Multiple catalogs are categorized 
according to product features. Retailers benefit from the access to MSN customers as a 
distribution service, although browsing through multiple catalogs makes buyers price 
sensitive. Due to intense interaction with exchange of product catalogs, some contacts 
to retailers have further distribution potential for MSN and can therefore develop into a 
key account for MSN. Although the exchange of product information constitutes 
continuous, long-term relationships, the inherent transparency and accountability of 
online retailing has clearly shifted the relationship: 
“Originally, portals have taken no risks and [have sold non-exclusive 
content and access] for high sums of money. In the meantime, risk has 
shifted and we only receive [financial compensation] when we have a 
[sales impact].” 
(Dr. Christian Göttsch) 
On a selective basis, MSN facilitates knowledge exchange between alliance partners 
based on benchmarks generated from alliance experience. However, information 
exchange is done very cautiously and only between non-competing business partners. 
Apart from the knowledge transfer on business-related issues, MSN provides alliance 
partners with additional support, technology solutions or user identification such as 
passports. The knowledge exchange as described above remains informal, is very 
much tailored to the individual alliance partner and improved in the daily information 
exchange. 
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Network objectives and performance & its supporting resource base 
Growing user base of the MSN portal 
As MSN provides access to selected user groups, the number of page views and net 
ratings represents an important performance criterion. Having been on the 18th position 
in German net ratings in 1999, MSN attained the number 2 position in 2001. 
According to the study by Jupiter MMXI Europe in October 2001, MSN has 
maintained the second rank in circulation and distribution of Internet sites in Germany 
with a market share of 41.1% (Microsoft 2001b). 
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Exhibit 2-21 MSN Germany: Reach in % 
Among the German ISPs, MSN follows the market leader T-Online with 60% reach in 
Germany. Internet reach or circulation is defined as the number of unique users 
divided by the size of the Internet population in Germany. 
On an operational level, MSN uses simple and predefined parameters to assess 
partnership performance: Circulation, average minutes of use and revenues. Market 
share of partners and its changes represent an important indicator for changes in the 
competitive position. Other secondary performance indicators such as revenues per 
user and revenue per employee are used as benchmarks for internal comparison. 
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As technology follower on the online portal market in 1999 and 2000, MSN has mainly 
independently developed technical resources in its online product development in the 
first phase, and then set up partnerships and alliances to complement its online services 
in the second phase. Microsoft has a good understanding of its solid software 
development competency base and is not seeking to acquire resources outside of its 
traditional core competency base. 
“We clearly have to say: We are a software company with compelling 
service offerings. We do not have any consumer business. We do not 
want to expand into full breadth of competencies and become a media 
house, telecommunications services or a bank.” 
(Dr. Christian Göttsch) 
Partnerships mainly fill gaps in the content categories described in Exhibit 2-19 but 
also supplement online services and applications to reduce the time-to-market launch. 
Especially in content provision and online services, MSN only relies on tested and – to 
some extent – proven outside competencies: 
“We have developed a financial portal and an automotive portal, three 
years after the first start-ups [had invented them.] We have done all 
this with very limited resources and have developed a competitive 
product. As I said, we have partners, we do not need an account 
aggregation and accomplish this with someone who has the 
capabilities.” 
(Dr. Christian Göttsch) 
In 2001, after the Internet hype and extensive PR spending tapered off, MSN’s only 
modest advertising and marketing communications and interactive service offerings 
achieved additional market penetration, circulation and increasing customer loyalty. In 
a final and current stage at the end of 2002, MSN has developed the capability to 
commercialize the distribution power of its user base. Commercialization requires a 
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good understanding of user profiles with demographics, service usage pattern or 
purchasing behavior. This expertise in user profiles provides the necessary basis for 
customer value assessment for each of the alliance partners. Customer values represent 
an important resource in the exchange of financial compensation and other non-
financial resources with individual partners. As a service offering to business 
customers, the online initiative ‘advantage MSN’ helps tailor online marketing 
campaigns according to business customers’ needs. Based on consumer demographics 
and behavior, marketing measures are bundled to reduce the overlap and to ensure 
complete coverage of communication measures. 
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2.4.3 E-Plus Mobilfunk GmbH & Co. KG 
E-plus extends its traditional business model with launch of the mobile data portal i-
mode. Under the objective of so called mass partnering, E-plus standardizes its 
collaboration approach with defined deliverables for all parties involved. 
Business background 
E-plus relies on innovativeness to alleviate the effect of low subscriber numbers 
In 2001, mobile operator E-plus, as part of the KPN Group, serves 6.7 million mobile 
subscribers in Germany. In third place to the two market leaders T-Mobile and D2 
Vodafone, E-plus seeks to develop an alliance network around its current competencies 
and business and to explore additional revenue opportunities in the establishment and 
distribution of mobile data services: 
“Voice services are our core competency and exactly the area that will 
not grow that much any more – and that’s what we are seeing this year. 
[…] Consequently, we have to think about expanding into new business 
opportunities and generating additional revenue potential.” 
(Peter Rohrmann, Manager Venturing & Partnering, E-plus) 
As a promising and beneficial starting point, E-plus considers itself an innovator in the 
German mobile communications industry, demonstrated by the launch of multiple 
product innovations such as the prepaid charging mechanism, mobile data transmission 
and i-mode. To bundle mobile service offerings, E-plus has planned and implemented 
its mobile Internet portal i-mode as an aggregator of mobile data applications for 
communication, entertainment and information. After the announcement of the 
European i-mode launch in 2001, E-plus has formed 80 initial partnerships with 
providers for content, technology and marketing until the launch date March 16, 2002. 
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Exhibit 2-22 E-plus: i-mode business model 
Embedded in a formalized partnership framework as outlined in Exhibit 2-22, E-plus 
partners deliver content to the i-mode portal and receive revenue share from E-plus 
when subscribers access the respective content. E-plus mobile subscribers receive a 
unique bundle of services charged by monthly subscription or the volume of data. 
Customers receive monthly bills for all services accessed within a certain period. E-
plus acts as a mediator by bundling payment streams and selecting attractive content 
for end consumers. In contrast to the previously unsuccessful first WAP standards, this 
pricing mechanism allows for “always-on” capability of the handset and a more data 
driven usage. As both mobile operator and content provider share the revenues of 
mobile subscribers, E-plus seeks to balance the joint pay-offs of content offering to 
achieve a “win-win situation” (E-Plus 2002b). In addition to this revenue sharing 
agreement, the i-mode business model aims for a deeper involvement of content 
partners outside the mobile communications industry to draw on their respective 
customer contacts. 
“With i-mode, E-plus moves away from mere voice communication to a 
new market, where mobile network operators are no longer only among 
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their peers and have to deal with new and established brands from 
other industries.” 
 (Uwe Bergheim, CEO, E-plus) in (E-Plus 2002a) 
E-plus requires content offerings to be apparently useful “at first glance” (E-Plus 
2002a) without the need for extensive explanations. Continuous availability of services 
for the daily usage such as cinema program information, news feeds, mass 
transportation schedules or mobile games represent the focus of the i-mode mobile 
portal. 
Network structure 
Replicating similar business models with partners and strong brands 
The launch of i-mode and its predefined alliance structure represents an opportunity for 
companies outside the mobile communications industry to develop additional revenue 
potential. With the formation of the alliance network for i-mode, E-plus management 
seeks to facilitate innovation and economical application development including risk 
sharing with outside partners. 
Until March 2002, E-plus has signed contracts with 80 partners, negotiations with 
another 250 content partners are either in progress or completed. E-plus aims at 
increasing the number of content offerings from 60 in March 2002 to 120 by the end of 
the year. Although the clear focus is on growth of service offerings, E-plus needs to 
maintain editorial integrity for the content: 
“To be precise: Only useful content counts. Active content management 
ensures success in this market. E-plus is ahead of the competition here. 
It’s not only due to the well respected brand names of partners 
involved. Mobile multimedia is also a chance for small and new 
providers, which quickly and precisely determine user preferences.” 
(Uwe Bergheim) in (E-Plus 2002a) 
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Business category Content Marketing Technology 
Estimated share 
based on interview 
results 
85 % 10 % 5% 
Number of 
relationships in 
March 2002 based 
on press releases 
and interview 
60 ~ 7 3 – 4 
Exhibit 2-23 E-plus: Number of alliances by category 
In spring 2001, E-plus started to develop and consequently build up this portfolio of 
partners with complementing skills in a top-down approach. As indicated in Exhibit 
2-23, content partnerships represent a large majority of cooperation relationships, 
followed by marketing and technology agreements. 
Individual alliance relationships for the contribution to i-mode content and technology 
are closely related to its Japanese model: Clear and transparent revenue sharing models 
with limited adaptations to the respective partner as well as open standards for the 
transfer of mobile content. These general guidelines certainly help to quickly negotiate 
and finalize contractual arrangements. However, predefined relationships apply one 
‘clean role model’ to the complete portfolio, which limits resource contributions 
outside the defined scope, constant interaction, adaptations and feedback. E-plus has 
named this approach ‘mass partnering’ with direct contact to E-plus units for 
operational and technical support. 
The majority of alliance partners directly interact with E-plus as the portal owner. In 
the minority of cases, E-plus has also integrated multiple partners from selected 
projects in business solutions. Deviations from the dominant and centralized i-mode 
model to multilateral exchanges have to overcome challenges of mutual buy-in into 
joint benefits: 
“Especially with business solutions for business customers such as a 
company sales force, we get in touch with partners and integrate an 
IBM or HP to develop adequate technical solutions. We have these 
cases, in which we combine PDA manufacturers, programmers and 
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distribution channels. In cooperation with them, we can develop 
specific products and act as a mediator in between. […] That’s the 
minority [of relationships], because it’s tremendously difficult to 
manage them. […] It’s a real challenge to integrate all these partners. 
One has to clearly demonstrate the benefits that each partner achieves 
in contributing his or her part to joint product development.” 
(Peter Rohrmann) 
Network adjustment and operational coordination 
Frameworks for facilitated partner selection and more complex operations 
E-plus very much applies a top-down approach of complementing previously 
determined white spots in the partnering portfolio. With several years of business 
development experience, the responsible ‘Venturing and Partnering’ department 
leverages contact within the existing alliance network – mainly to large publishing and 
media companies – or additional alliance formation. 
Clearly defined business models and pre-determined technical standards facilitate the 
selection of potential alliance partners. Both factors have a positive impact on alliance 
due diligence processes and criteria:  
“We certainly have a clear concept on which partnerships we need, 
especially in the content area. We select the brands that represent a 
good match with our company and bring a strong customer base with 
them: Large publishing houses, media companies and television 
stations. We actively seek partnerships with a good fit to our strategy 
and to [content] areas we would like to cover.” 
(Peter Rohrmann) 
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Based on the business category – content, marketing or technology – of the alliance, a 
detailed and clear due diligence process outlines decision criteria, process guidelines, 
the estimate of business growth potential and the department to be involved in the 
review: A matching brand, considerable market penetration with a compelling 
customer base, fit with the content strategy, the fulfillment of quality standards and 
complementary technological skills in the case of providers of content and technology 
represent the most important criteria for a decision on the formation of alliances. In the 
majority of cases, both the legal and controlling department are very much involved in 
the alliance formation process, which underlines the adherence of relationships to 
contractual and business model standards. Marketing functions are only involved on a 
project basis and as far as co-marketing aspects with E-plus and the partner 
organization are assessed. 
Upon the announcement of i-mode and the beginning of partner acquisition, E-plus has 
originally assumed that it required a majority in technology partnerships. During the 
course of developing alliance network relationships, however, the department 
Venturing and Partnering received feedback from ongoing negotiations and realized 
that technology infrastructure alone does not generate loyal customers. Attractive 
content utilizing the technical infrastructure seems to be much more of a requirement. 
“We realized that purely technology partners do not do us any good, 
because we do not have the resources to support them and develop any 
respective application that might be of interest for our customers. For 
that purpose, you need content partners […] and group them together 
with technology enablers and mobile communication.” 
(Peter Rohrmann) 
As a predefined i-mode policy, E-plus has full ownership of i-mode’s future direction 
and potential new participants in the alliance portfolio: As an open platform, i-mode 
does not guarantee the exclusivity of content offerings, the partner has to 
independently ensure the economic sustainability of its business in his or her own 
interest. Thus, the incorporation of additional partners and potential competition or 
redundancies in the entire alliance network have never been an issue or area of conflict 
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between E-plus and its partners. However, the ownership of intellectual property and 
exchange of technical innovations has raised the level of conflict between E-plus and 
alliance partners, mainly due to historical experience of clear purchasing relationships 
between network operators and technical suppliers. As a ‘lesson learnt’ from i-mode 
mass partnering, E-plus needs to be more actively involved in finding a compromise 
and balancing interests within all parties involved. At this stage of the i-mode launch in 
March 2002, conflict management has not been institutionalized and is handled on a 
case-by-case basis. Further learning with the launch of services and experience with 
potential conflicts may lead to a more formalized process and appropriate measures. 
An important area for E-plus, know-how and innovation exchange is also not 
facilitated by formalized processes, and is handled on a case-by-case basis mainly in 
more intense technology alliances. Exchange in technology alliances is performed 
regularly by close daily operation in joint teams. Motivated by E-plus’ interests, 
‘Venturing and Partnering’ facilitates this process to gather information on technical 
specification or guide the development in the desired direction. However, the sharing 
of intellectual capital in content and applications or continuous tracking in the majority 
of partnerships happens only in rare occasions due to constraints in human resources. 
Network objectives and performance 
Relationship frameworks allow for detailed benefit assessment 
With the alliance network close to its operational launch, E-plus is in the process of 
developing a system of key performance indicators for ongoing monitoring. Clear 
selection criteria in the due diligence process certainly help the ongoing performance 
monitoring of individual alliances and the complete network. At the end of March 
prior to the launch, E-plus has prepared and tested a key performance indicator system 
that in the long run can be aggregated for the entire alliance portfolio. Since content 
and technology offerings at the time of the interview have not become operational, 
performance results have not been documented. 
Profit and loss impacts, market shares, revenues, resource commitments, costs for 
customer care and others represent a selection of future indicators to assess both an 
individual alliance and a complete portfolio. On a case-by-case basis, reductions in 
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capital expenditures and operational costs have already been tracked for individual 
alliances in its business. Soft factors such as the evolution of technical skills are not 
considered in alliance performance assessment. 
Initial resource base and development 
Confronting a stable organization with cross-industry partnerships 
E-plus as a large organization with stable and defined processes faces challenges of 
adapting its resource profile. Traditionally, E-plus does not regard the development of 
mobile data applications or the cooperation with external alliance partners as a 
particular area of expertise. However, top management recognizes that E-plus’ entry 
into the market of mobile applications requires an apparent transition in both strategy 
and organization: 
“So far, business processes of mobile operators are largely targeted 
towards transferring information of their customers by voice and SMS. 
In the case of integrating third parties into the core business, one needs 
many and very flexible interfaces. With i-mode, E-plus has made this 
move.” 
(Uwe Bergheim, CEO, E-plus) in (E-Plus 2002a) 
With the foundation of ‘Venturing and Partnering’ in March 2001, E-plus has made a 
first move in founding and growing alliance initiation and management skills. Close 
cooperation with E-plus stakeholder NTT DoCoMo helps to develop these initial 
organizational competencies in alliance management (E-Plus 2002d): Providing a 
multitude of content offerings to mobile handsets requires the sign-up of a large 
number of alliances through so-called ‘mass partnering’. Mass partnering builds on the 
simple i-mode business model, an easy and transparent data volume-based charging 
mechanism (E-Plus 2002c) as well as fast and direct contact to E-plus for technical and 
organizational support in the development of mobile content. The access to external 
resources based on the clearly defined relationship frameworks allows the rapid growth 
of alliances in fulfillment of the described transparent selection criteria. 
Case studies and analyses  
 139
Utilizing and further developing this resource, the ‘Venturing and Partnering’ 
department determines the demand for partnering, selects the appropriate organization 
and conducts the due diligence process with the respective functional departments. 
After finalizing the negotiation, daily operations are completely taken over by 
functional departments without further operational involvement of Venturing and 
Partnering. Benefits and progress of alliances are monitored continuously, and 
conflicts are resolved on a case-by-case basis. Personnel resources represent the 
dominant constraint for further involvement in this process. Therefore, the selection of 
alliance opportunities aims at choosing partners that can independently drive an idea, 
product and application development. 
As a learning effect in this process of alliance network evolution, alliance formation 
for i-mode content does not require a venturing component and the investment of 
financial capital and risks. Large corporations with well-known brands as preferred i-
mode partners do not need additional external forms of financing. As another learning 
effect, standardized interfaces to the E-plus organization seem to limit the opportunity 
for interaction as well as trial-and-error, aggravated by the absence of knowledge 
sharing routines. 
In a self-assessment of its alliance management capability, E-plus has successfully 
developed the skill of seeking innovations, matching potential partners and 
establishing joint business models. However, the operational implementation of 
business models after closing contracts due to missing joint learning opportunities of 
both partners faces significant hurdles: 
“What the telecommunications industry [including E-plus] still needs 
to learn is the immediate implementation. The telecommunications 
industry relies on extensive back-up scenarios: Network operation 
requires hundred percent availability and multiple process validations. 
This mentality is shared within the whole telecommunications industry 
and does not fit with innovation and partnership models. They require a 
little bit more flexibility, which telecommunication companies obviously 
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do not possess. And that’s the problem with the fast implementation of 
partnerships: [Operational] relationships to the interfaces, technology, 
billing and network operations act a little bit slowly.” 
(Peter Rohrmann) 
Although the relevant business issues can be agreed upon quickly on management 
level, the time span from the formal decision to the implementation of the agreement 
could well take up to one year. Implementation tasks range from transferring content 
and instructing customer care to providing the billing infrastructure. As an example, E-
plus’ customer care processes have historically been tailored towards subscribers using 
voice services. With the integration of new partnerships into the operations, customer 
care needs to deal with new user requirements and shared responsibilities: The partner 
for content, and E-plus for billing and transfer. 
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2.4.4 Lycos Europe GmbH: Mobile Channel 
Initially launched as an Internet service provider, Lycos Europe is now extending its 
online services into mobile communications. To complement Lycos’ internal technical 
developments, partnerships for technical infrastructure are followed by more complex 
arrangements for cooperation in content and marketing. 
Business background 
Establishment and commercialization of mobile service offerings 
Lycos Europe was founded in 1995 mainly as an Internet service portal with European 
footprint and 20 million users. The company has branched out into multiple 
information and communication channels from automotive to music, games to travel, 
carrier to sports. Between October and December 15, 2001, Lycos started to launch an 
additional information channel around mobile service offerings with five million 
European users in five countries. The service offering incorporates a community 
toolkit and an Internet presentation layer to integrate applications and services such as 
logo and ringtone composer, send/receive messaging for mobile short messages 
(SMS), information retrieval on the wireless access protocol (WAP), user database as 
well as other entertainment and information services for travel. Lycos’ segmentation of 
services and applications targeted towards both consumer and business markets (refer 
to Exhibit 2-24), represent the developing structures of internal development and 
service provision of outside partners. 
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Business area Content products 
Advertising and 
sponsorship 
products 
Operational 
infrastructure 
Target group Private households and consumers 
Businesses and 
organizations Internal 
Services 
? Logos and 
ringtones 
? Travel 
information 
? Games 
? … 
? Sponsorship 
sales 
? Product 
illustration 
? Advertising 
communication 
? Targeting and 
profiling 
capabilities 
? … 
? Interactive voice 
response (IVR) 
? Premium rate 
number charging 
(PRN) 
? Gateway for 
SMS 
? Access to mobile 
networks 
? Payment 
solutions such as 
paybox 
? … 
Exhibit 2-24 Lycos Mobile: Business areas and services 
Service offerings described above are associated with key operational units within 
Lycos: The operational infrastructure provides access and billing relationships to 
network operators based on revenue sharing agreements. In five countries with Lycos 
presence, premium rate number providers supply payment options to prepaid 
customers via their regular telephone bills. This charging mechanism requires voice-
based instructions and feedback on how to order products which are offered by 
interactive voice response service providers. Alternate payment solution providers 
such as paybox complement payment alternatives. SMS (Short Message Service) 
based information exchange requires the support of SMS gateway providers which 
route data traffic at minimal costs from and in mobile networks. 
Network structure 
Growing towards commercialization of user base 
All three business categories rely on external partners for the implementation of 
service offerings. As the operational infrastructure provides the framework and 
transaction platform, the formation of alliances in this category precedes partnerships 
for content products as well as advertising and sponsorship products. 
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Business area Content products 
Advertising and 
sponsorship 
products 
Operational 
infrastructure 
Number of 
partnerships in 
March 2002 
? 5 ? 4 – 5 
? Interactive voice 
response (IVR): 1 
? Premium rate 
numbers (PRN): 5
? SMS gateway 
providers: 2 
? Revenue sharing 
with mobile 
operators: 20 
? Payment solution 
providers: 11 
Sequence and 
prioritization of 
alliance formation 
II. III. I. 
Exhibit 2-25 Lycos Mobile: Business area and alliance portfolio 
Content and proprietary Lycos products all utilize the basic operational infrastructure 
as a foundation and later develop the Lycos user base. Even commodity applications 
such as sending SMS can be leveraged for initial establishment of customer loyalty: 
“What we found out: People come back to send a SMS. So we can start 
layering in more value-added services and high quality products later, 
we don’t have to have them right from the start. In terms of priority, 
services in this area followed the set-up of technical infrastructure in 
terms of priority: Infrastructure first, content second.” 
(Matthew Hall, Director Lycos Mobile) 
Communication with a customer base can be used to promote products and services of 
Lycos’ business customer at a later stage. The advertising and sponsorship category is 
directed towards the businesses and organization with demand for promoting products 
and services. As an example for this business category, Lycos has developed a 
relationship with handset manufacturer Nokia to promote the 7650 phones with multi-
media messaging (MMS) capability. Lycos has implemented a composer for MMS 
communication to illustrate phone functionality and service usefulness on the Internet. 
Later, after launch of the handset, this application allows for MMS communication to 
Case studies and analyses  
 144
all compatible phones. For this alliance, Nokia is investing a part of its marketing 
budget and technological resources in this relationship with Lycos Mobile. 
Network adjustment 
From contractual and standardized arrangements to resource intensive partnerships 
Increasing competition for mobile communication services and rapidly changing 
consumer demands make access to alliance partners a necessity. Alliances with outside 
partners are regarded as an entry option into new technology areas and later enable 
Lycos’ mobile channel to build up competencies in-house, to license it or further 
integrate external services in the technology platform, if customer demands have 
stabilized and generated reliable cash flows. 
The review of alliances in the time sequence demonstrates that Lycos Mobile has first 
established its operational infrastructure based on service for interactive voice 
response, premium rate numbers and SMS gateway and others to launch the product. 
Premium rate numbers are required for all countries with Lycos presence, which are 
routed into one interactive voice response provider to achieve synergies on European 
level. Relationships with infrastructure providers remain rather stable, since 
adaptations to technical systems and APIs (Application Program Interface), that have 
an impact on the data exchange, are limited to rare exceptions. Lycos Mobile 
management reviews these ties on a case-by-case basis, since these partners provide 
commodity service offerings. Redundant agreements to alternative suppliers back up 
the operational infrastructure to ensure high service levels. 
Based on the earlier established operational structure, simple and later more 
sophisticated content services build up and maintain loyalty in the customer base. 
Services provided from outside partners include ringtones, SMS Games, WAP 
directory, entertainment with logos and ringtones, travel information and other 
information offerings. SMS Games and WAP directory are two-way technologies that 
require the development of specific features and other operational know-how. For 
Lycos Mobile, relying on outside partners – in the case of SMS games – enables the 
access to unavailable technological know-how, in the example of the WAP directory 
cost reductions or market tests of innovative technology. Although Lycos’ corporate 
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culture generally advocates building up in-house technical capabilities, the majority of 
alliance formation decisions are driven by the access to much needed technological 
resources. Access to internally unavailable and differentiating technologies ensures 
acceptable time-to-market cycles in markets with rapidly shifting consumer demands. 
SMS, games, picture messaging and in the future JAVA applications – as examples – 
currently generate both attention and revenue for Lycos Mobile. As short user attention 
spans require quick responses to changing customer preferences, third parties also 
provide service hosting and billing without any significant integration into the Lycos 
Mobile platform. Low levels of integration ensure full flexibility to discontinue or 
redirect relationships to external providers. 
The important market for logos and ringtones has become much more competitive with 
a clear differentiation in product quality, which calls for frequent discontinuation and 
redirection of partnerships: At any given time, Lycos needs to maintain editorial 
integrity with its product, which requires service offerings on Lycos Mobile sites and 
databases to be updated on a regular basis for constant availability. In this process and 
due to comparisons between content providers on a European basis, Lycos has 
selectively replaced agreements and also improved profit margins from 30% to 55% on 
these contractual agreements.  
Besides replacing and rebalancing these relationships to logo and ringtone providers, 
three value chain steps – promoting the product, licensing content, and providing 
operational infrastructure for billing and distribution – represent options for further 
internalization. Lycos Mobile decides between these make-or-buy alternatives after the 
assessment of internal competencies, time-to-market cycles, financial consideration of 
revenues, gross margins and return on investments. Based on historical experience as 
an example, Lycos does not regard licensing branded content as a preferred option. 
“If we don’t own the branded content, which is very rare and involves 
tremendous excitement, we have to license it. […] We are not 
organized as a company to go out acquire and license content. We are 
set up to resell and distribute it.” 
(Matthew Hall) 
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Greater  negotiation leverage through increased competition, revenue stabilization in 
this service segment and the described internal assessment have motivated Lycos to 
internalize related capabilities. Consequently, relationships to these providers have 
been transformed from forwarding Lycos’ customers for commission payments to 
independent Lycos service offerings with license payment to original copyright 
holders: 
“Our relationship before rolling out the mobile channel: There was a 
link on our site to transfer to one of their pages […], and you can buy a 
logo and ringtone [there], and [third parties] pass a revenue share 
back to Lycos. […]” 
(Matthew Hall) 
With the launch of the mobile channel, Lycos has built up an independent platform and 
proprietary database, which contains, sells and delivers the content. After direct 
revenue generation with the service, Lycos now gives reduced revenue share back to 
the right holder. As access to a loyal customer base represents a valuable resource, 
Lycos does want to represent the only interface to the end customer without giving 
third parties valuable customer details. 
The assessment of available revenue opportunities and availability of Lycos resources 
for commercialization has determined prioritization of alliance formation activities. 
Following this logic, establishment of the operational infrastructure and content 
products are at a later stage complemented by partnerships for product promotion and 
advertising. Since five million Lycos Mobile users represent an attractive exchange 
value in the very competitive Internet advertising market, setting up a content alliance 
with smaller companies, which only seek distribution for their products, takes little 
time and effort. In a competitive market environment, however, service providers like 
Lycos Mobile have to develop and offer something “really unique and really value-
added” for larger shares of corporate marketing budgets: 
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“Now as things evolve, I am moving towards marketing and advertising 
types of relationships: More high-level strategic deals that now take 
advantage of the [online and mobile] product that we have built.” 
(Matthew Hall) 
The Nokia advertising alliance as an example for unique advertising and sponsorship 
agreement requires Lycos’ established customer base, technical expertise, joint 
exchange of expectations and complex definition of deliverables. Typical for these 
partnerships, unclear ex-ante alliance benefits in terms of the number of page views, 
user traffic and online functionality require a continuous and more extensive 
negotiation process. For implementing the partnership and rolling out Nokia’s 
advertising program, Lycos Mobile’s management faces the upfront make-or-buy 
decision for innovative MMS capabilities: 
“We can talk to some of these cutting-edge venture-backed technology 
companies that are developing MMS composers and viewers or we can 
build our own. And, in conducting research on this more operational 
and commercial decision, we found that we could license a MMS 
composer and viewer. But then we would have to integrate it into our 
site. Although we would have to do 30% less work, developing MMS 
internally has turned out to be much faster.” 
(Matthew Hall) 
Another reason for independently designing MMS technology was motivated by its 
underlying technology standard SMIL, which is related to Open Source and LINUX. 
As Open Source allows for programming variations, Lycos has minimized technology 
and incompatibility risks by building up internal competencies. Internalized 
competencies also facilitate the exchange with Lycos Mobile’s related messaging and 
micropayment solutions. As a result, the marketing driven alliance with Nokia – 
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compared to market-based transaction by Lycos Mobile – has clearly enhanced Lycos’ 
technological skills in MMS communication. 
"With our latest product developments of trend-setting mobile features, 
we are well prepared for such technological innovations. The 
cooperation with Nokia is a great chance for us to act as one of the first 
movers in this field and to introduce this new generation of 
communication services to the millions of Lycos users." 
(Dr. Jürgen Galler, Managing Director Lycos Mobile and Vice 
President Lycos Europe in (Lycos Mobile 2001)) 
Although the spending of Nokia’s marketing budget bears similarity with market 
transactions, other aspects of the agreement require the deployment of non-financial 
resources such as collaboration in MMS design and functionality, exchange on 
capabilities of Nokia’s handset and briefing on marketing strategy. 
Other services in this business category provide direct marketing with profiling user 
behavior, which require a complex combination of capabilities: Since Lycos has not 
built up competencies in wireless advertising and has no detailed databases on the 
longitudinal history of advertising behavior, this service is provided by an external 
partner as well. This external partner not only contributes consumer relationships in 
addition to Lycos Mobile’s user base, but also a specialized sales force with a good 
understanding of wireless advertising solutions. 
In the process of selecting a cooperation proposal within these three categories, Lycos 
does not use a formal due diligence process for screening alliance opportunities and 
contractual arrangements: Although regarded valuable for all alliance opportunities, 
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“In a way this company still operates somewhat entrepreneurially. 
Very reactive and moving very quickly and not in very formalized 
processes […] But so far, we don’t have a long enough alliance history 
for setting that up.” 
(Matthew Hall) 
Although Lycos is actively promoting its current alliance network for additional 
business development, limited personnel resources remain the biggest constraint in 
assessing and negotiating potential deals. Missing internal resources for the 
administration of partnerships limits the potential and integration of existing 
agreements. 
Operational coordination 
Towards stabilization of operational processes 
Influenced by resource availability, uncertainty and alliance opportunities, Lycos 
Mobile gradually develops its alliance network across five European countries. Due to 
the launch of operations, stabilizing operational processes with business partners is 
associated with a certain level of conflict and requires both channeling of 
communication and standardization of relationships. 
Since the operation of Lycos Mobile based on industry-wide communication standards 
requires alliances with specific service providers for content and technical 
infrastructure, perspectives on the structure of the overall alliance network, decisions 
on the selection of future companies and staffing are widely shared among partnering 
firms. Other ongoing operational issues ranging from the appointment of alliance 
executives and staffing to setting the product development agenda and technology 
transfer policies are also viewed consistently among organizations in the alliance 
network. However, dissimilar partner views on overall alliance goals, product and 
market development agenda, annual budget levels and financial contribution are 
subject to the negotiation and reassessment process. 
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As a trigger for the level of conflict in the diverse Lycos Mobile alliance portfolio, 
different firm sizes cause differing expectations in the success of the partnerships and 
result in discussions between alliance partners. Within all partners, no formal processes 
for knowledge sharing and intellectual property transfer have been established. The 
same applies for conflict resolution if the partnership requires available but restricted 
resources: 
“I think we are a small enough business unit, [considering] the number 
of people directly involved in Lycos Mobile on a European basis. 
Obviously, on the country level we have people that can also help to 
solve problems, but we are too small to have a formal process for those 
things.” 
(Matthew Hall) 
Due to the presence in five European countries and very decentralized organization, 
Lycos Mobile has faced communication challenges within its web of partners, which 
have become apparent during the launch phase with higher information exchange 
requirements and rapid business changes: 
“Sometimes one or two people from each country are contacting that 
partner on a European basis. It makes good partners unhappy. They 
spend all of their time managing that relationship. But we are trying to 
get one partner manager to serve as the interface between the countries 
and the partner [to deal with this problem].” 
(Matthew Hall) 
In more straightforward technological areas, Lycos seeks to achieve service level 
agreements with operational infrastructure providers to achieve standardization and 
reliability of these relationships. Since service level agreements are uncommon in a 
changing technology environment of mobile communications, Lycos has only been 
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able to sign agreements for older and more stable technologies for premium rate 
numbers and interactive voice response.  
Network objectives and performance and supporting resources 
Leveraging earlier knowledge acquisition for valuable consecutive growth 
In rating the overall performance on a qualitative scale, Lycos Mobile has been 
satisfied to some extent with absolute sales and sales increase. Full satisfaction has 
been reached in the capability to initiate alliance, although operational management 
and the quality of communication still leave room for improvement. As relationships 
are rarely reviewed on a regular basis, Lycos has no formal metrics to assess the 
performance of the individual alliance. Missing defined criteria and data on only the 
first months of full European operation make performance assessment very difficult. 
Across the majority of countries with Lycos presence, operations on the Lycos Mobile 
platform have been stabilized and relationships to some content providers have been 
renegotiated to improve margins. 
Over the course of the alliance network development, Lycos Mobile and its resource 
requirements have determined its alliance formation activities, not vice versa. In 
general, not one alliance has developed into such a high value, moneymaking 
relationship that it could have changed the strategy or major resource configuration of 
Lycos as a company. Some effects, however, are visible on the lower level of Lycos 
Mobile: 
“The alliance network has not effected [Lycos’] corporate strategy as a 
whole from my perspective in mobile, but it has, to some extent, done 
that at the lower level with the mobile strategy. If you had asked me in 
October last year: ‘Are you planning on building up MMS capability?’ 
I would have said: ‘No way.’ But then Nokia came on and said: ‘What 
if you develop an MMS capability and we sponsor it?’ Okay, that’s 
revenue and an interesting area and keeps us on the cutting-edge of our 
mobile technology development. […] Other development priorities 
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have been shifted back and it will dramatically affect our business 
cycle. One of the questions that I ask and I know we will never have an 
answer to, is: With which one will we be better off? 
 (Matthew Hall) 
Being one of the largest Internet portals, Lycos defines its traditional competencies as 
web-based like comparable competitors: Representing content on the Internet, person-
to-person messaging capability and profiling users by database technology. These 
technology components enable mass communication on the Internet with further 
potential in mobile communications. 
“I think of Lycos as a media company: Our key revenue sources are 
selling advertising, page views or sponsorship to a marketing buyer. 
[Mobile communication applications] are new business models for 
Lycos.” 
(Matthew Hall) 
Lycos’ corporate culture is traditionally inclined towards building up capabilities in-
house and this has remained unchanged. To maintain a position at the cutting-edge of 
technology in the example of MMS or protect value-added customer data for content 
services, Lycos has decided to expand own technical and operational capabilities with 
its implications for external partners. 
As technical and content capabilities have been the first priority, Lycos has gained a 
better understanding of its business model in mobile communications, which apart 
from learning effects finally helps to establish the more strategic relationship to 
customers like Nokia. 
“[We have built] an understanding of our own business [of mobile 
services]. So one of the great aspects about going through the classes 
of operational deal-making is that you have to have a grounding about 
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how your business works. Now that I have that, it is much easier to 
establish higher-level strategic sales activities.” 
(Matthew Hall) 
Over the course of operational deal-making, Lycos can now leverage the learning 
effects from operational infrastructure relationships to explore and explain its product 
capabilities to business customers, which utilize this technical infrastructure for 
promotional services. 
With clear knowledge of the business model and the underlying operational 
infrastructure, other Lycos business units offering ‘commodity’ Internet e-mail and 
chat services might be merged in the near future into larger communication business 
units. All these business units offer communication-oriented products and a 
combination of their assets allows for economies of scale and better interoperability of 
services. 
Although the competency to initiate alliances has developed to the satisfaction of 
Lycos Mobile, the ongoing management and controlling of relationships and its 
ongoing assessment still leaves room for improvement. 
“We have various weaknesses in reporting. We get a new partnership 
in place for new products with people scrambling everywhere to get the 
product stabilized. Therefore, reporting gets shoved to the side. 
Reporting is required to maintain a successful relationship.” 
(Matthew Hall) 
Sales, revenues, the number of clicks and page views are important key performance 
indicators not reported on a regular basis to review both benefits and costs of the 
ongoing relationship. On the other hand, Lycos, as very entrepreneurial organization, is 
very responsive and moving very quickly, when a partner articulates certain 
requirements and issues regarding the established relationship. 
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2.4.5 Sonera Zed Germany GmbH 
As a start-up with a clear focus on mobile online services, Sonera Zed has first 
handedly experienced the effect of uncertain and shifting customer preferences. 
Refocusing and concentrating on younger subscriber audiences has drastically shifted 
and reduced the partnership network. After the clear establishment of user community 
and preferences, early content and technology alliance have been followed by more 
complex marketing partnerships. 
Business background 
Innovating and refocusing mobile data applications 
The Finnish telecom operator Sonera who integrates and supports all activities around 
mobile data applications has founded Sonera Zed in Germany along with other units in 
six countries. Known as an early innovation leader in mobile data applications, Sonera 
already started in 1998 in its home country to develop and market information-based 
services around telephone directory services and business information. Sonera still 
offers these mainly information-based services in the very mature Finnish market and 
benefits from its mobile savvy subscribers with data driven usage pattern.  
Incorporated as Sonera Zed and first established in Finland in October 1999, the 
Finnish mobile operator has branched out with its mobile data services to country units 
in the United Kingdom, Italy, Germany, Malaysia and the Philippines. Sonera Zed’s 
early data services have been mainly focused on the information segment, but have not 
found matching subscribed demand. Consequently, Sonera Zed Germany has quickly 
refocused and was relaunched in March 2001 as a service provider for entertainment 
demands of younger mobile subscribers under the age of 30. 
“As first movers, we have started in Germany to refocus in the 
entertainment sector […]. Which means, we have been in touch with 
our users and said: ‘What [services] do you really want?’” 
(Michael Weiss, Commercial Director, Sonera Zed Germany) 
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Even the variety of roughly 100 refocused service offerings around sports, dining 
guides and entertainment have been reduced to twenty, since users older than twenty 
have unanimously questioned information value and usability of the offered mobile 
services. The great majority of remaining applications is clearly concentrated on 
entertainment and communication demands of an even younger audience. For this very 
tailored approach, Zed Germany has discontinued the majority of external content 
offerings specified by information categories and has replaced them to some extent 
with the development of internal and proprietary services for 2.3 million subscribers in 
March 2002. This transition is accompanied by shifting revenue segments: 
Standardized content service such as the offering of cell phone ringtones and logos has 
been reduced from 75% in June 2001 to 25% of the total Zed Germany revenue in 
March 2002, which underscores this shift in consumer demand and target groups. The 
evolution towards very focused service offerings has also required the Sonera Zed 
brand to be refocused. 
Network structure 
Growing relationships to corporate and business customers 
Like comparable information portals in both the Internet and mobile arena, Zed relies 
on alliances and external partners (Exhibit 2-26) for providing the operational 
infrastructure, retailing its products to end consumers, complementing its internally 
developed products and capitalizing on its customer base. Shifting business priorities 
and partnering needs have impacted the number and type of alliances significantly 
from year 2001 to the year 2002. 
Due to unavailable resources for the operational infrastructure or significant 
development costs, Zed has worked early on with service providers to send large 
volume SMS to mobile operators and to provide pre-paid payment options for its users. 
Defined by the standards in mobile communications, the number and intensity of 
relationships to infrastructure providers have remained relatively stable over time. 
As outlined above, shifting user patterns have demanded a substitution of external 
commodity content offerings with more interactive internal software developments. 
Zed’s internally developed entertainment services can be described by outlining the 
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concept of its “Virtual Lover” and “SMS Chat” products. The former entertains the 
user community by simulating a love relationship needing care and sensitiveness. A 
database tracks the user response and behavior and sends out the response. SMS chat 
allows anonymous exchange of SMS information with other mobile subscribers, which 
are both matched based on location, age and other factors. Both mobile service 
offerings need continuous adaptation and expansion of Zed’s internal application based 
on user requirements. From Sonera Zed’s perspective, preserving the uniqueness of the 
software development and personal information about user behavior mandate internal 
application development as the only option available. 
Business 
category Content 
Advertising and 
Co-marketing Retail 
Operational 
infrastructure 
Target 
group 
Private 
households and 
consumers 
Businesses N/A N/A 
Services 
? Logos and ring 
tones 
? Entertainment 
and news 
? … 
? Product 
presentation 
? Advertising 
communication
? Targeting and 
profiling 
capabilities 
? Distribution of 
consumer 
products 
? Interactive 
voice response 
and premium 
rate numbers 
(PRN) 
? Credit-card-
based payment 
system (EVS) 
? SMS gateways 
? Support 
services for 
capacity 
shortages 
Number 
of 
partner-
ships in 
2001 
? 30 – 40 ? 2- 3 ? 12 – 15 
? PRN: 1 
? EVS: 0 
? SMS: 4 
? Support: 4 
Number 
of 
partner-
ships in 
2002 
? 5 – 8 ? ~ 12 ? 2 
? PRN: 1 
? EVS: 1-4 
? SMS: 4 
? Support: 4 
Company 
examples 
? Tomor-row 
Internet 
? Fanta 
? Kiss FM 
? Wissen.de 
? Karstadt 
? Schaulandt  
Exhibit 2-26 Sonera Zed: Alliances by business category 
Case studies and analyses  
 157
Despite growing proprietary applications, Zed still offers standardized services for 
handset logo and ring tones, which are provided by external suppliers. In this area, Zed 
has also accepted alliance partner redundancies to rapidly satisfy shifting consumer 
preferences. In the early pursuit of exclusive content, long-term contracts have also 
kept Zed in relationships with suppliers of invaluable or inappropriate content for its 
user group. Alliances to content suppliers are defined by standard contracts with only 
minor adaptations and variations to the revenue sharing agreements with partners. 
Similarly, partnerships with retail partners as well as infrastructure providers are also 
framed and structured by similar contractual arrangements. 
Sonera Zed’s subsequent growth area – alliances for advertising and co-marketing – do 
not follow clear patterns or standardized frameworks. With an established user base, 
Zed cooperates with business customers that have a demand for advertising 
communication to Zed’s young customer group through mobile communications 
means. Requiring tailor-made cooperation agreements, provided services range from 
developing a mobile advertising concept to accessing Zed’s customer base to co-
promote products. 
For future growth in another alliance category, Zed is planning to offer its services not 
only as prepaid but also as postpaid services, which requires cooperation and 
integration into the operations of mobile network operators. Many mobile network 
operators themselves also develop mobile applications and could potentially consider 
Zed as a possible competitor. However, Zed’s clear and focused repositioning as a 
service provider for the younger user community leaves broader information portals of 
mobile operators enough flexibility to expand around Zed’s core offerings. Therefore, 
Sonera Zed foresees additional important growth potential in establishing close and 
trustful relationships with mobile network operators. 
Network adjustment 
Alliance adaptation for efficiency improvement and revenue generation 
In an assessment of the entire alliance portfolio, earlier alliances for operational 
infrastructure, retailing and content and later relationships for advertising and co-
marketing take completely different paths in their evolution. Whereas the former 
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categories show signs of efficiency improvement, the later group exhibits high 
formation rate and extension of resource exchange. 
With increasing technical transaction volume driven by a larger customer group, Zed 
has leveraged its stronger negotiation position with its technical infrastructure 
providers. Premium rate number providers share a large portion of their revenues with 
Zed and also feed back a richer set of customer usage data. The establishment of EVS 
Technology as another alternative payment solution based on credit card charging 
mechanisms illustrates the development cycle of these operational relationships: 
“Both partners would have to see: What are your capabilities and what 
are my capabilities? What can we achieve together? Balancing the 
prices and services received in many cases is only a second step.” 
(Michael Weiss) 
Zed’s refocusing of service offerings has reduced the portfolio of content alliance 
partners: The discontinuation of Zed’s earlier information and sport services which 
showed no fit with the requirements of the user community has significantly decreased 
the number of content providers. Zed has also discarded a number of global partners 
provided by Sonera headquarters, that have lacked the understanding for local user and 
market requirements. Although willing to adapt to changing customer preferences, the 
majority of earlier partners have not been flexible enough to fulfill Zed’s needs. 
Although intimate knowledge of the mobile subscribers and their usage patterns 
represent the most important decision criteria for alliance formation or discontinuation, 
these providers have severe difficulties to quickly understand and comprehend 
preferences of Zed’s young user group: 
“We check out the requirements of our users and ask: ´What do we 
need for you?’ And then we look at the decision on whether we need a 
partner or whether we can do it alone. What we have found out and 
what sounds strange in an extremely volatile and fast moving market, 
is: Although developing applications is very labor intensive, it is faster 
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to develop our own applications. Before I have even explained it to my 
partner, business is already over.” 
(Michael Weiss) 
Relationships to the remaining and now merely complementing content partners 
offering commodity content have changed dramatically over the course of the year. 
From “dictating prices for seemingly invaluable content” to “why don’t you deliver 
what our users are looking for and then we will talk about prices”. As the number of 
providers has decreased dramatically in just one year, relationships to them have also 
been intensified and the quality of provided content has clearly improved. As a clear 
requirement for continuing business, all remaining content providers share a good 
understanding for Zed’s user behavior and entertainment needs. 
Following a good understanding of Zed’s users as an important prerequisite, 
advertising and co-marketing agreements represent the focus for alliance formation at 
the end of 2001 and the beginning of 2002. Co-marketing integrates communication 
and interaction with customer groups between Zed and its marketing alliance partner. 
In many cases of this complex resource exchange, Zed seeks access to the marketing 
and distribution power of the partner and offers contacts to its current customer base. 
Partners need to determine structure, intensity and monetary compensation of the 
arrangement. Marketing agencies help Zed to find potential and promising business 
partners, because they deeply understand both target groups, communicate 
appropriately and correctly analyze marketing campaign results. As an innovative way 
of communication, co-marketing projects are still exploratory in nature: 
“High flexibility in an extremely short time period. There is virtually no 
preliminary lead-time to test the product. We go into the market and 
conduct market tests. […] This may change in two or three years when 
things calm down a bit. But until then, you would have to try one or the 
other.” 
(Michael Weiss) 
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Although very exploratory in nature, innovative marketing concepts due to high 
internal resource commitments have to undergo a diligent planning process to reduce 
all uncertainties to the lowest minimum possible. 
“We need an accurate landing as far as revenues are concerned. […] 
Our funding has been focused and very much depends on in-depth 
consideration of what we should do.” 
(Michael Weiss) 
The formation of advertising and co-marketing alliances requires completion and 
approval of a detailed business case for the management team that defines the number 
of mobile subscribers involved, response rates, technical development requirements, 
and cost volumes by category. These quantitative factors are complemented by 
qualitative evaluation criteria such as the client’s industry or relatedness of user 
groups. Based on Zed’s experience, the relatedness of user bases is an important 
predictor for the impact of the co-marketing initiative and product acceptance. The due 
diligence process involves marketing, content and technology departments to provide 
multiple perspectives in the review process. The comparison of all qualitative, 
quantitative and financial indicators to the goal of profitable revenue growth is of 
major importance to top management.  
Operational coordination with effects on network objectives and performance 
Mutual contribution for joint benefits 
As outlined above, access to and selection of a valuable alliance represents an 
important prerequisite for alliance performance. In the case of alliance formation, the 
business case in the due diligence process defines mutual contributions and quantifies 
joint benefits and therefore plays a significant role in reducing the potential level of 
conflict in the alliance. Especially for these very valuable relationships, smooth 
alliance implementation and quick day-to-day operations depend on mutual pay-offs 
for both alliance partners. In contrast to this agreed upon approach, all external and 
forced resource commitments lead to an increased level of conflict in the alliance 
network. As marketing budgets have to be kept within certain constraints, many 
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alliance partners including large consumer brands are unwilling to spend significant 
financial resources. This underscores the importance of a balanced mutual pay-off in 
this competitive environment. All other topics around technical solutions or intellectual 
property of software do not play an important role in the discussion with partners 
outside of the mobile industry. Besides the discussed mutually comparable 
contributions, the later ownership and usage of the MSISDN (Mobile Subscriber 
Integrated Services Digital Network) or subscriber telephone number after the 
marketing campaign represents an important negotiation issue. This observation 
underlines the importance of customer ownership and knowledge for further 
advertising and co-marketing campaigns. 
Due to their value for Zed and its partners, alliances for content and joint marketing 
initiatives are tracked on a monthly basis and are compared with the original business 
case. Less complex content offerings receive a review of user acceptance and success. 
As outlined above, low performing services are optimized in the first step and, if no 
further improvement potential can be found, are abandoned quickly due to resource 
constraints. 
On the company level, partnership reviews are mainly dominated by clear revenue and 
cost criteria. Qualitative criteria such as time-to-market or value of product 
development are only important with a clear identification of future or deferred 
revenue potential. The development of cutting-edge technology skills does not play a 
significant role, since Zed’s initial learning experience showed the necessity of 
considerable financial and personnel resources to sustain technological leadership. 
In a review of company performance in financial terms, Zed has seen 50% revenue 
growth on a monthly basis from January to February 2002. At the same time, the 
number of transactions is decreasing, mainly due to the expiration of free trial offers. 
After the establishment of clear brand recognition and a loyal user base, all Zed 
services are now provided on a revenue basis only and many former trail users seem to 
return as paying customers.  
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Initial resource base and development 
Clear focus on understanding a growing and loyal customer basis 
In the time following the launch date in March 2001, Zed has realized that business 
survival in the market of mobile communications depends on providing services on a 
clear revenue basis only. Since external financing through the capital market is 
unavailable at this time, only profitable and cash positive business models represent an 
option for further sustainable growth. Services with revenue potential require user 
acceptance, which in turn demands Zed’s clear understanding of user behavior. 
Although GPRS and WAP as mobile communication standards continuously expand 
possibilities for novel applications, Zed remains focused on the standard SMS data 
transfer, because this type of communication standard is widely accepted by its user 
group. Disregarding the variety of all technical options, Zed has made developing 
comprehensive understanding of its user base, brand equity and interactive mobile 
services a top priority. 
 “The user, who looks at the web of Zed services and brands, says that I 
believe in that and that’s also something I would definitely want to buy. 
The developed customer demand and the deep understanding of our 
user base are the two areas we needed to build a brand [as a solid 
basis with the flexibility to go anywhere].” 
(Michael Weiss) 
Technical skills and capabilities are merely regarded as underlying facilitators and Zed 
has accepted the position of not being able to set technical trends and standards. 
However, financial and personnel resources are sufficient for tailoring proven technical 
solutions to communication and entertainment needs of the younger user groups. 
Technical applications have been focused on the small number of propriety and 
interactive entertainment and communication solutions. An understanding of 
commodity database technology with a clear understanding of youth entertainment 
represents a valuable combination of skill sets. Other related technology expertise 
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covers detailed customer profiling based on service usage patterns. Complementary 
mobile phone technology skills such as JAVA-based handset or GPRS transmission 
technology are either purchased directly or in the future will most likely be accessed by 
technology alliances to experiment with these more costly infrastructure options. In 
recognition of scarce resources, additional technology infrastructure is implemented 
only on an as-needed basis and is driven by Zed’s user requirements. 
The reduction of Zed personnel from 25 in 2001 to 14 employees in March 2002 
makes an approach of cautious technology adoption appear all the more applicable. 
Therefore, alliance formation with additional resource commitments has to be backed 
by a detailed business outline of both revenue potential and committed Zed resources. 
“All business cases are evaluated based on performance only. Some 
things such as the changes of certain infrastructure costs have not 
received full and due consideration. […] Today we know much more 
about the aspects we need to pay attention to: Legal clauses that allow 
the exit, short duration of contracts, and flexibility in the event of 
market changes. We now have much better control of all these areas 
which I would call clear management guidelines.” 
(Michael Weiss) 
In addition to the development of evolution criteria outlined in the network adjustment 
section, experience in screening alliance opportunities has been built up over time and 
has led to further organizational changes: All business cases are now being centrally 
discussed, reviewed and decided on by the management team as the controlling entity. 
Identified as improvement area in alliance management, the top management team 
faces significant challenges in seeking additional co-marketing opportunities with 
significant revenue potential. The high value of the partnership and the industry of 
potential clients – consumer goods and media – can be identified as the cause of these 
challenges, which in part can be alleviated by enlisting marketing agencies as 
mediators as described above. 
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2.4.6 Within-case study analysis 
All case study firms are faced with uncertain customer preferences and technological 
standards. Although all case studies apply different degrees of standardization in the 
development of alliance networks, all four case studies show a path towards 
increasingly complex and valuable partnership relationships. Whereas MSN, Lycos 
Mobile and Sonera Zed follow a more organic approach of alliance network growth, E-
plus applies a more top-down approach of structured and predefined relationships. 
Microsoft Network Germany 
Driven by the vision of interactive online services and the expectation of further 
industry consolidation, Microsoft Network Germany provides online services aimed at 
developing a loyal user base through attractive service offerings. Loyal user bases limit 
their Internet access to only a small number of information portals, which provides 
companies contributing to information offerings with the opportunity of focused 
customer access. The value of a loyal user base can be justified with strong economies 
of scale in providing online services at low variable costs. 
Since the parent company Microsoft is widely regarded as an industry leader, 
generating sufficient leads for additional partnerships does not represent a significant 
obstacle. For available alliance opportunities, MSN on the operational level applies a 
trial-and-error approach without a formalized due diligence process and evaluation 
criteria. Although on the corporate level certainly framed by Microsoft’s cooperative 
agreements, MSN on the strategic level strongly promotes Microsoft’s software 
standards for Internet identification and operating systems. In this regard, Microsoft 
utilizes MSN as an additional vehicle to sponsor its standard driven and compatibility 
focused business model. The establishment of standards can be linked to the objective 
of focusing on a loyal and stable customer base for MSN’s online services. 
The informality of MSN’s approach to alliance formation is also reflected in the 
ongoing management and maintenance of partnerships in terms of defining their 
objectives. Project-based and exploratory partnerships leave room for innovation 
beyond broadly defined partnership scopes. Due to many unproven business models 
for online services, MSN’s trial-and-error approach requires the utilization of 
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redundant partners in its portfolio. Across the majority of partnerships, MSN relies on 
the fact that partnership benefits gradually evolve with an open mind on 
complementary and mutual benefits from joint agreements. This open-minded 
cooperation anticipates ‘unknowns’ in technical capabilities, corporate culture or 
market conditions and refrains from any standardization of alliance relationships. 
Flexibility also has a positive impact on the magnitude of joint decision-making and 
the low level of conflict in the alliance relationships. 
However, in cases of joint success and further business potential, the extension of 
weak partnerships – in a limited number of incidents – leads to increased resource 
exchange which involves a more intense utilization of both partners’ user bases, 
technological skills and brand equity: Embedded in a richer alliance portfolio of 39 
alliances in March 2002, in selected cases MSN acts a mediator in the development and 
innovation of new service offerings. 
Microsoft’s strong technological position through its core software business as well as 
deliberate Internet technological follower position reduces the overall need for external 
collaboration. However, in cases of needed outside support, a converging alliance 
portfolio from content and technology ties towards advertising alliances clearly 
illustrates the path to more valuable partnerships. This transition follows the evolution 
of MSN company resources. The development of content rich and interactive online 
products results in a loyal user base, which can later be commercialized in subsequent 
advertising partnerships. In this context after establishing a critical mass, a good 
understanding of user preferences provides a valuable feedback mechanism for the 
initial service development and deployment. Both these iterations and an open-minded 
approach to alliance evolution provide MSN and its highly skilled employees with 
ample learning opportunities from cooperative relationships. As the dominating 
performance indicator, net ratings of MSN in Germany seem to prove sustainable 
progress on this path. 
E-Plus Mobilfunk GmbH & Co. KG 
With the launch of mobile portal i-mode, E-plus conceptually extends its traditional 
business model with the support of external service providers for mobile data services. 
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The high alliance formation rate of 80 partnerships with a timeframe of one year 
between introduction and launch of i-mode can be associated with transparent alliance 
evaluation criteria, a detailed alliance due diligence process and highly standardized 
alliance relationships. 
The highly standardized alliance relationships are adopted from the successful launch 
of i-mode in Japan and accelerate the alliance formation rate, because the basic 
structure of agreements and technical standards are known in advance – in most cases 
– can only be accepted as a take-it-or-leave-it option and have a limited number of 
open parameters to negotiate. However, this predefined and rigid interface to 
cooperation partners leaves little opportunity for adaptation, joint decision-making and 
conflict. Therefore, the learning potential for both partners is limited to involved and 
committed resources outlined in the i-mode framework. However, clear structures for 
alliance relationships have a positive impact on some ‘components’ of the alliance 
management capability: The restricted complexity of alliance structures simplifies the 
partnership selection and benefits the due diligence process. The clear definition of due 
diligence processes is underlined by the high involvement of legal and controlling 
departments. As another component of the alliance management capability, ongoing 
performance controlling of partnerships is also made straightforward through a set of 
qualitative and quantitative financial indicators. 
As E-plus in its traditional mobile operator business model is composed of clear-cut 
managerial and technical resources, its capability of integrating and training additional 
resources such as online user patterns, consumer goods marketing strategies or 
technical development is limited. The rigidities of the i-mode partnership framework 
as outlined above present further obstacles for learning new capabilities. Limited 
knowledge acquisition can be demonstrated by multiple empirical observations in the 
E-plus case: The case-by-case switch from the dominant i-mode model to the multi-
party alliance framework for some business applications seems to impose major 
obstacles for E-plus. The limited value of a complete focus on technical relationships 
and missing necessity of equity investments can be considered as insufficient feedback 
from one year of network evolution. Forced knowledge sharing in technical 
partnerships proves the missing capability of absorbing knowledge during daily 
operational processes. Consistent with this observation, the growth in technical 
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capabilities is also not included in the key performance indicator system for the 
ongoing monitoring of partnerships. And most important as a presumable result of 
limited learning, E-plus departments such as billing and network operation with their 
structured interfaces have difficulties in quickly implementing defined business 
agreements.  
Lycos Europe GmbH 
With the launch of the mobile channel in five countries, Lycos extends its current 
online service offerings to the area of mobile communication. The establishment of 
earlier operational alliances is the technical basis for business in mobile 
communications: Payment options, short message services, voice-based customer 
instructions represent fundamental ‘exchange mechanisms’ in the mobile arena. These 
services initiate the formation of a loyal customer base, which later can be extended 
through more sophisticated content-based software services. Lycos Mobile can then 
capitalize on enhanced customer loyalty and on a stable operational infrastructure by 
forming valuable partnerships for advertising and sponsoring. 
Operational and content alliances as a replacement for missing internal competencies 
or entry options in new technology areas cannot be replicated at reasonable cost. In the 
cases of reduced uncertainty, Lycos may decide to internalize or discontinue the use of 
outside technology and content services to increase efficiency. Besides these structural 
changes to the alliance portfolio, after the initial setup of business processes 
specifically relationships to technology infrastructure providers show stability in the 
regular exchange of information and resources. Service level agreements and 
channeling of information further stabilizes these partnerships. Due to industry factors 
such as changes in customer preferences, content alliances are either discontinued or 
rebalanced by Lycos Mobile. Rebalancing content alliances leads to adaptations to the 
financial resource exchange and the level of backward integration of Lycos Mobile. 
With the increased revenue stability and certainty in technical standards, Lycos Mobile 
now stores, distributes and charges for content services ordered online. Later, more 
strategic advertising and sponsorship partnerships built on previously acquired 
competencies require long timeframes for negotiation to cover the breadth of involved 
resource exchanges. In the Nokia alliance example, mandated by a marketing 
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agreement, Lycos Mobile extends its technological knowledge to an unrelated area of 
MMS Communication. In contrast to previous content alliances, Lycos Mobile - for 
this project - disregards technological uncertainties and cost efficiency, internally 
develops this technology and acquires valuable technological know-how. 
In expanding its traditional Internet business model to mobile communications, Lycos 
has developed a commodity operational infrastructure and knowledge of mobile 
communications. In a second step, a loyal customer base of 5 million users created 
more value alliance opportunities with the potential of technological leadership in 
MMS. Operational partnerships therefore represent a clear requirement of more 
strategic and valuable cooperation agreements. Low formalization and frequent 
adaptation in the area of content service agreements have facilitated Lycos’ learning 
effects in this service segment, which provide valuable knowledge of mobile 
communication services’ capabilities. 
The high involvement in alliance formation explains a relative high proficiency in 
initiating, selecting and adapting partnerships. Due to missing stability of the entire 
portfolio, the skills for the ongoing performance assessment still leave room for further 
enhancement. In a general self-assessment, Lycos Mobile is not only satisfied with its 
capability to initiate cooperative relationships, but also with absolute revenue and its 
increase at this very early stage of business development. However, the operational 
management and quality communication with the alliance network reveal weaknesses, 
which may be alleviated with increasing stabilization of business and cooperative 
agreements. 
Sonera Zed Germany GmbH 
Driven by refocusing Zed’s business model from mid 2000 to March 2001, strategy, 
partnership structures and internal resources have undergone significant changes. A 
concentration on user demands and an unsuccessful experience with earlier external 
content offerings have generated unique understanding of customer preferences and 
user behavior. This knowledge has been used to inform internal software development 
for proprietary, interactive and more valuable internal software products and an 
evolution in Zed’s partnership structure. Whereas the majority of relationships to 
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commodity content providers has been discontinued, the relationships to a few and 
adaptive suppliers have been extended. Remaining and highly structured alliances have 
improved the content quality and face continuous efficiency and cost reviews. Quality 
content is very much customized to Zed’s users, facilitated by enhanced and good 
understanding of user behavior and entertainment needs. 
Interactive software applications have generated a loyal user base of 2.3 million in 
March 2002, which can be leveraged for the establishment of high value advertising 
and co-marketing arrangements. Based on the unique understanding of user 
preferences, this revenue growth area is driven by the demand of corporate customers 
to find novel options to communicate advertising messages to Zed’s young user 
audience. 
In contrast to earlier partnerships, these alliances are very much tailored to corporate 
client needs and their business cases have to meet a set of critical criteria. Extensive 
resource commitment for these exploratory alliances and custom-made service 
offerings require this more extensive review process on top management and 
functional level. The variety of resources committed to these exchanges range from 
marketing and distribution services, access to brand equity and sharing of customer 
contacts. Clearly defined business cases that describe the mutually expected resource 
contributions also ensure a low level of conflict in the operational implementation of 
relationships. 
Clear profit and cash interests of mobile service providers like Sonera Zed have 
mandated the transition of business models and respective partnership structures. The 
growth path towards high value marketing relationships is enabled by the earlier 
development of products and a well-known user base. Zed’s management has 
appropriately described brand, positioning and user base as the building block for 
further development and expansion. Proprietary software development also makes this 
building block very difficult for competitors to copy. Both subscriber and successful 
revenue growth clearly demonstrate the beneficial performance implications of this 
very focused business and partnership model for Sonera Zed. 
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2.5 Development of a model of tentative propositions for focal firm alliance 
networks and resources 
In this section, analyses from within-case studies are integrated to detect common 
patterns of co-evolution between focal firm resources and alliance networks. In a step-
wise approach, the section derives tentative propositions on the development of 
alliance management resources, focal company resource additions as well as their 
interactions with future alliance formation and transformation activities. In general 
empirical observations from all case studies firms contribute to development of all 
tentative propositions. However, only Intel and Sun & DLR show divergent patterns 
for the issues of future alliance formation and tie transformation. 
As these two cases cover larger firm’s business development support for new 
technology-based firms, these ‘mentoring’ partnerships follow defined firm or industry 
patterns and undergo only minimal future formation and transformations. As an 
example, Intel Capital’s relationships to NTBFs by default involve minority equity 
investments and defined support activities from Intel’s business units. In contrast these 
predefined frameworks, the experience gained from deep operational integration of 
Elisa’s city carriers or partners of all four online service firms open up additional 
business challenges and opportunities over time. These challenges and opportunities in 
turn result in the transformation of existing and the formation of additional cooperative 
relationships. 
Development of alliance management capabilities and stable alliance structures 
Across all case studies presented, industry environment, business objectives and 
current resource base result in alliance network objectives whose implementation 
intends to fulfill firm objectives in the context of available resources. Firms in the 
center of these networks in this section are defined as focal firms. With exposure to 
alliance formation and management activities, focal firms develop specific skill sets or 
capabilities that influence both current and potential future partnerships. 
Intel Capital as Intel’s central business development function, has been assigned a 
pivotal role in exploring new technological fields and developing further market 
potential for its core silicon business. Also guided by overall network objectives, 
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Lycos, MSN  Sonera Zed and E-plus extend their partnerships in addition to internal 
resources to complement their online or mobile service portfolio, which allows direct 
or indirect future commercialization. Suggested by industry-wide consolidation, 
Elisa’s and Tropolys’ profitability objectives for local loop fixed-line access require 
consolidation of a city carrier network. 
The network objectives are to select and deploy internal and complementary external 
operational resources. Operational resources are defined as the set of human, 
technological, financial and organizational or other resources that support target 
processes industry specific to the individual business. With regard to alliance network 
evolution, alliance network objectives serve as a blueprint and guideline for alliance 
formation. With wide-ranging effects, the defined set of network objectives facilitates 
and assesses the alliance selection process, the deployment of resources and learning 
activities between companies. 
In the case of Intel Capital, highly stable network objectives direct the selection and 
subsequent development of financially viable new technology-based firms that build 
up market potential for Intel’s core business. Sun’s and DLR’s Business Innovation 
Center aims at assembling entrepreneurial projects within the defined technological 
scope. More oriented towards operational integration, the alliance networks of Lycos, 
MSN, E-plus and Zed aim at initially setting up the infrastructure for online services 
and later selectively commercializing the growing user base. Dynamic in their nature, 
the alliance network objectives represent an alliance filter and therefore determine the 
selectiveness in screening partnership opportunities. As an example, Intel’s demanding 
expectations for the expected performance of potential investments result in a low rate 
of selected investment proposals. Zed’s early success in establishing a well-defined 
user base refocuses the target of potential alliance partners towards selected consumer 
goods and media companies. Across all online service case studies, higher quality 
standards for attractive content reduce the alliance formation rate with only a selected 
number of external providers. 
Proposition # 1 Determined by an assessment of a focal firm’s operational 
resources, more selective alliance network objectives as 
guidelines in the alliance formation process have a negative 
effect on the alliance formation rate. 
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Although companies in Intel’s equity portfolio stem from a diverse set of industries, 
make use of uncertain high-technology applications and cooperate with Intel’s 
business units that pursue dynamic strategies, Intel’s extensive experience in corporate 
venture capital activities ensures relatively stable network objectives and – as a result – 
dependable alliance network relationships. Detailed due diligence processes for 
concise information gathering, transparent selection criteria for mutually agreed upon 
decisions, involvement of all relevant functional departments including business units 
for ongoing commitment, and milestone-based investment agreements for continuous 
dedication to jointly defined goals represent some essentials of Intel’s well-developed 
capabilities in forming and developing alliance networks over time. Due to Sun’s and 
DLR’s fewer alliances to new venture teams and companies, their alliance management 
capability only includes selection criteria without clearly describing a due diligence 
process. More sophisticated alliance management resources with defined processes and 
criteria can also be found in E-plus case and the later evolution of Zed’s alliance 
network. The increasing number of Elisa’s equity investment cases with repetitively 
performed activities generates alliance management resources. Constant alliance 
network objectives, which provide the context of this capability, ensure stability and 
relevance of this resource value. 
Proposition # 2 With an increasing number of accumulated alliance 
formation activities under constant alliance network 
objectives, the focal firm develops valuable alliance 
management resources of refined selection criteria and 
processes to successfully screen, form and advance alliances 
in its network. 
Intel’s alliance management resources to continuously advance alliance networks with 
benefits mentioned above minimize the failure of alliances and necessary adaptation in 
terms of intensity and functionality. Best practice approaches for setting milestones 
and controlling performance and replicated relationship frameworks to define the 
exchange contribute to partnership stability. Similar patterns can be found in Zed’s 
later advertising and co-marketing partnerships, which undergo a detailed business 
case assessment to ensure mutual alliance benefit contributions and benefits during 
implementation. And even the Lycos case illustrates that channeling communication in 
alliances increases partners’ satisfaction and – at the same time – the longevity of 
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alliance relationships. Along the same lines, Elisa and Tropolys set up structured 
functional boards and standardized controlling to stabilize majority equity ties to 
regional city carriers. 
Across all these cases, alliance management resources are instrumental in harmonizing 
goals before partnership formation, determining milestones for the resource exchange, 
in providing performance metrics over the lifecycle of the partnership and assisting in 
conflict resolution. Distorting factors such as changing partner motivation, missing 
fulfillment of promised resources or unclear expectations are reduced, which has a 
beneficial effect on the partnership’s stability. 
Proposition # 3 Better-developed alliance management resources contribute 
to higher stability in alliance relationships between the focal 
company and its alliance partners. 
Although high technology collaboration in all case studies is associated with inherent 
technological uncertainties and poses managerial challenges, alliance management 
resources can limit the required modifications in the functional dedication, intensity, 
and resource exchange of partnerships. As seen in Intel’s case, a stable relationship 
reduces the need for ‘trial-and-error’ and the level of conflict. Lycos Mobile’s 
channeling of the communication flow from its regional units to operational 
infrastructure providers facilitates a consolidation of interests, reduction of 
informational redundancies and conflicting needs, which contributes to the stability of 
relationship to the external partner. E-plus’ very structured relationship framework for 
i-mode alliances clearly defines mutual contributions and financial benefits, which 
reduces conflicts in negotiating the contractual arrangements. The reduction of ‘trial-
and-error’ processes, misled communication flows or disproportionate contributions 
also reduce the level of unintended resource exchanges beyond the scope of the 
alliance defined previously. 
Proposition # 4 More stable alliance relationships reduce the magnitude of 
unintended resource exchange and the level of conflict in 
partnerships. 
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Focal company resource acquisition and learning 
As focal firms cooperate to support business development, to consolidate fixed-line 
communication operations or to develop online service offerings, their interaction has 
effects on the exchange of operational resources. Propelled by the interaction based on 
alliance relationships and guided by their objectives, all case study firms exhibit an 
acquisition of resources either through learning or transfer. The magnitude and type of 
resource acquisition depends on alliance network and firm level factors. 
Low levels of conflict in relationships to Intel Capital investments, restrictions in the 
enforcement of legal sanctions and milestone payments to ensure partnership 
compliance signal and convey a successful partnership model, support consensus 
driven decision-making and motivate the reliable achievement of defined stable 
partnership goals. In the Sun and DLR cases, variety of alliance partners, diversity of 
partnership frameworks and emerging alliance management functions result in 
multiple feedback loops in the coaching process and flexibility of venture development 
in the later seed stage. Both flexibility and feedback loops can be leveraged to explore 
product applications and business models, beyond the initial objectives of the alliances. 
In contrast, as relatively tight i-mode relationship frameworks regulate alliance 
partners and define mutual contributions, E-plus faces difficulties in implementing 
partnerships and even greater challenges in motivating innovativeness beyond initial 
alliance purposes. Elisa’s and Tropolys’ functional boards, group-wide controlling, 
standardized product offerings, and defined city carrier assessment criteria clearly limit 
innovativeness for fixed-line communication products. A reduced magnitude of 
unintended resource exchanges therefore decreases the number of opportunities for 
learning and creative and innovative resource combinations as the basis for potential 
future collaboration. 
Proposition # 5 Lower magnitude of unintended resource exchanges reduces 
the focal firm’s level of innovation and exploration beyond 
the originally defined alliance objectives. 
A low level of unintended resource exchanges and conflict implies that partnerships 
closely follow their defined goals for the previous resource exchange. Limited changes 
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in alliance objectives, product development schedules, and marketing plans during the 
implementation of the partnership reduce the diverse interaction between functional 
departments of both alliance partners. Diversity of interaction can be regarded as a 
‘trial-and-error’ approach, which supports awareness of the breadth of partner 
capabilities, explores new processes for resource transfer and benefits from unintended 
resource exchanges. Lacking the clear-cut and engineered interface for the alliance 
relationship, both partner companies invest in the mutual relationship by exploring the 
mutually beneficial balance of resource exchange. This search process facilitates 
mutual learning for innovation or future partnership projects beyond the current 
alliance objective. 
The Sun and DLR case studies clearly demonstrate the diversity of cooperative 
relationships. Multiplicity of technical projects, case-by-case business development 
activities and tailored cooperation agreements create a rich learning environment for 
all alliance partners. In this environment, DLR has learned how to cooperate with 
industry clients and has developed stronger entrepreneurial orientation. This valuable 
learning experience depends on intense interaction between alliance partners for the 
reasons described above. Elisa and Tropolys in their objective to consolidate city 
carrier operations needed a conflict with minority stakeholders to raise the awareness 
of their objectives and to discover their value in acquiring new city carrier customers. 
In contrast to these examples, i-mode cooperation models as defined by E-plus follows 
predefined selection criteria, offers a recurring revenue sharing framework and 
provides standardized operational interfaces with E-plus’ departments. This degree of 
standardization supports the high frequency of alliance formation in its “mass 
partnering” approach, but limits diverse exchange beyond defined alliance objectives. 
Reduced learning effects from i-mode alliance partners can clearly be associated with 
missing accounts of technical learning, problems in the implementation of partnerships 
and intentional knowledge acquisition procedures for technical alliances. The 
implementation of partnerships would clearly benefit from initial learning, which 
creates awareness of partner capabilities and facilitates in the anticipation of 
cooperation benefits. 
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Proposition # 6 A higher level of conflict and unintended resource exchange 
in alliance relationships increases the learning potential for 
partners involved in the alliance. 
If conflict and unintended resource exchanges generate learning potential, can it be 
utilized by the focal firm? As the first case indicates, Intel Capital’s learning of 
technical resources beyond the previously mentioned alliance management capabilities 
is limited to rare exceptions. However, the magnitude of Intel’s learning as a by-
product of resource exchange increases with the technological relatedness to Intel’s 
core microprocessor design and manufacturing technology base. In this case, Intel 
intentionally intensifies its relationship to the portfolio company to internalize learning 
from joint development projects. 
Other cases exhibit similar patterns: With a clear understanding of city carrier 
operations through initial consulting assignments, both Elisa and Tropolys could better 
internalize and standardize resources of city carriers for network operation and shared 
service processes. Due to focus on the matching technological domains in navigation, 
communication, geographical information and avionics, corresponding DLR institutes 
enjoy a rich learning experience in cooperation with new venture projects and 
acquisition of valuable resources. In contrast to these examples, media, entertainment 
and consumer goods companies in i-mode’s alliance network show a low degree of 
similarity with E-plus, which is focused on operation and administration of cellular 
networks. This difference in partners’ resource bases reduces the magnitude of focal 
firm learning. 
Comparing all these case examples, the similarity to the current focal company 
technology base seems to facilitate the accurate valuation of the external technology 
base, identification of own technology gaps and integration of innovations into the 
current know-how base. The integration of existing knowledge makes integrating new 
results and findings easier, because ‘reference points’ make interfaces to existing 
resources visible. 
Proposition # 7 Higher learning potential and closer resource base 
relatedness of alliance partners with the focal firm have a 
positive impact on focal firm learning.  
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Interaction effects of alliance network formation and focal firm resources 
In the case of jointly coordinated operations across multiple partners, the presented 
case studies have shown clear patterns of co-evolution between focal firm resources 
and alliance networks. This pattern can be demonstrated in the online services case 
studies of MSN, E-plus, Lycos and Sonera Zed: Formerly less resource intensive 
partnerships – more comparable to market-based transactions – provide an operational 
infrastructure, which represents an ‘obvious industry specific necessity’ to transfer 
information and provide payment options. The subsequent development and 
deployment of more valuable resources – interactive services, loyal customer base, 
unique understanding of user behavior – open up a range of further, more advanced 
alliance formation opportunities for these companies. Also the case study of Elisa and 
Tropolys demonstrates a similar sequence: Earlier minority equity investments in a 
broad and diverse portfolio of city carriers have been used to clearly assess their 
capabilities and regional strategies. This more detailed understanding facilitated the 
decision on the viability of a consolidation strategy in general and commitment of 
further financial resources to later acquire majority stakes in particular. This section 
derives a set of propositions to describe this recurring and refining cycle of alliance 
formation that has an impact on focal firm’s alliance network structure. 
As outlined above, MSN, Lycos and Sonera with their existing technology resource 
base have formed initial contractual and technical partnerships related to market 
transactions to complement their resource profile. Inter-firm cooperation with external 
providers mainly supply payment options, data transmission to mobile network 
operators or electronic content to complement internal information offerings. In a 
classical make-or-buy assessment, the obvious unavailability of internal resources or 
cost-based efficiency assessments have apparently mandated alliance formation for 
these basic technical services. The inevitable alliance network for the basic operational 
infrastructure provides commodity services and can therefore be easily replicated by 
competitors in the industry. The very narrow resource exchange of technical and 
financial resources follows a very defined scope and objectives, due to the nature of 
standardized services. 
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Proposition # 8 Initial alliance formation for the support of technical 
processes across the alliance network aims only at the 
availability and narrow exchange of operational resources. 
As described above, primary partnerships exhibit clear structural patterns of the 
defined exchange of services – payment, SMS transmission, electronic content – on a 
transactional or revenue-sharing basis. Although the extent of financial compensation 
dominates these service agreements, the focal firm also receives feedback on technical 
interfaces, sales volume or customer preferences as a non-financial and knowledge 
resource. Therefore, these cooperative relationships and their underlying contracts 
show some similarity but no identity to market-based transactions. 
After initial learning effects, the acquisition of external resources and the independent 
development of focal company resources, additional partnership opportunities open up 
for the focal companies in the alliance network. Examples across all case studies 
clearly demonstrate this pattern: MSN has utilized earlier content alliances and internal 
applications development to bundle information channels into online products, which 
earn the loyalty of an increasing customer base. Similarly, with the help of an initial 
alliance for the operational infrastructure, Lycos has offered simple SMS sending 
functionality and Zed has distributed externally sourced content to establish a solid 
customer base. This customer base represents an attractive resource and therefore a 
motivation for business customers such as Volkswagen (MSN) or Nokia (Lycos) to 
intensify relationships and newly establish higher value relationships. Continuously 
returning and migrating customers from other online service providers gradually 
develop a user community. Database technology helps analyze online usage patterns 
and develop an understanding for customer profiles. With many feedback loops 
between service offerings and user preferences, these firm activities continuously 
develop a very valuable resource for all online information portals: A loyal and well-
known customer base. 
The case study of Elisa and Tropolys reveals similar patterns: The in-depth 
understanding of city carrier operations, consolidation potentials and city carrier 
capabilities represent a unique set of resources in the consolidation of the fixed-line 
telecommunications market. Although knowledge about running a city carrier has been 
replicated regionally on a number of occasions, the emergent resources of developing 
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and implementing a consolidation strategy made Elisa and Tropolys the unique and 
inimitable hub for a network of local-loop access providers. Newly acquired and 
developed resources can be used as a ‘stepping-stone’ for richer and more valuable 
partnership opportunities. 
Proposition # 9 The growing base of internally developed and externally 
acquired focal firm resources creates additional and more 
valuable alliance formation opportunities. 
An establishing customer base has motivated business customers to collaborate with 
online service providers as an alternative option for advertising and marketing 
communication. If these more valuable alliance opportunities are turned into a 
cooperative relationship, how does their implementation affect the continuing resource 
exchange between partners? 
In executing more valuable alliance opportunities, MSN has developed a mobility 
portal for Volkswagen with rich and interactive functionalities. For customers in the 
retailing industry, MSN has established a complex infrastructure for shopping channels 
enabling browsing within multiple product catalogs. Showing similar patterns, Zed has 
signed tailored co-marketing agreements with consumer goods companies that require 
complex customization of technical applications and retrieval of customer preferences. 
As Lycos promoted Nokia’s MMS handsets, Lycos has internally developed an MMS 
messaging capability tailored to the functionalities of the mobile phone. Along the 
same lines, Tropolys and Elisa thoroughly communicate on multiple channels – in this 
case functional boards – to identify, implement and track implementation potential. 
This intensification of inter-firm interaction has been established after the decision to 
include the city carrier in the consolidation network and to acquire the respective 
majority stake in the company. 
In the case of all online service providers, all cooperation agreements involve the 
combined and complex deployment of technical development, customer profiling, 
external messaging or content services. The consolidation of city carriers requires the 
combined development and deployment of centralized controlling, standardized 
product offerings and shared administrative services. Due to the business relevance of 
these complex interactions, these more comprehensive alliances require very intense 
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relationships and the extensive exchange of multiple resources. Highly intense alliance 
relationships are associated with the frequent interaction to coordinate operational 
processes between alliance partners. 
Wide-ranging resource commitments from the focal company call for a more 
sophisticated due diligence process with defined criteria embedded in a formatted 
business case. In the case of Elisa and Tropolys, the extension of city carrier 
relationships to majority equity stakes has been facilitated and verified by a detailed 
assessment process: Elisa’s very thorough due diligence covers technical, legal and 
business aspects complemented by the earlier experience of minority stake holdings. 
Similarly, Sonera Zed’s detailed business case based on input from diverse functional 
departments has to be approved by the entire top-management, which underlines the 
business relevance and significance of Zed’s resource commitments. 
Proposition # 10 Emerging alliance management resources facilitate the 
selection of high-value alliance formation opportunities and 
their beneficial transformation into partnerships of higher 
resource exchange intensity. 
Proposition # 11 Alliances of higher value and resource exchange intensity 
mandate a higher degree of customization and complexity in 
resource exchange. 
The technical development of the Volkswagen mobility portal by MSN, consolidating 
fixed-line telecommunications services or the pioneering technical deployment of 
MMS messaging capabilities illustrate valuable resource exchanges of higher 
complexity and magnitude. Especially in these contexts, the development of alliance 
management resources represents a precondition for the assessment and negotiation of 
more complex partnerships. Extended timeframes for the negotiation of the Nokia 
MMS promotion or Zed’s co-marketing agreements serve as indicators for the value 
and relevance both parties attach to the cooperation. Similar patterns of steady but 
gradual growth can be detected in the yearly and continuous addition of partners to 
MSN’s shopping channel and specific utilization of marketing agencies to seek 
matching partners for Zed’s co-marketing alliances. 
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Challenges in selecting appropriate and beneficial high-value partnerships can be 
overcome after initially acquiring resources from partners in the alliance network. A 
good understanding of previously acquired operational resources from existing alliance 
network partners represents an important feedback mechanism for the capability to 
screen, form and advance alliance opportunities. Learning as the primary acquisition 
mechanism (Proposition # 7) contributes to changes and the refinement of alliance 
network objectives. In a second step, necessary adaptations provide a basis for clearer 
and more concise selection criteria. 
Proposition # 12 Focal firm learning through changed alliance network 
objectives represents a valuable feedback mechanism for 
refined selection criteria as a component in alliance 
management resources. 
Empirical evidence for this proposition can be found in the more careful selection of 
Zed’s content providers after its user profiles have been made available. Along the 
same lines, Elisa and Tropolys have determined clear criteria for the selection of 
promising city carriers with solid consolidation potential only after the earlier 
experience with a variety of local loop access providers. Out of the entire initial 
portfolio, some regional network operators revealed some financial, operational and 
managerial characteristics that have signaled no fit with the intended consolidation 
strategy. 
Transformation and discontinuation of alliance network relationships 
Environmental changes such as shifts in customer preferences and internally developed 
resources have an impact on the value of resources acquired from external 
partnerships. Changes in value obtained require a reassessment and redirection of 
earlier partnerships. 
In studies of all four online service companies, resource exchanges with suppliers in 
initial relationships for technical processes (Proposition # 8) only complement internal 
resources. After full implementation of daily operations and initial learning effects, 
services and content provided go through a review process, which leads to a 
rebalanced exchange of resources. Options to rebalance the alliance relationship range 
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from internalization of services, renegotiations of existing contracts or discontinuation 
of the relationships. 
Cost considerations and a focus on improved margins for Lycos Mobile have led to the 
internalization of activities for its content services: In mature stages of the adapted 
relationships to content providers, Lycos now independently hosts the database, 
provides payment options and therefore gives a reduced share back to the copyright 
holder. In addition to operational changes, both Lycos Mobile and Zed have reviewed 
and renegotiated agreements with premium rate number providers and now receive 
larger revenue shares from its service providers. In addition to rebalancing the resource 
exchange, Lycos and Zed have also discontinued content partnership as a reaction to 
unmet consumer demand. The emergence of a customer base with more defined profile 
leads to the obsolescence of earlier partnerships at the end of their lifecycle. Along 
these lines, Elisa has also divested multiple minority interests in city carriers after 
assessing their competencies and fit with a consolidation strategy. Comparable 
efficiency considerations mandate the divestment of equity stakes to free up financial 
resources for the acquisition of majority stakes. 
Proposition # 13 Initial and less resource intensive alliance relationships face 
value reviews in their comparison to internally developed 
and externally available focal firm resources. 
Proposition # 14 Value reviews may lead to the internalization of resources, 
rebalancing of resource exchange or the discontinuation of 
the relationship based on efficiency considerations. 
This decision not only reflects the underlying strategic rationale, but also economically 
driven assessment to free up much needed financial resources in exchange for minority 
stakes. As a common understanding in the Elisa and Tropolys case study, intensified 
relationships are the precondition for the transfer of resources between network 
companies to achieve economies of scale in administrative service, customer care and 
billing within the network. Only majority stake holdings offer the necessary authority 
not only to plan but also to forcefully implement operational consolidation. The 
magnitude and speed of resource shifts in the consolidating city carrier network cannot 
only be based on the learning of other firms’ capabilities. Forced and directed transfer 
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of resources orchestrated by the integrating entities Elisa and Tropolys seems to be 
required as well. 
Proposition # 15 An increase in the relationship intensity over a certain 
threshold allows for the transfer in addition to learning about 
network company resources. 
With the addition of resource intensive and the discontinuation of initial technical 
partnerships alliance networks around focal firms converge to fulfill and further 
specify their ‘business purpose’: Across a number of cases in this study, a certain 
transition from broad and diversified portfolios to a focused and selected set of 
partnerships can be observed in conjunction with focused alliance network objectives: 
In the Elisa and Tropolys case, the need for a consolidation strategy has been 
developed earlier based on the information received form its initial portfolio 
companies. Changes in the industry environment have led to both, sharp price 
decreases and intensified competition. Stand-alone city carriers with the current 
resource base of marketing, network operation and customer care have very limited 
competitive advantages over rival carriers and Deutsche Telekom AG. With 
profitability and the time to break even being very uncertain, consolidation of 
operational resources with current knowledge represents the only remaining option to 
achieve profitability within certain timeframes. The need for consolidation and the 
design of the appropriate strategy has been developed in the phase of minority stake-
holdings of Elisa Kommunikation in city carriers. Earlier knowledge resources 
generated by providing initial consulting services and holding minority stakes have 
presented a diverse set of information to Elisa Kommunikation as the focal 
organization in this alliance network: Performance metrics, best practice benchmarks, 
customer profile. The wealth and diversity of information has underlined both the 
feasibility and the necessity of a consolidation strategy. 
With the integration in the operational network under Elisa’s sub-unit Tropolys, city 
carriers have been embedded in the web of functional boards to exchange best 
practices and to track their implementation across multiple operational areas. 
Previously defined consolidation potentials now await their implementation, which 
requires resource intensive exchanges on detailed best practices and coordination 
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among multiple partners for consistent and harmonized internal processes. This 
adaptation in resource exchange is facilitated by alliance network transition from 
Elisa’s hub-and-spoke ‘hierarchy’ to Tropolys’ very dense network with multiple 
interconnected network firms. The initial exploration of roughly identified 
consolidation potential now awaits its exploitation in the actual implementation of 
efficiency improvement measures. 
Proposition # 16 Motivated by a transformation from exploration to 
exploitation in alliance network objectives, an adaptation to 
the resource exchange between the focal firm and other 
network firms requires more intensive alliance network 
relationships to the focal firms and between network firms. 
MSN Germany reveals a similar tendency in its mediating role between alliance 
partners and their interest to jointly develop information services for a user community 
of senior citizens. Network companies having shared their business initiatives and 
ideas, MSN can now exploit commonalities, foster further integration of alliance 
partners and direct the joint resource deployment of network companies. In a similar 
account after the exploration of user preferences in a trial-and-error approach, Sonera 
Zed has reduced the number of relationships to content providers and intensified ties to 
the remaining suppliers of online content. In exploiting the proven capabilities of 
remaining suppliers, Sonera Zed now constantly feeds back user preferences based on 
more intensified cooperative agreements. 
Overview 
In an overview of all derived propositions, Exhibit 2-27 integrates the multitude of 
presented relationships into a consolidated system. Both growing focal company 
resources and alliance networks are influenced by partnership reviews, 
interorganizational learning and changing alliance network objectives. 
Based on the described sequence of tentative propositions, operational resources or the 
lack thereof represent the starting point for the co-evolution of alliance networks and 
focal firm resources. Resource gaps motivate the firm for external partnering, which is 
guided by specific alliance network objectives. Any learning effect – or resource 
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addition – in the top right corner of the chart leads adaptations in alliance network 
objectives. Alliance network objectives represent selection criteria, which have the 
described effect on the partnership formation rate. The process aspects of alliance 
management resources are built by cumulative and repetitive partnership formation 
activities. Developed alliance management resources – consisting both of appropriate 
selection criteria and sophisticated processes – have a positive impact on the stability 
of the individual alliance relationship and the network as a whole. Stability reduces the 
level of conflict and unintended resource exchanges, which both limit focal firm’s 
learning potential. The similarity of resources between focal and network firms turns 
the available learning potential into operational resource addition or actual learning. 
The nature of operational resources depending on industry, firm size or relevant 
business context can be assessed along financial, technological, physical, managerial, 
human, organizational dimensions. Growing operational resources increase the value 
of externally presented alliance opportunities, which – facilitated by appropriate 
alliance management resources – leads to more intense partnerships in the event of 
actual alliance formation. 
The entire model of alliance formation and focal firm resources reveals interesting 
converging patterns: Based on initial alliance formation activities, interorganizational 
learning through increased conflict and unintended resource exchanges provides 
feedback for a more selective screening of further high-value alliance formation 
opportunities. In this respect, the complete alliance network – exploiting earlier 
developed resources – is converging towards a more defined set of alliance network 
objectives and relationships. These converging relationships show sings of increasing 
intensity, higher complexity and customization of exchanged resources. The focal 
company can therefore start with a set of relatively unspecific alliance network 
objectives, which result in broad screening criteria and a multitude of unstable alliance 
relationships. These initial relationships provide ample opportunity for focal firm 
learning, which results in a more selective set of alliance network objectives for the 
screening of increasingly valuable alliance formation opportunities. Facilitated by 
growing alliance management resources, these more stable partnerships deploy an 
increasingly complex and customized set of resources. 
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Exhibit 2-27 Overview: Framework of tentative propositions 
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Proposition Definition 
Proposition # 1 
Determined by an assessment of a focal firm’s operational resources, more selective alliance network 
objectives as guidelines in the alliance formation process have a negative effect on the alliance 
formation rate. 
Proposition # 2 
With an increasing number of accumulated alliance formation activities under constant alliance 
network objectives, the focal firm develops valuable alliance management resources of refined 
selection criteria and processes to successfully screen, form and advance alliances in its network. 
Proposition # 3 
Better-developed alliance management resources contribute to higher stability in alliance 
relationships between the focal company and its alliance partners. 
Proposition # 4 
More stable alliance relationships reduce the magnitude of unintended resource exchange and the 
level of conflict in partnerships. 
Proposition # 5 
Lower magnitude of unintended resource exchanges reduces the focal firm’s level of innovation and 
exploration beyond the originally defined alliance objectives. 
Proposition # 6 
A higher level of conflict and unintended resource exchange in alliance relationships increases the 
learning potential for partners involved in the alliance. 
Proposition # 7 
Higher learning potential and closer resource base relatedness of alliance partners with the focal firm 
have a positive impact on focal firm learning. 
Proposition # 8 
Initial alliance formation for the support of technical processes across the alliance network aims only 
at the availability and narrow exchange of operational resources. 
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Proposition # 9 
The growing base of internally developed and externally acquired focal firm resources creates 
additional and more valuable alliance formation opportunities. 
Proposition # 10 
Emerging alliance management resources facilitate the selection of high-value alliance formation 
opportunities and their beneficial transformation into partnerships of higher resource exchange 
intensity. 
Proposition # 11 
Alliances of higher value and resource exchange intensity mandate a higher degree of customization 
and complexity in resource exchange. 
Proposition # 12 
Focal firm learning through changed alliance network objectives represents a valuable feedback 
mechanism for refined selection criteria as a component in alliance management resources. 
Proposition # 13 
Initial and less resource intensive alliance relationships face value reviews in their comparison to 
internally developed and externally available focal firm resources. 
Proposition # 14 
Value reviews may lead to the internalization of resources, rebalancing of resource exchange or the 
discontinuation of the relationship based on efficiency considerations. 
Proposition # 15 
An increase in the relationship intensity over a certain threshold allows for the transfer in addition to 
learning about network company resources. 
Proposition # 16 
Motivated by a transformation from exploration to exploitation in alliance network objectives, an 
adaptation to the resource exchange between the focal firm and other network firms requires more 
intensive alliance network relationships to the focal firms and between network firms. 
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3 Theoretical perspectives of focal company resource and network evolutions – 
towards a dynamic model 
After concluding case study descriptions and analyses, the tentative propositions are to 
be compared with relevant and appropriate theoretical frameworks: A combination of 
two emerging theoretical concepts – the resource-based view of the firm and strategic 
network theory – both informs tentative propositions and also requires conceptual 
extensions through theory building. Although many scholars have already 
acknowledged the relevance of company resources and strategic networks, especially 
new theoretical models for dynamic resource and network evolution require additional 
conceptual extensions. 
The longitudinal case studies of the previous chapter and the derived tentative 
propositions shed light on emerging theoretical concepts for resource and network 
evolution. The following sections describe the basic theoretical frameworks, establish 
relationships between company resources and networks, elaborate on implications of 
network structures for their further evolution and explore learning across network 
structures. In a final stage, all theoretical perspectives are combined in one unified 
longitudinal model of focal company resource and network evolution, which is later 
compared with the set of tentative propositions. 
3.1 Overview of selected and applicable theoretical frameworks 
The combination of the resource-based view of the firm and the strategic network 
theory provides an insightful theoretical underpinning. However, both theoretical 
frameworks have to be integrated using the theoretical concept of network resources. 
Resource-based view of the firm and its derivatives 
The resource-based view (RBV) of the firm regards strategic capabilities as a bundle 
of internal resources important for the foundation of competitive advantage (Penrose 
1959; Wernerfelt 1984; Barney 1991; Amit and Schoemaker 1993). The accumulation 
and deployment of valuable, rare and inimitable resources generate synergies and rents 
(Wernerfelt 1984; Barney 1986; Dierickx, Cool and Barney 1989; Barney 1991; 
Mahoney and Pandian 1992; Peteraf 1993; Barney 2001). Resources as tangible or 
intangible assets are generated over time by complex interactions and are guided by 
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information exchange through the firm’s human resources (Amit and Schoemaker 
1993). 
Researchers have identified three characteristics that build up the barriers of 
inimitability as a major source for the sustainability of competitive advantages: 
Tacitness, complexity, and specificity (Reed and DeFillippi 1990). Tacitness 
characterizes skills and organizational routines whose re-creation and replication 
require learning by repeatedly executing the task. In contrast, explicitness describes 
knowledge and information that can easily be codified and transferred (Penrose 1959; 
Polanyi 1967). Complexity occurs when many different and interrelated skills or 
organizational activities exist within a firm (Nelson and Winter 1982) or across 
organizational boundaries (Gulati and Singh 1998). Specificity refers to the nature of 
some resources being specialized to the requirements of specific transactions either 
within a firm or across organizational boundaries (Williamson 1985). 
As an important resource example for high-technology firms in this study (Tushman 
and Anderson 1986; Henderson and Clark 1990), technological capabilities comprising 
patents, development knowledge, and production skills define the roots of a firm’s 
sustainable competitive advantage. Technological intellectual property protected by 
patent law allows for the subsequent value creation in the commercialization of new 
product development efforts, development of market opportunities and differentiation 
from incumbents. Not all technological capabilities can be safeguarded by patent laws 
and are therefore vulnerable to imitation and replication, which weakens the firm 
appropriability regime to capture respective rents from these capabilities (Teece 1986). 
However, technical organizational skills are hard to copy, because they remain largely 
embedded in the tacit routines and practices of the firm (Kogut and Zander 1996). 
Since tacit skills can be backed by enjoying a tight appropriability regime, innovators 
can be assured to translate innovation into market value for a certain time period. 
Resource-based strategy research is traditionally concentrated on explaining sustained 
performance differences between firms. In its application to alliance formation, 
resource heterogeneity plays a significant role in explaining strategic change and 
actions. As a consequence, in numerous empirical and theoretical descriptions of 
alliance formation, the dominant focus has been on exploring the resource-based 
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motivations supporting alliance formation (Berg, Duncan et al. 1982; Hagedoorn 
1993). 
Consequently, scholars have identified collaborative practices across firm sizes and 
industry sectors as a practical method of knowledge resource creation and transfer 
(Hamel 1991; Nonaka 1994; Powell, Koput et al. 1996). In addition to the mentioned 
specificity and complexity, strategic alliances also have the potential to create 
competitive advantages through idiosyncratic complementary resource combination 
between partnering firms (Kogut 1991). The idiosyncratic character of resource 
combination and the embeddedness of the focal firm establish barriers to imitation 
(Hansen, Hoskission, Lorenzoni and Ring 1997). 
Since the RBV is traditionally limited to the single firm only, it fails to explore the 
process by which multiple firms work collaboratively and develop individual and 
common capabilities. Therefore, both concepts of knowledge transfer and resource 
combination between partnering firms are not reflected in the resource-based view of 
the firm. In order to explore relational firm capabilities, the assumption of inimitable 
and therefore immobile resources that dominates the RBV (Barney 1991) has to be 
abandoned. Scholars have criticized the assumption of immobile capabilities (Hannan 
and Freeman 1989) and have released this notion by introducing different types of 
imperfect immobility that are not disadvantageous for the firms (Peteraf 1993) and by 
identifying certain resources that are selectively tradable through a network of firms 
(Hansen, Hoskission et al. 1997) in a process approach. 
The related theoretical concept of dynamic capabilities builds on the resource-based 
view of the firm and provides a better insight into the basis of competitive advantage. 
By emphasizing strategic processes, the dynamic capabilities approach explores the 
mechanisms by which firms gather and distribute new skills and capabilities in order to 
quickly adapt to changes in the environment despite path dependencies and 
technological or organizational core rigidities (Lado and Wilson 1994; Teece and 
Pisano 1994; Teece, Pisano and Shuen 1997). Dynamic capabilities enable strategic 
firm behavior in the deployment of high response capabilities, reduced time-to-market 
cycles and innovative capabilities (Lorenzoni and Lipparini 1999). 
In another related approach, the knowledge-based theory (KBT) emphasizes not only 
the ability to appropriate value (RBV) or to innovate (dynamic capabilities) but also 
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the very strategic capability to integrate the complementary resources of multiple firms 
(Hamel, Doz et al. 1989; Grant 1991; Nonaka 1994; Grant and Baden-Fuller 1995; 
Conner and Prahalad 1996; Grant 1996a, b). The knowledge-based theory regards a 
firm as a repository of knowledge and competencies (Conner 1991; Kogut and Zander 
1996). According to this perspective, the organizational advantage of firms over 
markets is derived from their superior capability in creating and transferring 
knowledge.  
Knowledge creation and innovation depend on new combinations of knowledge and 
other resources (Cohen and Levinthal 1990; Kogut and Zander 1992). The 
accumulation of knowledge through learning constitutes a driving force in the 
development and growth of young technology-based firms (Penrose 1959), because 
knowledge acquisition results in new productive opportunities. Inter-firm networks 
may be an effective option to facilitate the capability transfer or access in dynamically 
competitive environments and under conditions of dispersed or specialized knowledge. 
Recent studies on organizational learning have proposed that inter-organizational 
relationships create opportunities for knowledge acquisition and exploitation (Dyer and 
Singh 1998; Lane and Lubatkin 1998; Larsson, Bengtsson, Henriksson and Sparks 
1998). Through interaction with others, firms gain access to external knowledge, and 
relationships create a context within which newly created knowledge can be exploited 
and applied. Studies consider alliances more as a specific type of relationship to learn 
new skills that reside within other organizations (Hamel 1991; Hagedoorn 1993; 
Hagedoorn and Schakenraad 1994; Powell, Koput et al. 1996). Attention to inter-
organizational cooperation as a mechanism to acquire know-how is raised by the 
concentration of alliance activity in particular sectors of the economy: As discussed in 
chapter 1, high-technology industries are the areas in which partnership activities have 
been predominant in the recent past. 
As a recently developed conceptual extension of the resource-based view of firm, the 
relational view of firm explores resource exchange between alliance partners as a 
source of competitive advantage. While the resource-based view of the firm is based 
on firm resource properties to explain competitive advantage, the relational view of the 
firm argues that the network of relationships represents an additional source of 
competitive advantage (Dyer and Singh 1998; Gulati 2000). The relational view of the 
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firm (Dyer and Singh 1998) extends the RBV beyond firm boundaries and argues that 
unique resource combinations of multiple firms beyond boundaries yield an advantage 
and a relational rent over competing firms. With the inter-firm network of partners as 
the dominant unit of analysis, key research issues are centered around the existence, 
the performance of the firm’s network of relationships, and the effects of network 
positioning on relational rent distribution. The achievement of relational rents and 
competitive advantage depends on the network position strength. 
Dyer and Singh (1998) defined four potential sources of inter-organizational 
competitive advantage: Relation-specific assets, knowledge sharing routines, 
complementary resources and capabilities, and effective governance. As empirical 
evidence, researchers have found that relation-specific investments between Japanese 
automakers (Dyer 1996) or tacit know-how sharing instead of explicit information 
sharing (Dyer and Singh 1998) can be the source of competitive advantage. Informal 
safeguards in the form of trust and reputation have an advantage over formal financial 
or legal penalties because they reduce transaction costs and allow alliance partners to 
invest in specialized resources or share tacit resources without any concerns about 
opportunistic behavior. 
The described theoretical frameworks focus attention on the skills and capabilities for 
the transformation of inputs into outputs, whereas the firm’s network of external 
relationships is relevant for the availability of external resources, disposing outputs and 
finding more rewarding opportunities (Burt 1992). 
Strategic network theory 
Firms are embedded in a social context with structural, cognitive, institutional, and 
cultural elements. Although all components are important for firm behavior, only the 
structural component highlights implications of social networks and their economic 
actors. A social network can be defined as a set of actors representing persons or 
organizations linked by a set of social relationships of a specified type (Laumann, 
Galaskiewicz and Marsden 1978). 
Following the social network perspective, all economic actions are influenced by the 
social context and depend on the position of actors. Firms can be embedded through a 
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variety of social relationships constituting multiple social networks. These networks 
range from supplier relationships, trade association memberships to interlocking 
directorates and relationships among individual employees. Because embeddedness in 
a network of strategic alliances leads to asymmetric access to resources across the 
industry, it can significantly support or obstruct a firm’s behavior or performance 
(Granovetter 1985; Burt 1992; Nohria and Eccles 1992). The concept of embeddedness 
refers to … 
“… the fact that exchanges and discussions within a group typically 
have a history, and this history results in the routinization and 
stabilization of linkages among members. As elements of ongoing social 
structures, actors do not respond solely to individualistically 
determined interests … a structure of relations affects the actions taken 
by the individual actors composing it. It does so by constraining the set 
of actions available to the individual actors and by changing the 
dispositions of those actors toward the actions they may take.” 
(Marsden 1981 p. 1210). 
The varying significance of social networks is determined by the nature, purpose and 
content of information that flows through it (Stinchcombe 1990). Scholars have 
developed two general analytical approaches for exploring the influence of social 
networks: On the one hand, social networks permit differential informational 
advantages (Burt 1992). On the other hand, an advantageous position in a social 
network can be leveraged for control benefits.  
Applied to the context of inter-organizational cooperation, information advantages 
from a social network can facilitate new alliance formation in three separate ways: 
access, timing and referrals: Access provides information on the capabilities and 
trustworthiness of current and potential network partners. The availability of recent 
information can also determine the structural choice of formalizing the alliance or 
evolutionary processes in its longitudinal development. Timing refers to having 
informational benefits about potential partners at the right time. Referrals depend on 
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the recommendations of future alliance partners by existing partners, which plays a 
significant role in the formation of alliance networks. 
Informational advantages are generated by relational and structural embeddedness of 
organizations. In the search for an optimal network configuration, (Gulati 1998 p. 296) 
illustrates the two types of network embeddedness relevant for addressing this 
question: 
“Relational embeddedness or cohesion perspectives on networks stress 
the role of direct cohesive ties as a mechanism for gaining fine-grained 
information . . . Structural embeddedness or positional perspectives on 
networks go beyond the immediate ties of firms and emphasize the 
informational value of the structural position these partners occupy in 
the network.” 
Relational embeddedness refers to direct and cohesive relationships for accessing 
detailed common information and knowledge. The development of a common 
understanding in strong, socializing relations directs future actions and conveys 
information that may reduce uncertainty, foster trust between network participants and 
improve knowledge about partners’ capabilities (Granovetter 1973; Podolny 1994; 
Burt and Knez 1995; Gulati 1995a). 
Structural embeddedness also has implications for informational benefits. According to 
this concept, information access not only depends on the intensity of ties but also on 
the network structure and firm’s position (Granovetter 1992). Structural embeddedness 
expands the perspective from dyadic relationships to a complete network. The 
relational pattern of all interactions determines the network position, which is 
associated with a certain status (Podolny 1993, 1994). Status is determined through 
clear and evident characteristics associated with certain positions in a social network 
that in turn require a very defined conduct toward other actors. Due to the importance 
of interaction patterns, secondary affiliations with the status of exchange partners also 
influence the status of focal actors as the central entity in the network. 
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Control benefits – as another benefit of social network participation – are generated by 
actors or companies located between other network actors: In these cases, two actors 
would like to attain the same relationship with a focal actor or have conflicting 
demands in separate relationships with the focal actor. In either case, the firms in the 
central role can create benefits for themselves by playing one off against the other and 
utilizing the tension between other network participants. 
For partnering firms, performance outcomes of these benefits can be valued as 
information access and control benefits of their respective ‘social capital’ that 
facilitates increased competitive advantage (Burt 1997). Consequently, the concept of 
social capital also described as network resources has been expanded from individuals 
and interpersonal networks to firms and their inter-organizational networks. Embedded 
in alliance networks, firms with higher social capital have access to information from a 
higher number of alliances, receive more partnership opportunities, attract more 
reliable partners, access stronger capabilities and can negotiate superior contract terms 
due to information and control benefits. 
Transaction cost theory 
Combining and pooling resources through multiple alliances can also be considered an 
alternative to the traditional make-or-buy decision largely based on transaction cost 
economics (TCE) (Hennart 1991; Williamson 1991). As a fundamental principle of 
organizational design, organization research states that firms react to uncertainties and 
dependencies in their environment by internalizing transactions from markets and 
placing them in more hierarchical structures (Williamson 1975; Ouchi 1980). 
Although widely applied around the issues of alliance formation and governance, the 
dominant TCE approach has received attention and criticism in a number of studies 
and therefore remains out of the specific focus of this thesis: 
(1) Researchers have begun to question the general TCE principle by demonstrating 
the increase of inter-firm market transactions with the rise in market uncertainty 
(Podolny 1994). Market uncertainty does not always lead to internalization of 
uncertainty within firm boundaries but rather to growing dependence on known and 
trusted external partners (Baker 1992). 
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(2) The TCE approach in its comparative analysis makes unspecific normative 
assumptions only within the boundaries of markets and hierarchies (Zajac and Olsen 
1993). Transaction cost economics with its focus on tangible assets do not reflect the 
dynamic rent seeking behavior that utilizes distinctive capabilities and intangible assets 
such as learning and reputation (Barney and Hansen 1994). Alliances as a distinct form 
of governance are deeply embedded in multiple relationships and therefore do not fall 
in between the various market and hierarchy alternatives (Powell 1990). 
(3) The static TCE approach treats each alliance as an independent and unrelated event. 
However, empirical evidence in many cases suggests that firms have extensive 
experience with each other by working side-by-side in multiple strategic alliances. The 
focus on one single transaction disregards the embeddedness in alliance networks and 
emerging processes from prior interactions (Ring and Van de Ven 1992; Gulati 
1995a). 
(4) Since the transaction cost theory focuses on structural forms of governance, 
significant process implications of ongoing exchanges and adjustments are neglected 
(Zajac and Olsen 1993). The focus on appropriation concerns due to contacting 
hazards and behavioral uncertainty leaves the issues of coordination costs unanswered. 
Empirical evidence suggests, however, that the choice of the alliance structure at the 
time of formation is very much determined by considerations around coordination 
costs incurred by the continuing harmonization of tasks between multiple partners 
(Gulati and Singh 1998). 
Due to limited focus and concentration on short-term dyadic ties, the TCE approach 
seems to be inappropriate for explaining the transformation of networks and extensive 
dependence on inter-firm cooperation in this study. A cost focused approach overlooks 
the opportunities of intensive relationships and therefore fails to describe changes in 
the structure of inter-firm alliance networks. The complex reality of rapidly developing 
technological fields, in which knowledge is both sophisticated and widely distributed, 
exceeds the simple make-or-buy consideration. However, breakthroughs in 
technology, product or market development require the variety of intellectual and 
scientific skills of multiple organizations. 
Based on this short review, combining strategic network theory with the emerging 
theoretical frameworks of the resource-based view of the firm will be more suitable to 
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thoroughly explore the sources of competitive advantages generated from the 
integration of competencies and the combination of knowledge across inter-
organizational alliance networks (Lorenzoni and Lipparini 1999). 
Bridging the gap: The concept of network resources 
According to the described resource-based view of the firm, competitive advantage of 
firms is generated from the utilization of valuable, rare inimitable firm resources. Since 
the set of derived tentative propositions describes possible interaction effects of 
alliance networks with firm resources, conceptual frameworks used in this thesis 
extend the traditional perspective of the RBV to available network resources that are 
developed by a firm’s participation in alliance networks. 
Although studies of the resource-based view have highlighted the relevance of social 
factors and unique firms history (Barney 1991), the process by which firms actually 
create value-generating resources and the resources developing from firms’ 
participation in inter-firm alliance networks have received limited attention. Therefore, 
exploring the source of value-creating resources and capabilities represents an 
important extension of the RBV and answers an important question regarding the 
origin of resources (Gulati 1999; McEvily and Zaheer 1999; Ahuja 2000b). A 
conceptual extension and subsequent definition of network resources uncovers 
additional and missing sources of value for sustainable competitive advantage. 
Since network resources are determined by network structures, memberships and tie 
modalities, their inimitability has the potential to contribute to a firm’s internal 
resources. Consequently, both the firm’s network and the resources they allow to be 
accessed can generate sustainable competitive advantage. 
Unlike traditional firm resources, network resources are not accumulated within firms 
but in inter-organizational networks in which firms are embedded. Due to their 
foundation on inter-firm networks, these resources do not reside securely within firm 
boundaries. The value of network resources depends on information access and control 
benefits of participating firms in inter-firm networks. Variations in these benefits can 
be linked to differing alliance network structures. Both the relevant industry context 
with implications on the resource value and the inimitability of the entire alliance 
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network have an impact on the sustainability and magnitude of the competitive 
advantage that can be generated from these benefits. 
The importance of network resources ranges from facilitative to substantive depending 
on the industry context. In its facilitative role, network resources provide information 
on alliance formation opportunities and signal reliability to other partners on the merits 
of their historic collaborative behavior (Gulati 1995b, 1999). As an example of a more 
substitutive contribution of networks, coordinated dominant technical standards can 
facilitate the product justification of focal firms. Therefore, established alliances with 
appropriate firms can be a necessary precondition for the successful development and 
commercialization of technology (Kogut, Shan and Walker 1993; Galaskiewicz and 
Zaheer 1999). In industries with strong network externalities and competing standards, 
network resources have a higher potential for significant impact on company 
performance. In this study, the industry environment of information technology and 
telecommunications is very much dominated by network externalities and competing 
standards. Intel Capital and Microsoft make predominating technical standards a clear 
requirement for the selection of alliance opportunities. Growing customer bases in 
online service case studies require the adherence to standards for large volume mobile 
communication and meaningful customer profiling. Network effects can be achieved 
through interaction between growing online users, which benefit from the addition of 
members as potential communication partners. 
Inimitability of alliance network resources can be traced back to its ambiguous, path-
dependent and idiosyncratic nature. Causal ambiguity, very related to the described 
concept of complexity and specificity, is regarded as an important mechanism in the 
link between resources and superior firm performance (Lippman and Rumelt 1982). In 
a recent study of the chemical industry, (Ahuja 2000b) has shown that prior 
accumulated network resources do not influence performance directly, but determine 
the strategic options in the form of available alliance opportunities, which might enable 
increased performance. According to his study, differences in the opportunity sets 
defined as partnership options might be another alternative for establishing this causal 
ambiguity. 
As network structures are developed and transformed through historical and 
evolutionary alliance formation patterns with multi-level effects on the frequency of 
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relationships, identity of partner firms and specific firm location in the alliance 
network, network resources are developed in path-dependent processes (Levinthal and 
Fichman 1988; Gulati 1995b; Walker, Kogut and Shan 1997; Gulati 1999), which 
describe the complete route towards an entire alliance network. The path-dependency 
also contributes to the complexity of network resources. 
Referring to the specificity of firm and industry context, inter-firm coordination in 
alliance networks also follows defined organizational principles that can be 
idiosyncratic to alliance relationships and difficult to imitate as well. These 
partnerships define particular capabilities to speed up product development or 
minimize inventories (Kogut 2000). Therefore, competitive advantage does not only 
depend on the firm or alliance network structure, but also on organizational principles 
by which cooperation is coordinated and supported in the network. These principles 
outline how products are supplied or the process by which innovations are produced 
and shared. In Kogut’s extension of the network resources, the network itself 
represents knowledge not in the sense of allowing access to distributed resources but in 
codifying coordination guided by continuing principles of the organization. 
All case studies presented support this understanding of network resources: Over the 
course of network evolution, the principle of causal ambiguity is supported by varying 
alliance opportunities (Proposition # 9). Path-dependencies can be identified across all 
case studies of online service companies. The discontinuation of relationships 
(Proposition # 14) to content providers can be clearly linked to previous experience of 
unfulfilled user preferences. Particularly high-value alliance relationships such as 
minority equity stakes in city carriers (Proposition # 11) require an intensified 
customization of relationship in the form of functional boards, which represent the 
distinct idiosyncratic characteristic of this alliance network. 
Inimitable and substantive network resources determined by network memberships, tie 
modalities and structures have the potential to generate sustainable competitive 
advantage and superior firm performance. 
When relationship formation with one actor binds the focal firm in its ability to 
develop ties with other actors, lock-in and lockout effects have implications for 
network membership and performance. These constraints result from limited resources 
spent only on selected partnerships or expectations of loyalty to the alliance 
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consortiums demanding membership exclusivity. In particular, firms with superior 
bargaining power refuse to sign exclusive alliance agreements and forge multiple 
partnerships regarded merely as strategic options (Gulati 2000). Suggesting the value 
of specific network memberships, a resource-endowed partner has the potential to 
provide the focal firm with complementary capabilities: Afuah (2000)’s findings 
suggest that suppliers’ capabilities significantly impact the performance of the focal 
firm. Depending on which network you are locked-in and out of, firm returns may also 
vary due to the fact that it is neither costless nor easy to shift across network groups. 
Since any single actor alone does not control the evolution of network structure, the 
early decisions by actors in the development of alliance network determines 
differences in benefits over time.  
The modality of an alliance network, whether cooperative or opportunistic, strong or 
weak, multiplex or single, has clear implications for a firm’s strategic behavior and 
performance. Network relationships as a resource provide valuable information and a 
competitive advantage by enabling action quicker than rivals in high-technology 
industries. Zaheer and Zaheer (1997) describe firm capabilities of alertness and 
responsiveness in the environment of information networks. Firms are highly alert 
when they create and leverage far-ranging responsive information networks with a 
majority of weak ties, high centrality and wide geographic scope. 
Regarding the performance implications of network structures, Powell, Koput et al. 
(1996) find that companies which form a higher number of alliances experience 
increased growth rates. (Hagedoorn and Schakenraad 1994) also suggest improved 
innovation rates with entry into technology alliances. 
In the industry contest of information technology, the alliance networks of all case 
study companies can represent a valuable source of sustainable competitive advantage 
and increased performance. The inimitability of alliance network resources is 
generated from its ambiguous, path-dependent and idiosyncratic nature, which can be 
found in the mature stage of collaborative networks. 
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3.2 Relationships of focal firm resources and alliance networks 
Establishing an initial framework, the following chapter introduces relationships 
between focal firm resources and the ‘surrounding’ alliance network structures. 
Resulting from empirical observations, firms have the clear need for deliberate 
configuration of partner resources in their alliance network. Current focal firm resource 
profiles act as both important inducements and enablers for future alliance formation 
through multiple feedback loops. In this evolutionary process, alliance management 
capabilities and partner characteristics have implications for the formation of the entire 
partnership network. 
Need for deliberate configuration of resources in the network 
In response to high technology industry challenges of dispersed resources, high 
specialization and extraordinary variety described in chapter 1, several firms have to be 
integrated through specialization, dynamic learning and exploration (Kogut 2000). 
Researchers have recognized that a firm’s competitive advantage depends on tacit, 
inimitable collaborative relationships and the success of suppliers, customers, and all 
alliance partners with whom it must collaborate and compete (Singh and Mitchell 
1996). Relationships to external parties are critical sources of innovations (Hagedoorn 
and Schakenraad 1994), organizational learning (Kogut 1988b) and capabilities (Kogut 
1988b; Dyer 1996; Gulati 1998; Khanna 1998; Dyer and Nobeoka 2000). By pooling 
resources and capabilities with partners, firms can initiate projects with greater success 
and higher performance (Harrigan 1985; Burgers, Hill et al. 1993). But unlike firms, 
alliance networks without authoritative relationships cannot enforce their 
organizational structures on its members. 
According to Kogut’s view, a supportive network structure follows operating 
principles that are derived from the inherent characteristics of popular industry 
technologies, social norms and institutional factors. As an example, biotech industries 
based on scientific technology tend towards rules that promote cooperation between 
research centers. These rules generate the structure of the network, which subsequently 
influences firm behavior and identity. Also certain differentiated capabilities or 
resource requirements result in industry rules that generate distinctive patterns in the 
structuring of a cooperative network. During the process of network formation, 
relationships develop informational properties and ‘signals’ that facilitate a matching 
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process between participating firms. During the process of network formation, 
knowledge is encoded in persisting structures that influence subsequent behavior in 
two different ways: A channel of information and the basis of coordinated action. 
Therefore, network structure is not only formed by exogenous factors, but also by the 
codification of competing and evolving rules that guide firm behavior. 
As described in Proposition # 8, all four online service providers follow the rules of 
their industries in establishing the initial operational infrastructure. In the case of Lycos 
Mobile, channeling information that flows to these providers also encodes the 
developed experience of previously inefficient and complex coordination processes. 
But the knowledge embedded in these earlier cooperation structures does not 
automatically lead to higher value and resource intensive alliance relationships 
(Proposition # 9;Proposition # 10). 
In the case studies of online service providers or Elisa, desired resources not only 
reside in the network structure, but also in focal organization itself (Powell, Koput et 
al. 1996). As a ‘strategic center’, Tropolys with developed alliance management 
resources can focus on the core internal and idiosyncratic activities, access specialized 
third party knowledge, coordinate external capabilities and potentially regulate trade 
between network partners (Lorenzoni and Baden-Fuller 1995). In this context, 
managerial decisions in strategic centers are clearly guided by internal alliance 
network objectives (Proposition # 1), which have an impact on the subsequent 
partnership network structure (Nohria and Eccles 1992; Madhavan, Koka et al. 1998). 
Therefore, deliberately configuring internal resources and the subsequent external 
network, and not only Kogut’s emerging operating principles in the 
telecommunications industry transforms a network of companies into specialists with 
dedicated roles. Facilitated by the deliberate search for and development of new 
internally created resources of the focal firms, these alliance network transformations 
involve intra-firm operational resources and alliance management resources, which 
lead to more aligned and converged relationships. 
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Development of focal firm resources: Inducements and enablers 
Across all case studies, the motivation for alliance formation can be associated with the 
demand for resources. Through inter-organizational partnerships, firms can obtain 
access to resources that create value, are not available for purchase in factor markets 
and need significant time to be developed. Since the shared resources can be accessed 
through alliances without being separated from the firm, the inherent obstacle of 
tradability can be bypassed. 
Since the value of internal resources depends on the nature and existence of network 
resources, firms utilize their relationships to mobilize complementary external firm 
resources that correspond to their internal capabilities. Organizations with broader 
network relationships receive higher returns on their internal capabilities, because they 
are in a position to identify and develop more rewarding opportunities (Burt 1992), to 
acquire complementary resources (Teece 1986) and to sell their production with better 
terms. 
Since prior studies have only separately explored the performance impact of internal 
capabilities (Grant 1991) on network relationships (Hansen 1995; Uzzi 1996), the 
interaction effects between both factors have not been fully identified in an integrated 
approach. In line with prior studies, Lee, Lee and Pennings’s (2001) study of Korean 
technology start-ups showed some positive correlation between the performance 
measured by sales growth and firm-level factors: entrepreneurial orientation, 
technological capabilities and financial resources. Regarding the issue of firm network 
relationships, from all the partnership-based linkages with other firms, venture capital 
companies, universities and research institutes, only the ties with venture capital 
companies have a positive and significant impact on firm performance. Interestingly, 
linkages to other enterprises do not have any effects on company performance. 
Classified as not performance relevant network relationships, sponsorship-related ties 
to financial institutions or government agencies also do not have a statistically 
significant effect on company performance.  
As an important contribution, their study revealed interesting interaction effects 
between internal capabilities and two types of network relationships. Linkages to 
venture capital companies and universities have interaction effects with internal 
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resources in their impact on company performance. Since the relationships to 
universities have no main effects on new venture performance, the results suggest that 
due to the lack of internal capabilities these ties do not contribute to company 
performance. Only firms with existing internal capabilities can effectively absorb 
knowledge and technologies that are developed in alliances with university and 
research institutes (Cohen and Levinthal 1990). 
In another study of innovation in the biotechnology industry, scholars showed that the 
firm’s number of collaborative relationships and network position is positively related 
to its innovation performance as an indicator for technical capabilities (Shan, Walker et 
al. 1994). Broken down by alliance types, especially the number of commercial ties is 
positively correlated with the number of biopharmaceutical patents. Illustrating similar 
patterns, Dutta and Weiss’ findings (1997) suggest that the level of technological 
innovativeness impacts the number of marketing and licensing agreements. 
This observation is very much in accordance with case studies of all four online service 
providers. These companies initially build up their technical infrastructures and 
develop software applications to define the functionalities of their online services. 
Only after establishing technical capabilities and corresponding customer bases, these 
companies develop options to commercialize and market access to these customers, 
Sonera Zed, Lycos Mobile and MSN are highly involved with corporate customers to 
design and implement co-marketing campaigns. 
The described research results contribute to the set of tentative propositions in two 
dimensions: Not all network relationships contribute to performance of young 
technology-based firms. Interaction effects between network relationships and internal 
capabilities have to be considered carefully regarding their effects on company 
performance. Growing alliance management resources (Proposition # 10) facilitate the 
appropriate selection of increasingly valuable alliance opportunities, which 
complement internal capabilities. The growth of these alliance management resources 
depends on learning from current partnerships (Proposition # 12). 
The drawback in findings from Lee, Lee et al.’s and Shan, Walker et al.’s studies is the 
static approach of collecting measures for relationships, internal capabilities and 
performance only in a certain, defined timeframe. Since firm growth changes the type 
and extent of resource exchange as suggested in the tentative propositions, the 
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contributions of their studies have limitations. Alliance network formation for 
increased performance requires the growing availability and selection of appealing 
partnership opportunities. 
Alliance formation opportunities depend on the possession of resources, which 
determine the firm’s attractiveness to other firms (Proposition # 9). The attractiveness 
of potential partners is related to their ability to provide access to previously 
unavailable resources. Combining both theoretical perspectives on alliance 
opportunities and incentives, firms with a low level of integration in partnerships with 
a desire to form new alliances face the challenge of limited attractiveness and reduced 
alliance opportunities. Highly embedded and resource endowed firms have many 
partnership opportunities at their disposal, but the marginal contribution of additional 
ties diminishes. As a consequence, firms in the middle are expected to be the most 
active in the alliance formation process.  
In a longitudinal empirical study of technical collaborative linkages in the global 
chemicals industry, Ahuja (2000b) has shown a positive correlation with the yearly 
number of linkages formed by firm and the level of internally available technical or 
commercial resources. However, the interaction of both commercial and technical 
resources has a negative impact on the number of relationships formed by a firm, 
which may suggest that the combined availability of multiple resources reduces the 
inducements of accessing partner capabilities. 
These findings on diminishing returns of accessing external resources are in contrast to 
Proposition # 9 and Proposition # 10, which suggest constant growth in the resource 
exchange based on cooperative relationships. Previously acquired and internally 
developed resources are leveraged as a stepping-stone for an extended cooperative 
relationship, which again – after learning and internalizing resources – expand the 
‘option space’. The continuous expansion without a saturation effect might be due to 
the high-technology industry environment and constant product and business model 
innovation. Online service providers constantly launch additional product applications, 
and the city carrier group around Elisa and Tropolys pioneers a novel business model 
of consolidating local loop access providers. 
Exploring a more related high-technology industry context, a study of emerging 
networks in the biotechnology industry underlines two key observations that support 
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the notion of the expanding ‘option space’ in network formation (Powell, Koput et al. 
1996): (1) Inter-organizational partnerships are not only an option to compensate for 
the lack of internal resources (2) nor should they be regarded as a sequence of discrete 
transactions. A firm’s value and ability as a partner is related to its growing internal 
assets, but – at the same time – alliances enhance and continuously expand those 
internal resources. Learning from collaboration makes a firm realize the need to access 
innovations and information from a variety of external actors – for example – to 
exploit research findings in a commercial context. Both skills and experience are 
needed to develop the resources to benefit from interdependencies across diverse 
partnerships and to balance a portfolio of partnerships. 
In a longitudinal approach, thier findings suggest that the formation of R&D and non-
R&D alliances provide an exploration starting point for developing the capability to 
manage partnerships. R&D alliances directly or through increased experience provide 
access to more diverse sources of collaboration through subsequent commercial 
alliances. The development of experience in managing partnerships enables the firm to 
become more central, which has two separate effects. Centrally located firms have 
access to information and resource flows for subsequent firm growth. Furthermore, 
centrally located firms pursue the initiation and continuation of additional R&D 
alliances. Powell, Koput et al. also show that standard organizational measures such as 
age or size appear to be secondary in accounting for patterns of collaboration: Neither 
growth nor maturity reduce the likelihood of engaging in alliance formation. 
Their findings underline empirical observations in all case studies: Focal companies 
continuously grow their operational and alliance management resources. Neither a 
clear-cut or discrete phase in the development of technical or marketing resources nor 
fundamental adaptations in the direction of network formation behavior can be 
detected. Furthermore, growing internal resources expand the option space and allow 
for additional alliances of diversity functionalities. The transition from technical 
alliances to commercial alliances capitalizing on initial development results has been 
suggested by (Powell, Koput et al. 1996). This pattern can also be demonstrated in all 
case studies of online service providers, which might justify additional research in the 
development sequence of internal resources. 
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In Ahuja’s study, alliance formation activities seem to increase with the size of the 
firm’s alliance network. However, a curvilinear relationship between previous alliance 
network size and current alliance formation rate, which suggests diminishing benefits, 
has not been identified. Diminishing returns and a downward sloping effect in the 
alliance formation rate have been justified with the theoretical assumption of 
increasing saturation in an over-embedded alliance network, which lacks informational 
diversity for the focal firm. 
The theoretical perspective on over-embeddedness into dense alliance networks 
ignores that according to important empirical observation in this study (Proposition # 
9; Proposition # 11) consecutive and close partnerships give access to an even broader 
range of resources. The broad range of resources facilitates extended focal firm 
learning and acquisition of external resources, which allows for diversity in 
information and resource access. In a ranking of all three types of focal firm resources, 
the availability of commercial capital, technical and alliance network resources in 
descending order has a positive impact on alliance formation. 
Ahuja’s study determined alliance network resources as a good predictor of joint 
venture formation, but not of technology agreement formation. As a reasonable 
explanation, the more selective search process for research and development 
agreements is not facilitated at all by generally unspecialized and unfocused network 
resources. In contrast to specific research agreements, broader joint ventures involve a 
higher level of operating flexibility and generally greater interdependence, which 
raises the potential facilitation of alliance network resources. The results in Ahuja’s 
study underscore missing support of network resources in the selection process of 
highly specific and valuable partnerships. 
In Lycos’ and Sonera Zed’s search process for co-marketing agreements, previous 
relationships to technical and content partners cannot be leveraged for additional high 
value alliance formation. Marketing agencies – in touch with corporate advertising 
customers – establish the desired initial contact. For specific and tailored agreements, 
alliance network resources show diminishing informational benefits in the search 
process for highly specific and tailored partnerships. As described in tentative 
propositions, previously developed internal operational and alliance management 
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resources (Proposition # 9; Proposition # 10) are also needed to attract, select and 
advance high-value partnership opportunities. 
Development of facilitative alliance management capabilities 
Since alliances can be viewed as incomplete contracts between firms without full 
specification of resource exchanges between partners, theoretical literature suggests 
that cooperative relationships tend to be difficult to manage. One reason might 
originate in inter-firm knowledge transfers, an important component of many alliances. 
The studies on knowledge transfer in alliances recognize the conflict between 
competition and cooperation (Hamel 1991; Gulati, Khanna et al. 1994; Khanna 1998). 
Related research has developed a classification of alliance learning strategies (Larsson, 
Bengtsson et al. 1998) informed by case studies on how learning unfolds in an alliance 
(Doz 1996; Arino and De La Torre 1998) in these environments. 
Consistent with the relational view and in recognition of the described challenges, 
Lane and Lubatkin (1998) consider the capabilities to manage external relationships 
very important in competitive environments. A growing alliance network, internal 
knowledge and resource acquisition support the focal firm in developing alliance 
management resources and in coping with challenges of inter-firm cooperation 
(Proposition # 2; Proposition # 10; Proposition # 12). Due to the outlined challenges, 
the concept of learning can be defined as improvements in the ability to anticipate and 
respond to contingencies that cannot be specified in formal contracts (Anand and 
Khanna 2000). 
Although so far scholars have primarily used resource-based arguments for the 
explanation of performance differences, observed resource variations and evolution 
can also represent the foundation of differences in firm behavior (Kraatz and Zajac 
2001). Since the management of alliances is not a very defined process, various 
differences across firms exist in the capability or resources to manage these 
partnerships. Firms possess routines and capabilities when they have managed to 
perform a certain function that is distinct from a comparable group (Nelson and Winter 
1982). Such knowledge is often described as tacit, which makes it inaccessible to other 
firms. 
Theoretical perspectives  
 210
By repeatedly participating in alliance formation and development activities, firms can 
develop capabilities as a result of historical learning processes (Dierickx, Cool et al. 
1989; Barney 1991). Firms can build up refined organizational capabilities from 
repeated experience and exploit existing capabilities (Levinthal and March 1992). 
Organizational theory argues that firms are driven by routines, repeatedly engage and 
gradually improve a comparable set of activities (Nelson and Winter 1982; Amburgey, 
Kelly and Barnett 1993). Therefore, organizational procedures and activities of alliance 
management can be set up, developed and established within the firm’s regular 
routines (Westney 1988). Especially with an increase in the number of alliance 
relationships (Proposition # 2), all focal firms seem to show comparable patterns of 
devloping alliance management capabilities. 
Evolving firm behavior illustrates a growing sophistication in alliance formation 
activities and management activities. With availability and the selection of more 
resource intensive alliance opportunities, alliance management resources are 
instrumental in assessing resource transfer implications on multiple levels, in balancing 
resource contributions, in drafting complex contractual arrangements and in tracking 
their implementation. On the operational level during the implementation of the 
agreement, alliance management resources support the early sharing of critical 
information, the continuous day-to-day exchange of technical feedback and the mutual 
understanding of alliance benefits (Lorenzoni and Lipparini 1999). In this respect, the 
sophistication of alliance management resources has to keep up with level and quality 
of alliance opportunities induced by growing operational resources (Proposition # 10). 
Especially high value partnerships are based on complex organizational agreements, 
demand extended efforts to identify partners, require sufficient authorization from 
many organizational levels, complex contract negotiations and a certain level of 
management attention to maintain the relationship (Gulati, Khanna et al. 1994; Ring 
and Van de Ven 1994; Doz 1996; Kale, Singh and Perlmutter 2000). Building up and 
maintaining an alliance network require the selection of appropriate governance 
mechanisms, the development of inter-firm knowledge sharing routines, relationship-
specific investments and initiatives for necessary changes to partnerships during their 
evolution (Dyer and Singh 1998). 
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As evidence from previous research on strategic alliances (Lyles 1988; Amburgey, 
Dacin and Singh 1996; Dyer and Singh 1998; Anand and Khanna 2000), research 
results suggest that benefits of experience can be transformed into dedicated alliance 
management resources. In building up dedicated alliance management capabilities, 
firms develop standardized procedures facilitating the creation of new alliances and 
they establish organizational units supporting the creation and management of strategic 
alliances. Standardized procedures clarify decision-making authority, set guidelines for 
projects considered appropriate for the alliance, specify the company-wide legal 
framework for alliances and create a checklist of issues to be considered for the future 
management of alliances (Gulati 1999). Dedicated organizational units provide 
information in legal and managerial templates to respective departments considering 
alliance formation. They also serve as an interface to the legal department and provide 
guidelines in selecting a partner. In some cases, these units also distribute information 
about alliances as a strategy to department management and scan the market for new 
alliance opportunities. As senior management becomes more familiar with the systems 
and structures to simplify alliance formation, they can more openly accept these ties as 
strategically valuable. 
All case studies in this thesis show similar patterns of developing standardized 
procedures and establishing dedicated organizational units with an increasing number 
of alliance formation activities (Proposition # 2). The majority of prior studies have 
focused on the process of learning within a particular partnership. Anand and Khanna 
(2000) extend this scope to the entire portfolio of alliances and focus the capability of 
managing a multitude of dense, repeated and extended inter-firm linkages. 
Based on stock market reactions and firm valuations, their results suggest that firms 
forging a greater number of alliances seem to obtain more of the benefits created 
relative to their partners. In a related study, Gulati (1999) has found that more centrally 
located firms with a longer alliance history have developed much broader alliance 
experience. Utilizing this experience for inter-firm collaboration, these firms are more 
likely to form additional partnerships. Although past experience has a significant 
impact, the diversity in terms of partner country and governance forms had no 
significant impact on alliance formation rates. No impact of alliance diversity could 
support the assumption that managing a diverse set of alliances and partners is not as 
important for firms as the experience of a larger number of such partnerships. 
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However, based on empirical accounts of case study firms, Proposition # 2 and 
Proposition # 12 suggest that the development of alliance management resources 
depend on both the frequency of formation activities and learning from the increasing 
diversity of partnerships. Especially the value of partnerships with increasing diversity 
and intensity of deployed resources (Proposition # 11) mandates and develops a 
growing set of alliance management resources. Therefore, the mere frequency of 
historic alliance formation behavior illustrates only a limited aspect of firm behavior. 
Evolving capabilities in managing partnership networks are also required to prevent 
inertia in alliance formation behavior: Two firms usually develop specific routines to 
manage their relationship (Gulati 1995a), they are inclined to exclusively focus on 
these routines and may ignore alliance formation opportunities with new firms. 
Prospective partner capabilities: Complementarity as an inducement for alliance 
formation 
In the environment of high innovation and change, relationships to external parties are 
relevant for focal company performance (Afuah 2000). Although firm’s network ties 
with suppliers and customers can be utilized the source of competitive advantage in 
exploiting existing technologies, but it can also become burdensome in an environment 
marked by rapid technological change. Especially in high growth industries (Teece 
1986), firms form partnerships to access complementary capabilities, to ensure timely 
product introduction and to command a wide scope of capabilities across many 
different firms. Across the entire partnership portfolio, the capabilities of partner firms 
are therefore expected to have profound effect on alliance network formation and 
performance. 
Also according to the theoretical network perspective on strategic alliance, research 
results suggest that partner firms’ attributes are likely to interact with the 
characteristics of the alliance partners and subsequent performance: Mitchell and 
Singh’s (1996) findings indicate that organizational mortality as a firm performance 
variable decreases when its strategic partner ceases operations or establishes a new 
partnership with another firm. Stuart’s (2000) findings from the partnerships in the 
semiconductor industry suggest that firm performance not only depends on the number 
of alliances, but also on the detailed characteristics of the partner: Since alliance 
relationships are regarded as access and reputation relationships, size and 
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innovativeness of the partner firm have a positive impact on focal firm performance in 
terms of innovation and revenue growth rates. Despite the risks of opportunistic 
behavior, the study findings also suggest that alliances can be significant benefits even 
when they fail to reach their objectives that led to their formation. The reason for this is 
that a focal company’s reputation may be upgraded by passing the due diligence 
process of a prominent partner, particularly if the focal actor is a young or small 
organization. 
The increasing reputation of later stage external partners of Zed, Lycos and MSN 
underlines the enhanced value: Fast-moving consumer goods companies, technology 
firms and media houses turn to these start-ups for more resource exchange-intensive 
co-marketing and advertising alliances. In this process, a broad set of resources such as 
product specifications and brand equity is exchanged based on these cooperative 
arrangements (Proposition # 9; Proposition # 11). 
The prospects of increasing performance with partners of selected capabilities have 
their impact on preceding alliance formation activities: The current resource base of 
the partner firms, conceptualized as strategic relatedness and resource complementarity 
(Tsai 2000), represent important factors for the likelihood of partnership formation: 
Strategic relatedness describes the extent to which two organizational units are 
strategically similar and determines an opportunity for sharing strategic resources 
between the two units (Rumelt 1974; Teece, Rumelt, Dosi and Winter 1994). Two 
strategically related units have common interests and are motivated to exchange 
information and resources in a beneficial way. The results of Tsai’s (2000) study 
suggest that inter-organizational units with a high degree of network centrality and 
strategic relatedness are more prone to create a new inter-unit linkage. In addition to 
prior network centrality, trustworthiness strongly impacts the rate of new linkage 
formation between two strategically related units. 
As a second factor, scholars have also emphasized resource complementarity between 
firms as a driver for alliance formation with additional benefits from pooling resources 
(Nohria and Garcia-Pont 1991). Although some studies suggest positive monotonic 
relationships between the number of prior relationships and the likelihood of forming 
repeated partnerships for the same complementary capabilities, there are arguments 
and supporting evidence for different relationships in the context of resource access: 
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Gulati (1995b) argues for a U-shaped relationship between prior ties and alliance 
formation due to potentially diminishing returns from a growing number of ties. As the 
number of interactions between two firms increases, additional exchange provides less 
information about the partner and consequently there is a reduced opportunity for 
additional partnership formation. 
In contrast to this perspective, Baker (1990) and Uzzi (1997b) suggest that the optimal 
strategy for firms in building up ties with other firms requires the utilization of both 
arms-length ties and strong or embedded ties. This strategy mandates an inverted U-
shape relationship between the number of prior ties and the likelihood of future 
alliance formation: Firms that rely on a few partners are limited in the number of 
partners with whom they can exchange information and form alliances in the future. 
These firms forego the advantages of arms-length relationships such as accessing 
diverse information (Uzzi 1997b) and negotiating competitive prices, which both result 
from competition between partners (Baker 1990). Therefore, dependence on a few 
partners reduces the capability to adapt to future uncertainties and decreases firm 
performance. However, frequently replacing alliance partners may also not be an 
optimal strategy. A firm adopting this strategy decreases dependence on some alliance 
partners and takes advantage of competition, but it cannot build up long-term, trustful 
relationships with other firms, because these firms will have no incentives to contribute 
their resources. Long-term, trustful relationships could be used to gain critical 
information and to create new economic opportunities. 
As a compromise, firms guided by the balanced strategy will extend more 
opportunities to their long-term alliance partners until a certain level of dependence has 
been reached. As a result, this strategy will result in inverted U-shaped relationships 
between the number of prior ties and the likelihood of forming new alliances. 
As empirical evidence this relationship, Baker (1990) shows that large industrial firms 
interact exclusively with neither a few nor as many banks as possible. A recent study 
of the U.S. investment banking industry in managing public offerings (Chung, Singh et 
al. 2000) shows that both resource complementarity and the developed alliance 
network resources have an effect on the likelihood of future alliance formation. In line 
with theoretical predictions, the role of alliance network resources in alliance 
formation intensifies as market uncertainty increases. But alliance partners are also 
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more likely to form partnerships with firms that complement their weaknesses (Gulati 
1995b; Chung, Singh et al. 2000) and therefore increase the possibility of generating 
synergies. Prior ties prove to be valuable predictors of probability of firms to form 
partnerships (Chung, Singh et al. 2000): Direct and indirect ties have an inverted U-
shape relationship with the likelihood of further alliance formation. 
Resource complementarity and a balance between weak ties and strong ties generates 
the alliance portfolios identified across all online service providers in this study: At the 
more mature stage of their development, weak relationships to infrastructure and 
content providers as well as strong ties to co-marketing, advertising and development 
partners characterize the portfolio. 
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3.3 Implications of alliance network resources for partnership formation and 
evolution 
Missing and developing focal firm resources motivate and enable alliance formation 
and subsequent development into an entire network, as described in chapter 3.2. The 
growing and emerging network as a feedback mechanism has implications for further 
alliance formation, evolution and collaboration between partners. The first section of 
this chapter elaborates on the effect of the mere alliance network structure on future 
alliance formation. The subsequent section sheds light on the trade-off between 
densely interconnected and structural hole rich networks. As any focal actor with 
influence on its network structure has to compare benefits and costs of these alternative 
network structures, the effects of environmental interdependencies and intended degree 
of exploration – explained in the remaining two sections – have to be considered as 
important factors. 
Implications of current structures for future partnership formation 
Since alliance networks shape the flow of information (Granovetter 1985; Baker 1990; 
Mizruchi 1992, 1996), the benefits of cooperative networks reduce certain challenges 
in the selection of partnership opportunities and formation of alliances. These 
challenges originate from the difficulty to obtain information about competencies, 
needs and reliability of potential partners (Stinchcombe 1990). Inadequate information 
about potential partners increases the search costs and the risks of exposure to 
opportunistic behavior (Gulati and Gargiulo 1999). Over the course of network 
evolution, embedded relationships are accumulated in a growing, trusted and rich 
repository of information on the availability, competencies and reliability of 
prospective partners (Powell 1990; Gulati 1995a; Powell, Koput et al. 1996). An 
iterative process of information internalization motivates firms to rely on the network 
for information about potential partners for future partnership decisions. Newly 
embedded alliances increase the informational value of the network, enlarging its 
impact on further alliance formation. 
Consequently, embeddedness in inter-organizational networks (Baker 1990; Podolny 
1993; Powell, Koput et al. 1996; Gulati and Gargiulo 1999) influences the number and 
quality of additional alliance opportunities, which has subsequent implications for both 
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firm behavior and performance. Embeddedness in alliance networks has a positive 
impact on partnership formation opportunities by utilizing three mechanisms. 
First, highly embedded firms can gather information about alliance opportunities from 
their partners (Gulati 1995b). Firms searching for partnerships can discuss their needs 
with their partners. These partners can forward this information to others within their 
alliance portfolio. Over time, embedded relationships develop informational properties 
that enable firms to gather information about alliance formation opportunities (Kogut, 
Shan et al. 1992; Gulati 1995b; Powell, Koput et al. 1996). In the process of selecting 
alliances, firms need to minimize risks of moral hazards by first being aware of needs 
and requirements of potential partners and second by obtaining information about the 
reliability of these partners (Balakrishnan and Koza 1993). The risk associated with 
partnerships (Doz, Hamel and Prahalad 1989; Kogut 1989; Gulati, Khanna et al. 1994) 
poses significant information hurdles in the creation of alliances. The access to 
valuable information can both lower the search costs and reduce the risks of 
opportunism, which in turn make firms more inclined to additional alliance formation. 
Second, the embeddedness into an alliance network serves as an indication of 
reliability. Partnering with multiple organizations supports the focal firm’s reputation 
as an attractive collaborator. Partners can serve as an indicator for capabilities and 
behavior of the focal firm. For potential partners it is less risky to deal with a highly 
embedded firm on whom information is available, than transacting with firms whose 
partnership behavior is unknown. Third, the embedded firm signals potential access to 
other highly embedded actors (Mizruchi, Mariolis, Schwarz and Mintz 1986). In this 
perspective, embedded focal firms provide not only their own resources but also a way 
to access capabilities of other organizations. 
In their longitudinal study of network formation, Gulati and Gargiulo’s (1999) results 
suggest that organizations with a higher number of prior direct and indirect alliances 
demonstrate a higher propensity to form alliances with each other. Moreover, firms 
more centrally embedded into alliance networks or with structural differentiation in 
their inter-organizational network increase their probability of forming a new alliance. 
Structural differentiation is defined as an emergent systemic property that captures the 
extent to which actors obtain identifiable sets of network positions, which are all 
characterized by a differentiated relational profile and are defined by an increase in 
network centralization. Since the position in an alliance network conveys its 
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willingness, experience and ability to form partnerships, higher structural 
differentiation of an emerging network conveys clearer information on the firm’s 
relational profile and potential alliance partners. 
Structural differentiation reduces the impact on environmental interdependence and 
increases the effect of network centrality on potential alliance formation. Reduced 
effects of interdependence are due to increased reliance on differentiated alliance 
network structures as the information repository in the search for potential alliance 
partners. The emerging network internalizes relevant information about competencies, 
needs and reliability of potential partners. 
Relying too much on an evolving alliance network structure in later stage partnership 
formation decisions could represent an obstacle for selecting appropriate alliance 
partners with complementary resource profiles (chapter 3.2), since firms could select 
well trusted but inferior partners with limited resources and capabilities. Termed as the 
‘dark side’ of network ties, Gulati and Gargiulo (1999) suggest that some features of 
strategic alliances illustrate that this trade-off is more than a theoretical possibility. 
Hazards of inter-firm partnerships together with difficulties in assessing 
complementary capabilities and the unclear relationship between alliances and firm 
performance may entice firms to form secure alliances without the full potential. 
This facilitative function of generation alliance formation opportunities can be 
observed in a number of case studies in this thesis: Intel as well as Sun and DLR, E-
plus and Sonera Zed recognize the increase in the number and quality of partnership 
opportunities, that are conveyed through the current set of partners. However, 
receiving partnership opportunities and actually mutually committing resources in an 
exchange between partners are two different things. The availability of valuable 
resources within the focal firm (Proposition # 9) boundaries represents a more 
important precondition for forming an alliance of balanced contributions and joint 
benefits. With greater shifts in alliance formation activities, the dependence on internal 
resources becomes even more apparent. Lycos’ and Sonera Zed’s co-marketing 
alliances with corporate customers in largely unrelated industries of consumer goods 
cannot be facilitated by earlier partnerships to infrastructure providers. Other internal 
capabilities and very selective search processes with the help of external marketing 
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agencies are required to establish an alliance in a completely new technological and 
commercial domain. 
However, it is reasonable to assume that due to the increase in the number and quality 
of alliance opportunities based on Gulati and Gargiulo’s findings (1999), the 
theoretical assumptions may very likely be traced back to growing centrality and 
structural differentiation of alliance networks in this study. Missing data on secondary 
ties in this study makes an comparison difficult at this stage. However, the ‘dark side’ 
of network ties can clearly not be illustrated through findings in this study. Later stage 
cooperative relationships clearly expand previous firm resources and add a significant 
magnitude of valuable resources to all case study companies. 
On structural differentiation, Gulati and Gargiulo (1999) also note that emerging 
networks may not always evolve into structural patterns that can be easily 
discriminated. In extremely dynamic, innovation-driven information technology and 
telecommunications industries with benefits from alliances for almost every player, the 
evolution of an emerging network may not reveal any structural differentiation or 
higher centrality. In this environmental context, no single company clearly has superior 
command of much needed resources and can guide network formation. 
Their study assumes that the evolution of an inter-organizational network structure 
results from a longitudinal dynamic in which action and structure are closely 
intertwined. Their models describe the social structure of inter-organizational relations 
from a bird’s eye perspective without focusing on firm-level decisions to get access to 
resources and to minimize uncertainty. In line with these arguments, Gulati in a related 
article (1999) considers the inter-organizational network structure only as an enabling 
condition for alliance formation in which only the second step of alliance 
implementation may influence firm behavior, allow resource access and improve 
performance. Alliance network research so far has concentrated on alliance formation 
from the perspective of missing resources and superficial alliance formation, scholars 
have paid less attention to the important availability aspect of alliance opportunities 
and external firm resources, which are highlighted in this study. 
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Dichotomy of alternative alliance network structures: Balancing costs and benefits 
The developing literature on network resources has highlighted network’s facilitative 
role (Burt 1997; Gulati 1999) with their benefits from increased trust, information, and 
power. However, scholars have been unable to agree on the form of social structures 
that constitute beneficial network resources, since both strong and weak ties as the 
relational embeddedness component are considered to have positive effects on firm 
performance. 
Normative recommendations range from densely interconnected networks (Coleman 
1988), structural hole rich networks (Burt 1992) to a network with only direct ties 
(Brass and Burkhardt 1992). Densely interconnected alliance relationships enable trust 
and fine-grained information exchange between partners (Krackhardt 1992; Larson 
1992; Uzzi 1996), but reduce access to diverse and innovative insights. Networks with 
a high number of structural holes lead to diverse and innovative information 
(Granovetter 1973), but limit the potential for increased trust. Partners with exclusive 
ties to other actors can leverage power benefits, but secondary partners can enhance the 
informational reach within the network. 
An established principle of organizational design helps to assess the value of 
competing benefits of network structures: The optimal structural design depends on the 
actions that the structure seeks to facilitate (Lawrence and Lorsch 1967): Non-
overlapping network relationships (Burt 1992) support an organization in a brokerage 
position with diverse access to information and technology (Hargadon and Sutton 
1997). As a contrast, the densely connected network can be utilized to face a common 
external threat and to set standards in the high-technology industry (Oliver 1990; 
Kogut, Walker and Kim 1995). Several categories of benefits and costs of inter-firm 
networks depend on the informational advantages of the distinct network structure. 
(1) Motivated by self-interest, benefits from competition are derived from non-
redundant ties (Burt 1992), which leave structural holes between actors and can be 
leveraged for powerful brokerage positions. Structural holes by definition represent 
gaps in information flows between partners linked to the same focal actor but not to 
each other: Achieving control benefits, firms bridging structural holes can arbitrate 
information flows between firms in this more hierarchical structure and finally accrue 
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the rent for their behavior. Networks with a large number of structural holes ensure 
access to mutually unconnected partners and differentiated information flows 
(Hargadon and Sutton 1997). According to this perspective, increasing the number of 
structural holes by decreasing the redundancies in relationships represents an important 
characteristic of constructing efficient, information rich alliance networks (Burt 1992). 
A network of weak ties represents an information channel for the access to novel 
information, since these ties provide benefits through efficient access to divergent 
regions of the network rather than to a connected set of firms (Granovetter 1973). 
(2) Alternatively, competing alternative benefits result from redundant ties in the 
facilitative effect of collective problem resolution (Coleman 1990). Coordination is 
improved through repeated exchange among stable actors in the network. The overall 
network structure tends to be flatter and yields rents for all network members 
depending on the quality of the interaction and relative bargaining power: Firms 
combining their skills, exchanging high-quality information and tacit knowledge (Uzzi 
1996), committing alliance relevant investments and conducting joint projects, 
generate resource-sharing benefits, which require the existence of significant trust 
between partners. Trust addresses not only the coordination costs for managing 
complex tasks across organizational boundaries (Gulati and Singh 1998) but also the 
issue of appropriation concerns. 
In the exchange process for fine-grained information, partner firms gather information 
about each other’s organization, become more dependent on one another and develop 
relational trust (Larson 1992). Trust between alliance partners facilitates extensive 
resource sharing, develops common behavioral standards and explicit knowledge 
sharing routines (Uzzi 1997a; Walker, Kogut et al. 1997; Dyer and Nobeoka 2000). 
Shared behavioral norms in turn again facilitate efficient knowledge sharing, skill 
combination, and commitment to large-scale investments (Walker, Kogut et al. 1997). 
Joint partners can also communicate the norms of expectations and responsibilities in 
the process of linking previously unconnected firms (Gulati 1995a; Uzzi 1997a). 
Implementation of extensive resource sharing requires intense and ongoing 
information exchange (Auster 1992) and facilitates joint problem solving (Uzzi 1997a, 
b) based on growing embeddedness in firm partnerships. Ongoing information 
exchange requires repeated and regular meetings between partners, a focus on 
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specified objectives, coordination, close contact and mutual dependency (Gulati and 
Singh 1998). Scholars suggest that repetitive exchanges provide the basis for even 
stronger ties (Ring and Van de Ven 1994; Gulati 1995a; Doz 1996). Focused on 
specified objectives, it implies that these ties will be used to communicate a narrow 
range of issues relating to the goals of collaboration (Rogers and Kincaid 1981). 
Extensive exchange indicates that both partners have a great incentive and opportunity 
to share information (Granovetter 1973, 1982; Krackhardt 1992). Representing a 
strong incentive, multiple trust-based relationships with key suppliers enable the access 
of lead firms to complementary capabilities and specialized knowledge with a positive 
effect on the networks as a whole (Lorenzoni and Lipparini 1999). These positive 
effects could potentially lower the overall coordination and production costs of the 
network with key external partners or suppliers. 
In addition to intensive resource sharing, strong ties promote trust, serve as control 
mechanisms and govern partnership behaviors. Due to limited control mechanisms, 
firms participating in an inter-organizational alliance face the risks of opportunistic 
behavior (Williamson 1985). Formal contracts are often ineffective governance 
mechanisms, because they cannot fully cover all contingencies and may even 
undermine collaborative efforts. Studies of supplier relationships in packaging 
industries (Lorenzoni and Lipparini 1999) suggest the important role of trust in the 
protection of core capabilities. Especially in networks of horizontal orientation, 
coordinating multiple partnering firms faces the additional challenge of a heightened 
threat of opportunistic behavior (Gulati and Singh 1998). Trusted inter-firm 
relationships are expanded by a sense of community, daily activities in knowledge 
access or joint development projects. Trust lowers the risk of knowledge dispersion 
and ensures commitment of external network participants to remain bound to 
specialized competencies and components of the production process. 
A closely connected alliance network can also play a safeguarding role in limiting 
opportunism (Coleman 1988; Walker, Kogut et al. 1997; Rowley, Behrens et al. 2000). 
In closed networks, information about opportunistic behavior is widely shared among 
all network actors, and sanction can be more easily imposed (Walker, Kogut et al. 
1997). Potential reputation loss will also discourage firms from engaging in any 
opportunistic behavior with any single actor in the network. On the positive side, 
strong ties gradually enhance trust and mutual benefits and promote norms of 
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reciprocity. Reciprocated exchange of economic opportunities focuses on only a few 
selected partners, which serve as key informants of new business opportunities. 
Accepting the principle of reciprocity, an alliance partner shows its willingness to both 
share the benefits of good economic opportunities in the uncertain future and to bear 
the possible risks and costs involved in collaboration. This willingness becomes a 
fundamental basis of trust and a long-term relationship between partners. By behaving 
reciprocally, a firm can build up a reputation of being a good interaction partner, which 
makes the firm a very attractive alliance partner to third parties (Coleman 1990). 
Focused on the long-term perspective, partners downgrade their own individual short-
term interests and develop joint problem-solving approaches. Strong ties are governed 
by relational trust and norms of mutual gain and reciprocity, which are developed 
through a history of interactions (Powell 1990; Larson 1992). 
Positive effects of increased integration in alliance networks may be challenged by 
disadvantages of saturation (Kogut, Shan et al. 1992): Additional linkages with 
partners in an industry network place a burden on its management. With evolving 
alliance networks, the described benefits improve only marginally and the costs of 
maintaining partnerships increase drastically (Harrigan 1985). Many firms also face 
the challenge of limited resources and managerial attention to further develop 
partnerships. (Walker, Kogut et al. 1997) also mention that a Coleman network faces 
the challenge of possible search limitations and the reduction of variety. As norms 
spread across this network structure, deviant behavior and innovation is suppressed 
(Coleman 1988), alliance networks with dense connections can limit a firm’s openness 
to information and to alternative ways of doing things. While some studies see the 
‘over-embeddedness’ as a potential disadvantage (Portes and Sensenbrenner 1993), 
other more recent studies (Gulati 1999; Ahuja 2000b) have not found this effect of 
diminishing returns or disadvantages. 
All case study firms utilize their alliance network partners to innovate or develop 
product applications, business models or organizational settings. As discussed above, 
the suggested alternative effects of network structures support two opposing 
predictions with respect to alliance network structure benefits. The focal actor’s access 
to diverse information is traded off with the promotion of trust and the reduction of 
opportunism for more intense resource sharing. These trade-offs between alliance 
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network structures can only be re-evaluated in the context of actions that the structure 
seeks to facilitate. 
In the assessment of alternative network forms based on changing rents, 
entrepreneurial brokers due to structural holes capture the rent for increased efficiency 
in the overall network. Net welfare gains to the network depend on the alignment of 
incentives that allow actions in collective interests. Burt (1997) has demonstrated that 
entrepreneurs who improve internal coordination by controlling scarce resources 
generate significant rents and improve the welfare of the entire system. 
Coleman’s rent depends not on informational efficiency, but on dense relationships 
that facilitate monitoring and coordination by matching incentives to contribution. A 
dense network also enables the sense of collective identity that supports coordinated 
exchange. Regarding the issue of alliance benefits, Coleman (1990) differentiates 
between independent and global viability in network associations. Independent 
viability is based on contributions of individuals to an organization such as closed 
network with a proportional reward. Global viability, which does not represent a 
sustainable basis for an organization over time, rewards actors at their reservation price 
of persistence in a network, allowing for intra-organizational payments to members in 
an amount that violates rules of proportionality. Whereas Burt implies that group rent 
is transferred to the broker, a Coleman network assumes that benefits of superior 
coordination must be distributed in ways to assure participation. Therefore, different 
concepts of network viability represent a critical distinction between the two types of 
networks. 
Trade-offs of network benefits may explain contradictory empirical findings in alliance 
network research with respect to innovation, which are also relevant in the context of 
this study: In the environment of scarce resources, firms can pursue only a limited 
number of technologies and product innovations, but the network can improve the 
firm’s access to information with benefits in two different forms: Open networks can 
serve as an information gathering device for the success and failure of many 
simultaneous research efforts (Rogers and Larsen 1984). On the other hand, a dense 
network of firms can be leveraged as information for processing and screening 
(Leonard-Barton 1984). Each additional partner firm can provide information 
processing, absorption and classification of new developments in addition to the 
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information processing capability of one single firm. Relevant developments in 
different technologies may be brought to the firm’s attention through its relationships. 
Faced with specific development obstacles, a focal player can structure and activate its 
network to identify the resources that are well informed about the specific innovations 
(Freeman 1982). 
In a process study of innovation, (Hargadon and Sutton 1997) illustrate how a firm 
uses its position in a network configuration with multiple structural holes to develop 
new products. In study of firm networks in the chemicals industry, Ahuja (2000a) 
found that an increasing number of structural holes can be related to reduced 
innovation output. Although Hargadon and Sutton (1997) suggest benefits of loosely 
connected networks, Ahuja’s study differs in the fact that the network consists of 
collaborative linkages between firms in the same industry. Hargadon and Sutton’s 
network actor operates as a network broker and does not require resource sharing and 
collaboration of interconnected, closed networks in the less innovative and commodity 
driven chemicals industry. The desired informational context determines the relevancy 
of structural holes: The development of more intense collaboration and reduction of 
opportunism requires the closed network structure. Quick access to diverse information 
requires the advantages of the alliance network’s high ratio of structural holes. 
However, many case study companies in this thesis (Lycos, Sonera Zed, Elisa and 
Tropolys) reassess, modify and discontinue their earlier technical, content and city 
carrier partnerships (Proposition # 13; Proposition # 14), although time and interaction 
has passed to build up certain levels of trust. Since some of these selective reviews lead 
to the discontinuation, renegotiation and internalization of alliances, the earlier 
involvement in alliance formation for these providers of mainly commodity services 
clearly has not shown benefits for them: Process internalization of initially provided 
services and discontinuation of relationships obviously results in lost business and 
further revenue potential. 
Early suppliers of Lycos and Sonera Zed do not play an important role in continuously 
identifying opportunities of new technology applications and in giving access to ideas. 
As illustrated in these case studies, the lack of supplier capabilities greatly reduces the 
focal actor’s motivation to expand relationships over the previously defined scope. 
This observation clearly illustrates that not only embeddedness in relationships, but 
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also continuously maintained relevance, generate incentives for ongoing collaboration 
and long-term commitment. Growing resources of online service companies and the 
Elisa and Tropolys group made some partnerships obsolete. As studies in 
manufacturing industries demonstrate, utilization of external partners for defined 
services and product components reconfigures the competencies of the focal firms. 
Reducing the overall mutual dependency by improving external parties’ capabilities, 
increased network flexibility reduces the relative stability of all cooperative 
relationships (Lorenzoni and Lipparini 1999). 
Alliance network evolution: Stages of transformation 
Although scholars have reached broad agreements regarding the importance of alliance 
networks for firm growth and success (Dyer and Singh 1998; Gulati and Singh 1998), 
the short review of empirical studies and conflicting theoretical predictions in the 
previous chapter illustrate that there is considerably less agreement about the most 
advantageous network characteristics. However, the described opposing views may 
become redundant because the great majority of network research has examined firm 
networks from only a single, static point in time (Hite and Hesterly 2001). 
As firms dynamically progress and develop, they require new and additional resources 
to support continued growth. An evolutionary understanding of resource needs 
suggests a more dynamic approach to the analysis of alliance networks, which may 
reconcile opposing network perspectives. Previous studies have already reached 
agreement on some important issues: As outlined above, networks can have both 
beneficial and also constraining implications. Changing benefits and constraints have 
an impact on the dynamic evolution of alliance networks. 
On the issue of network dynamics, the question of whether network creation will 
always follow single linear processes is of particular interest. Prior research on the 
formation of networks has, in many cases, described the context for the evolution of 
networks (Burt 1992; Nohria and Eccles 1992; Powell, Koput et al. 1996; Gulati 
1998): Scholars have related differences in initial conditions to network characteristics 
without focusing on the actual formation processes. Initial conditions have been 
conceptualized as environmental dependencies (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978; Doz 1996; 
Madhavan, Koka et al. 1998), similar interests (Powell 1990; Powell, Koput et al. 
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1996) and triggering identities (Lorenzoni and Baden-Fuller 1995; Dyer and Nobeoka 
2000). 
Selected case studies of network formation (Browning, Beyer and Shelter 1995) or 
conceptual models (Zajac and Olsen 1993) illustrate the sequence of formation 
activities, but have not generalized beyond empirical observations. Case studies on 
formation processes (Larson 1992; Ring and Van de Ven 1994; Doz 1996; Gomes-
Casseres 1996; Arino and De La Torre 1998) have identified the sequence of activities, 
but vary greatly in the degree of detail, which limits their exploratory value. 
Differences in the influences of previous activities on subsequent activities within the 
studies are rarely explained. Although none of these studies provide insights into the 
evolutionary development of networks, there is consistency in the general sequence of 
activities in the formation process, described in exhibit 3.1. 
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Theoretical 
construct 
Description 
Environmental 
Interdependence 
? Collaboration due to identification of interdependency 
? Reasons range from product standardization or market 
development to external threats or increased competition 
Similar Interests 
? Interdependency narrows the search for partners 
? Same interdependencies facilitate converging reasons for 
cooperation 
Triggering 
Entity 
? Legitimacy of triggering entity in case of low interdependence, 
unspecified technology or tacit knowledge 
? Entity reduces the concerns of potential participants on costs and 
benefits 
Seeking Domain 
Consensus 
? Clarification and understanding processes in the negotiation 
process 
? Agreement on performance membership expectations and scope 
of cooperation 
Open 
Solicitation 
? Early search for partners governed by interdependencies 
? Membership addition to partnership for strategic reasons and 
familiarity with focal firm 
Expectation of 
Continuity 
? Conditions of rising reliance and trust 
? Shadow of future after initial experience gains 
Formal Structure 
? Ability to deliver on expectations over a sustained period 
? Changes in external environment require design of formal 
structures 
Learning ? Learning due to the process of cooperative activities ? Ability to learn and to adapt minimizes the level of conflict 
Escalation of 
commitment and 
satisfaction 
? Ability to meet objectives of efficiency and adaptability 
maintains legitimacy of partnership 
? Fulfillment of cooperative commitments allows network to grow 
in scope and duration with additional resource commitment 
Exhibit 3-1 R&D networks: Formation activities adapted from (Doz, Olk 
et al. 2000) 
Network evolution and interdependence: Need for a triggering entity? 
In their exploratory and empirical study of U.S. research and development consortia, 
Doz, Olk et al (2000) have explored two distinct network formation paths. Both so-
called ‘emergent’ and ‘engineered’ processes lead to the expectation of continuity for 
the R&D consortium as a precursor for its further commitment, satisfaction and the 
foundation of a formal structure. The selection between the two process paths depends 
on the level of environmental interdependence: 
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Researchers have typically understood network and alliance formation as a reaction to 
exogenous factors such as the distribution of technological resources. Several studies 
suggest that organizations enter into ties with other organizations in response to the 
challenges posed by so called interdependencies they share in their common 
environment (Aiken and Hage 1968; Pfeffer and Nowak 1976a, b; Pfeffer and Salancik 
1978; Berg and Friedman 1980; Duncan 1982). Following this perspective, firms 
create alliances to mitigate uncertain environments and to satisfy their resource needs 
(Galaskiewicz 1985; Harrigan 1988; Hagedoorn and Schakenraad 1990; Nohria and 
Garcia-Pont 1991). Oliver (1990) identifies six broad categories of exogenous drivers 
for inter-organizational ties: Necessity, asymmetry, reciprocity, efficiency, stability 
and legitimacy lead to cooperative relationships, which address the needs for external 
interdependence. 
On the ‘emergent’ process for network formation, environmental interdependence 
aligns similar interests, which facilitates the achievement of domain consensus in the 
network. Consensus in the consortium can be reached on the structure, its goals, 
operations and the level of information sharing. A higher degree of consensus then 
raises the expectations for continuity of the cooperation. In contrast to this self-
organizing bottom-up process, the ‘engineered’ process requires a triggering entity that 
determines consortium memberships in the absence of any open solicitation. In a 
second step, the triggering identity without the support of higher levels of 
environmental interdependence also has to establish the expectations of continuity 
within the partnership network. 
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Environmental 
Interdependence
Evidence of 
Learning
Seeking Domain 
Consensus
Formal Structure
Escalation of 
Commitment and 
Satisfaction
Expectations of 
Continuity
Triggering Entity
Similar Interests
Open Solicitation
-
+
+
+
+
-
-
+
+
+
 
Exhibit 3-2 R&D networks: Relationships among formation activities 
adapted from (Doz, Olk et al. 2000) 
Interestingly, a joint understanding of continuity within network members predicts 
both an escalation of commitment and satisfaction as well as the establishment of a 
formal structure. In an adjacent path, similar interests seem to directly influence 
evidence of consortium learning in the form of joint product development, research 
and technology transfer mechanisms. 
Both processes– emergent and engineered – summarized in exhibit 3.2 will be required 
for long-term organizational survival. According to a similar dichotomy, Koza (1999) 
describes the evolutionary dynamics in network organizations as either 
intentionally/rationally constructed or emergent. Koza (1999) argues that over the 
course of organizational development, previously emergent network will be 
intentionally or rationally managed as a result of institutional pressures. In their 
analysis of the emergent process, Doz, Olk et al. describe environmental 
interdependence and similar interest – initial conditions in their model – as highly 
related to each other: Environmental incentives to collaborate motivates organizations 
to develop similar interests for collaboration and definition of problems. Doz, Olk et al. 
thus propose that collaboration driven by responses to common threats or a perceived 
need to gain access to similar resources will follow an emergent pattern without the 
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active involvement of a triggering entity. Since all case study companies in this thesis 
are involved in their unique innovation processes to develop new technology-based 
firms, establish a new organizational model for fixed-line communications or to define 
online service products, Doz, Olk et al.’s findings (2000) on research and development 
networks have important implications for this study. 
In contrast to the assumptions of the ‘emergent’ process, the case study of Elisa and 
Tropolys (Proposition # 1) clearly illustrates that besides the imminent environmental 
demand for cost consolidation both the formation and the implementation of an 
integrated city carrier network require a triggering entity in the form of Elisa and 
Tropolys. This triggering entity rules out network actors who do not fit with network 
objective ‘consolidation’ and implements the determined cost reduction potential. 
Although Doz, Olk et al. (2000) suggest a process of self-selection for network 
membership in the case of environmental interdependence, cost reduction and resource 
reconfiguration for Tropolys’ city carriers does not allow free membership. 
Implementation of unpopular cost reduction initiatives requires a careful selection of 
capable city carriers and their joint commitment. A strong focal actor is also required 
to accelerate and control the implementation process: During the identification of 
improvement potential, a central entity alleviates developing conflicts about best 
practices in city carrier operations. In the actual implementation process, Tropolys’ 
tracking of cost reductions ensures the timely achievement of targeted efficiency gains. 
Although the environmental interdependence of price decreases in the fixed-line 
telecommunications market clearly mandates cooperation for cost consolidation, a 
central entity is needed to propel and ensure the path towards further, more intense 
cooperation. 
In line with Elisa and Tropolys case study findings, Doz, Olk et al. propose that similar 
interests between network members facilitate consensus and lead to strong 
expectations of continuity among network actors. Based on the expectation of 
continuing collaboration in the network, actors engage in developing a formal structure 
for the partnership network. In particular, organizations from similar industries may 
need to protect their competitive interest due to concerns about unequal control of 
resource allocations. 
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In their analysis of the ‘engineered’ process of network formation, Doz, Olk et al. 
(2000) argue that low interdependence and dissimilar interests require the intervention 
of triggering entities. Although environmental interdependence clearly exists for 
independent city carriers, the initial internal self-assessment of their business situation 
in some cases leads to the assumption of achieving profitability without external 
support as an independent entity. It was up to the triggering entities Elisa and Tropolys, 
to encourage an extended and later self-propelling mutual cooperation. However, pride 
in their previous independent achievements and strong local ties represent a stumbling 
block for local city carrier management to realize the necessity for extended 
cooperation. Similar patterns can be detected in the case studies of all online service 
companies: Unclear initial user behavior requires a trial-and-error approach in 
assembling service providers for content and infrastructure. The innovation level of 
services requires an integrating entity, which – in the case of MSN – can integrate the 
emerging objectives of its partners for novel service offerings. In line with these 
empirical accounts, Dyer and Nobeoka’s case study (2000) of Toyota’s United States 
component suppliers also illustrates that common interests among suppliers for cost 
reduction and quality improvement are only transformed into network formation when 
the triggering entity is highly involved in a “hub-and-spoke” approach. 
In contrast to this setting, the absence of environmental interdependence leaves 
structural holes between firms (Burt 1992), which create entrepreneurial opportunities 
for the triggering identity. Information transfer on opportunities to potential network 
participants with collective capabilities and resources to capitalize on this opportunity 
motivate partnership formation with existing network firms. The central network actor 
utilizes multiple approaches to target a limited number of firms and to broker a 
consortium around environmental opportunities and threats. Multiple approaches 
create awareness for inter-organizational interdependence and carefully select 
organizations based on appropriate task and partnering criteria. After initial partnership 
formation, the focal actor mediates consensus among network firms, which explains 
the missing direct relationship between the triggering entity and seeking domain 
consensus in the described model. In their framework, an integrating central actor – 
present in both the ‘emergent’ and ‘engineered’ process – plays a more important role 
in the early stages of the ‘engineered’ and top-down driven process. 
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In its top-down approach, the ‘engineered’ process of network formation suffers from 
lower expectations of continuity and commitment, but provides the basis for creative 
exploration: When firms in alliance networks fail to acknowledge similar interests and 
do not seem to independently seek a domain consensus, the expectations of continuity 
for their partnership network are much lower in this ‘engineered’ formation process 
than in the alternative ‘emergent’ formation process. In the second step, lower 
expectations of partnership survival consequently lead to the perception of the alliance 
networks as only one option among many others. Missing recognition of similar 
interests and initiative to explore collaboration advantages results in network firms that 
initially do not commit and invest enough in the respective collaboration opportunity. 
In this status, a strong central firm as a stimulus for intensifying interaction in a weak 
alliance network might lead to dissatisfied network actors. 
Network evolution and exploitation: Need for closed and embedded networks? 
The previous chapter has indicated that industry factors such as environmental 
interdependence seem to influence the alliance network structures (Auster 1992; 
Hagedoorn and Narula 1996; Hennart 1997). The described balance between the 
‘emergent’ and ‘engineered’ process also involves a trade-off of how much to invest 
either in the exploration of new or refinement of existing technologies to secure returns 
in the future. Unstable environments with uncertainty mandate firms to increase the 
rate of innovation through exploration. With a focus on gathering new and broad 
information on many different alternatives, exploration requires resource 
commitments, but represents the only option to secure first-hand results (Levinthal and 
March 1992). In contrast to this strategy, exploitation focuses on refining existing 
innovation by gathering information that provides deeper insights into one particular 
domain. 
To the degree to which firm strategies and alliance network objectives tend either 
towards exploration or exploitation, skills and information needed for exploring 
emerging innovations or exploiting existing technology differ significantly (March 
1991). While exploitation utilizes existing information to improve efficiency and 
returns from present strategies, competencies, and procedures, exploration searches 
and experiments to find emerging innovations that will produce future profits. March 
(1991, p. 85) argues that the 
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“essence of exploitation is the refinement and extension of existing 
competencies, technologies and paradigms … [the] essence of 
exploration is experimentation with new alternatives.” 
In recognition of a reasonable balance between the strategies of exploitation and 
exploration, Afuah (2000) suggests that firms should not invest all of their partnership 
resources in strong ties to a small group of suppliers and horizontal partners. 
Technological changes can significantly adjust the competitive advantage, if the firm 
has focused too much on one strategic position through strong ties to close partners. 
Therefore, firms also need to allocate resources to building up and maintaining weak 
relationships with alternative partners as future growth options in the event of 
technological changes. 
In the study of horizontal ties in the semiconductor and steel industries, Rowley, 
Behrens et al.’s results (2000) help to adjust the appropriate balance according to the 
industry context. General findings for both industries suggest that weak ties are 
positively related to firm performance. Interestingly, strong ties are negatively related 
to firm performance and therefore do not seem to generate performance advantages 
through trust-based governance or norms of reciprocity. The same pattern has been 
suggested in the absence of structural holes: A firm embedded with strong ties to its 
partners, which are also densely connected to each other, gains little additional benefits 
of alternative social control mechanisms and invests too much into the maintenance of 
strong ties. 
Besides these general findings, their study offers some support for interesting 
interaction effects. The performance effects of embeddedness in alliance network 
depend on the environmental industry context: Results suggest that strong ties are 
positively related to firm performance, when the industry context demands a high 
degree of exploitation. Following this contingency approach, weak ties are associated 
with higher performance in exploration contexts. Interestingly, Rowley, Behrens et al. 
found no detrimental effect of even stronger ties in exploration environments. In the 
alternative context of exploitation, the densely inter-connected ego network with a 
reduced number of structural holes provides the firm with a redundant information 
source, which enables the information received from each source to be thoroughly 
evaluated and improved. These beneficial effects of strong and dense network 
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relationships are in accordance with findings in the Elisa and Tropolys cases and 
Proposition # 16. 
As the ‘engineered’ process driven by triggering entity targets the creation of new 
relationships and exploration of the described collaboration advantages, the involved 
alliance relationships tend towards an explorative orientation. The formal structure in 
these networks may be intended to facilitate creativity and innovation rather than to 
constrain opportunistic behavior. Consequently, there might be fewer boundaries on 
technology transfer in a formal structure involving the engineered process in network 
formation. 
Clearly constituting an ‘engineered’ process, focal companies in all case studies 
determine the constraints and requirements as well as roles and responsibilities of 
network membership in a top-down approach, especially in more mature stages of 
network formation. In the Elisa and Tropolys case, the selected city carriers with a lack 
of commitment to a consolidation strategy are required to adapt their personnel 
resources in a top-down approach. In this study, online service providers clearly appear 
as a triggering entity in selecting providers for content and infrastructure. 
Although all case studies involve creativity and exploration driven by a triggering 
entity, online service providers show only limited earlier signs of knowledge transfer, 
but increased rates of innovation in their later stage high-value relationships. As the 
relevance of and trust in partnerships increases over time, the issues of joint partner 
commitment and technology transfer gain more relevance: Later advertising and co-
marketing arrangements need mutual benefits for a sustainable cooperation. 
The orientation in the alternative ‘emergent’ process tends to be more focused on 
exploitation. As network participants experience the initial impact of an opportunity or 
threat in comparable ways, they will independently consider actions to react to it. 
Confronted with the inability to mitigate the common environmental interdependence, 
firms in a network utilize joint and bundled resources until the common threat no 
longer exists. 
In line with theoretical predictions and after the initiation of the triggering entity, 
Elisa’s and Tropolys’ city carriers jointly exploit the economies of scale in sharing 
resources due to commonly perceived industry interdependencies. Challenged by the 
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inability of independent city carrier reactions, Tropolys has established dedicated 
functional boards, which in their determination of cost reduction potential interestingly 
have a significant explorative character in creatively defining measures with high 
effectiveness and easy implementability. Implementation of cost reduction measures in 
a second step requires a dense and repeated alliance network to develop the required 
trust and to alleviate the mounting level of conflict. 
In this transition between the two network formation processes, firms in an alliance 
network created by an engineered process tend to make these relational investments 
(Lorenzoni and Lipparini 1999) and improve their relational quality (Arino and De La 
Torre 1998; Kale, Singh et al. 2000). In this environment under the supervision and 
maintenance of an active and triggering focal firm (Lorenzoni and Baden-Fuller 1995; 
Gomes-Casseres 1996), city carrier partnerships formed by the ‘engineered’ process 
might develop into a network governed by the ‘emergent’ process. Both focal actors 
and network firms gradually recognize similar interests and opportunities to further 
capitalize on their initial investments in the form of relational capabilities (Dyer and 
Singh 1998). In this change process, the impact of the triggering entity decreases and 
self-organizing principles of the emergent process play a more important role. Similar 
empirical observations in the transformation from dyads into full networks have been 
made for a U.S. supplier network (Dyer and Nobeoka 2000) and packaging machinery 
manufacturer (Lorenzoni and Lipparini 1999). 
Although still committed to an engineered process of network formation, all studies of 
the Elisa and Tropolys and online service companies show similar patterns: Reduction 
of and focus on the number of partnerships results in an intensified exchange of 
resources along with increases in relational quality. In this context, network 
relationships develop from weak, flexible ties into selective, operational, intense 
alliances. Intensification of alliance relationships and growing relational qualities 
trigger the described self-organizing principles, which are sustained with the support of 
mutual benefits from cooperative relationships. 
However, as resource exchange intensity increases with the value of partnership 
opportunities, the coordinating role of the central node remains very relevant in even 
later stages of network formation. The more intense explorative nature of the 
individual alliance relationship requires a coordinating entity for the previously 
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mentioned reasons. Interestingly, these resource intensive cooperative relationships 
have only been enabled by the potential exploitation of economies of scale (Elisa and 
Tropolys) and previously developed resources (online service companies). These 
previously developed resources include the technical infrastructure, online services and 
customer bases, which have been built up earlier with the support of weaker 
partnerships. 
In a related theoretical study on the development of networks around entrepreneurial 
firms, Hite and Hesterly (2001) argue that firms motivated by growth objectives and 
driven by a reversed shift from exploitation to exploration tend towards more 
calculative networks. Their definition of calculative networks aims at combining a 
larger and more diverse set of purposeful and functional partnerships to underline the 
firm’s capability to proactively manage the network rather than simply accepting the 
constraints of previous relationships. The evolution towards the combination of a 
larger and more diverse set of purposeful functional partnerships requires the addition 
of fewer redundant relationships and the creation of structural holes. 
In their assumptions, the transition to more calculative networks is accompanied by the 
addition of non-embedded relationships. Although earlier embedded ties may be 
beneficial in overcoming the challenges of resource access and limited awareness of 
available opportunities, firms in later growth stages develop a broader base of new 
arm’s length ties with similarity to market ties (Powell 1990; Uzzi 1996) without the 
facilitation of social contacts between parties. In the evolution towards more 
calculative networks, firms distance themselves from cohesive structures with high 
density, mutuality and obligation, but without diversity in relationships, resources and 
information. With the discontinuation of asymmetric exchanges in cohesive networks, 
growth firms tend to turn towards less cohesive networks for novel information and 
resources that reduce redundancy and can exploit structural holes. 
In all case studies, firms show increasingly purposeful selection of functional alliance 
relationships and growing capability to proactively manage alliance networks 
(Proposition # 2;Proposition # 3;Proposition # 4;Proposition # 9;Proposition # 10), 
which constitutes the clear trend towards the described calculative networks. However, 
the increasing resource availability generated in very early development phases makes 
more valuable partnership opportunities available, which require a more intense 
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resource exchange and interaction between firms. With focus on a limited number of 
high value relationships, the embeddedness in partnership networks increases over 
time and provides diversity through complexity of the resource exchange. Therefore, 
the addition of arm’s length relationships is no longer required to increase the diversity 
in resources and information. The focus on high value and resource intensive 
relationships also requires a trustful interaction between alliance partners and 
deliberate absence of structural holes. Proposition # 12 also suggests that focal firm 
learning in the initial growth phase represents an important feedback mechanism for an 
even more selective approach in future alliance formation. 
In their development of more calculative networks, firms are also assumed to follow 
the approach of intentionally adapting and manipulating their alliance network. Most 
previous research assumes an alliance management capability as a specific skill set to 
intentionally create, adapt, and control the desired network structure and to meet 
changing resource needs (Anand and Khanna 2000; Dyer and Nobeoka 2000; Rowley, 
Behrens et al. 2000). However, early ties are limited in their flexibility and adaptability 
and the limited scope of available resources only further reinforces the path 
dependence of initial alliance formation (Afuah 2000). Increases in alliance network 
management capabilities and transition in further firm growth determine the rate at 
which firms migrate from path-dependent to intentionally managed networks (Hite and 
Hesterly 2001). 
All case studies clearly demonstrate the facilitation of alliance management resources 
(Proposition # 2;Proposition # 3;Proposition # 4;Proposition # 10). The development 
of respective skill sets, however, represents only a necessary, but not a sufficient 
condition for further focal company growth. Valuable additional operational resources 
are needed to attract alliance partners for a more beneficial and valuable exchange 
partnership. 
Theoretical perspectives  
 239
3.4 Learning in alliance networks 
Learning across interorganizational networks depends both on firm-level and network-
level factors. Besides these factors, the sequence of collaborative processes between 
firms also plays an important facilitative role for resource acquisition. 
Learning in inter-organizational networks 
From a purely strategic perspective, the decision to acquire resources from another 
organization can be considered a comparison between risk and return on assets (Teece 
1986; Williamson 1991). Due to a possible lack of trust between partners, obstacles to 
relinquish control, the complexity of a joint project and differential capability to learn 
new skills, alliance formation involves moral hazards (Powell 1990). Partnering 
decisions depend on each partner’s size and position in the value chain, the level of 
technological sophistication, and resource constraints. When the set of skills and 
resources to be exchanged determine the form of partnership (Hennart 1988; Pisano 
1989; Parkhe 1993), alliance formation can be regarded as a make-or-buy decision 
framed largely by transaction cost economics. Firms choose alliance formation to 
obtain resources and skills that cannot be produced efficiently internally, when the 
hazards of cooperation can be kept within boundaries. 
According to an alternative perspective adopted by this study, inter-organizational 
learning can also be understood as an alliance network formation process linked to 
certain facilitative conditions. Knowledge creation is determined by the context of a 
community, which is fluid and evolving rather than tightly defined and static. Sources 
of new knowledge cannot be found exclusively within firm boundaries, they are found 
in the relationships between firms, suppliers and customers (Powell 1990). Supporting 
this perspective, Kogut and Zander (1996) have argued that the capabilities of a firm 
primarily lie in an organizational learning process by which new knowledge is 
replicated or integrated across different parts of the firm. Such an organizational 
learning process can be understood by analyzing the relationships of inter-firm 
knowledge sharing. Although the traditional focus of organizational learning is on the 
individual firm, increasing evidence points towards a network of firms as a critical, but 
less understood unit of analysis (Powell, Koput et al. 1996; Dyer and Singh 1998; Yli-
Renko, Autio and Sapienza 2001). As a result, the degree to which firms learn about 
new innovation depends on their alliance formation activity (Levinthal and March 
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1992). Baum, Calabrese et al. ’s studies (2000) show the strong impact of networks on 
innovation-related performance indicators, which support the widely held assumption 
that alliance networks form a ‘locus of innovation’ in high technology fields. In short, 
various researchers have recognized inter-organizational learning as a critical 
contributor to competitive success through collaboration with other organizations or 
internalization of practices. 
Inter-organizational learning processes can also reduce high network coordination 
costs and provide a foundation for the evolution of the described ‘emergent’ process of 
network formation (Powell, Koput et al. 1996; Larsson, Bengtsson et al. 1998). 
However, alliance network formation based only on the ‘emergent’ process is less 
prone to discover and develop necessary innovations in response to changing industry 
conditions, as the consensus of common interests will limit the ability to recognize 
new approaches (Uzzi 1996). Doz, Olk et al. (2000) therefore suggest a balanced focus 
on efficiency and innovation-based network formation processes to ensure partnership 
survival. 
Irrespective of the network formation process, scholars suggest extensively defined 
domain consensus, realistic expectations of continuity and practical network structure 
to support learning outcomes in an alliance (McEvily and Zaheer 1999; Doz, Olk et al. 
2000). An extensive domain consensus seems to have positive impact on focal firm 
learning, especially in an innovation driven industry with unclear alliance outcomes 
during the formation of the partnership (Proposition # 5;Proposition # 6). Adaptability 
in alliance network membership, objective and activities creates a rich environment for 
firm-level learning of resources for later utilization.  
Firm-level and network-level factors with implications for learning 
In addition to the general approach of network formation, the external knowledge a 
firm obtains from external partners depends on multiple firm-level and alliance-level 
factors: (1) The intensity of the relationship, (2) the quality of the relationship in terms 
of goodwill, trust and reciprocity, and the (3) similarity of resource bases. The intensity 
of relationships refers to relational embeddedness between actors (Larson 1992; Ring 
and Van de Ven 1992). As described above, relationship quality is improved by 
Theoretical perspectives  
 241
increased trust and expectations of reciprocity through interaction (Ring and Van de 
Ven 1994; Dyer and Singh 1998). 
(1) Increasing levels of relationship intensity between actors enhance the knowledge 
acquisition by improved abilities to recognize and evaluate pertinent knowledge 
(Cohen and Levinthal 1990; Lane and Lubatkin 1998) and by stronger motivation to 
exchange and process information. Larson (1992) and Ring and Van de Ven (1994) 
describe that social interactions develop over time as exchange partners learn about 
each other’s competence and reliability. As a result, the more social interaction 
develops, the greater the intensity, frequency and breadth of information exchanged. 
Lane and Lubatkin (1998) argue that interactive learning and intensive information 
exchange allows a firm to acquire not only the explicit knowledge but also the deeper, 
tacit components of knowledge (Kogut and Zander 1996). In the process of 
intensifying the frequency, breadth, and depth of information exchange, social 
interaction creates relation-specific knowledge. Common knowledge increases the 
relation-specific absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal 1990), which represents an 
even greater incentive to invest in learning routines and capacity in recognizing 
external knowledge. Grant (1996b) defines learning routines as a ‘regular pattern of 
interactions among individuals that permits the transfer, recombination, or creation of 
specialized knowledge’, which can be considered as the capability of managing 
knowledge flows in inter-organizational networks. 
Emerging high-value opportunities in all case studies show the similarity of 
intensifying relationships. Complex arrangements require high frequency, breadth, and 
depth of information exchange already in the negotiation phase of co-marketing and 
advertising relationships. Already minority equity investments in city carriers can be 
used to assess the reliability and competence of individual companies. To-be 
advertised product specifications, brand equity and best practices for efficiency 
improvement include the shared tacit resources at this stage. Therefore, the increasing 
interaction intensity represents an important contribution to focal company learning 
(Proposition # 6;Proposition # 7). Established and refined due diligence processes, 
tailored controlling systems and structured functional boards represent relationship-
specific investments and learning capabilities within the focal company. Supporting 
these propositions, Yli-Renko, Autio et al.’s study (2001) of knowledge exchange 
relationship between new U.K.-based, technology-based firms and their customers 
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suggest that social interaction and network ties have a positive impact on the acquired 
knowledge acquired from relationships. 
(2) The quality of the relationship is determined by the extent to which the two parties 
develop common goals, norms and reciprocal expectations regarding the goodwill and 
trustworthiness of the exchange partner. Goodwill trust and reciprocal obligations are 
considered alternatives to formal, arm’s length, or third party governance mechanisms 
(Larson 1992; Dyer and Singh 1998). 
Over the course of alliance network evolution, the addition of partnerships increases 
the potential for alliance redundancy, which raises the importance of relationship 
quality. To the extent that ties provide access to the similar information (Burt 1992) or 
non-complementary resources (Gomes-Casseres 1994), focal companies face the risk 
of inefficient configurations that return less diverse information and capabilities for 
great costs than a smaller, non-redundant alliance network. Entering into additional 
alliances without attention to the overall portfolio can also lead to conflict among the 
firm’s partners as duplication of resources creates rivalry among a firm’s alliance 
partners (Gomes-Casseres 1994). As Dyer and Nobeoka (2000) show in their 
automotive case study, Toyota will not place competing suppliers together in voluntary 
supplier learning teams. The number of partner firms that perform similar functions or 
take on duplicate roles fuels potential conflict. 
In the case of Elisa Kommunikation, the level of conflict between regional carriers 
might also be influenced by the need to differentiate and to compete against each other. 
Although focused on distinct regional areas without any overlaps, the directed transfer 
of competencies in the area of billing, marketing and customer care provides enough 
motivation for competition and conflict among firms that are extremely comparable in 
their technological base. Disagreement can focus on the determined best practices, 
timeframe for the implementation or cost reduction targets. Loss of senior management 
and initial resistance against the consolidation strategy provides clear evidence for a 
mounting level of conflict, especially in the transition process from independent 
entities to a more consolidated group of city carriers. 
Referring to the initially discussed open domain consensus, Baum, Calabrese et al. 
(2000) suggest that internal conflict may have two opposing effects: To a certain 
extent, a higher level of diverse interaction can increase flexibility, foster innovation 
Theoretical perspectives  
 243
and ensure secure access to critical complementary assets (Proposition # 6). But a 
higher level of conflict can also pull interests’ of competing partners in different 
directions, and network firms fail to reach sufficient returns to invest in an alliance and 
moral hazards tend to diminish cooperative efforts. 
As strategic alliances are inherently incomplete contracts without a clear definition of 
property rights and alliance benefits, alliance partners risk the moral hazards of 
opportunistic behavior. Inter-alliance rivalry retains the potential to severely disrupt an 
alliance and to harm a participating firm. Particular partnerships risk engaging in 
learning races (Khanna 1998) in which a partner attempts to extract as much 
knowledge as possible from its partner by divulging as little as possible. Such rivalries 
are likely to be most harmful among potential rivals, when firms regard their 
partnerships as zero sum games when the potential for competition between them is 
high. Mowery, Oxley et al. (1996) have shown that alliances involving partners who 
compete in the same industry exhibit lower levels of knowledge transfer. Partnerships 
with less diversity also do not allow complementary specialization, which enables the 
focus on only a subset of activities. In their study of the Canadian biotechnology 
industry, Baum, Calabrese et al. (2000) have found that diverse alliance networks at 
the founding of start-up companies consisting of ties to incumbents, universities, 
government labs, industry associations and research institutes contribute to higher 
learning and subsequent performance. Firms with these founding relationships have 
access to more diverse information, which raises growth rates for revenue, R&D 
spending and patenting. However, adding potential rivals to the alliance portfolio has a 
negative impact on these performance indicators, moderated by the potential rival 
partners’ scope and innovativeness. 
Dyer and Singh (1998) suggest that due to the moral hazards of sharing know-how in 
inter-organizational relationships, effective procedures are required to facilitate 
knowledge sharing and deter free-riding. According to their perspective, self-enforcing 
governance mechanisms defined as informal norms of reciprocity and trust support 
knowledge sharing and prevent free-riding because (a) relational governance norms are 
valid indefinitely and can increase in value as the relationship progresses, (b) 
cooperative actions are more likely undertaken, when reciprocal benefits are expected 
and, (c) the likelihood of violation decreases with the development of high-quality, 
irreplaceable relationships. Larson (1992) also suggests that norms of reciprocity allow 
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firms to exchange a larger pool of resources, to take risks, to innovate and to share 
information without boundaries. Shared norms reduce the need for formal monitoring 
and bargaining (Dyer and Singh 1998), which leaves more resources for knowledge 
acquisition. Shared expectations and goals facilitate the creation of compatible systems 
and culture in the individual relationships. The relative absorptive capacity is also 
improved, when the knowledge is contained in similar systems generated by 
compatible expectations. 
The negative relation between relationship quality and knowledge acquisition 
suggested by Yli-Renko, Autio et al.’s study (2001) can be explained as follows: If 
relationship quality and trust reach a very high level, the required level of monitoring 
is reduced, which diminishes the level of conflict and of intense processing of 
information. Although reduced monitoring and bargaining diminishes the costs of 
knowledge exchange, this effect might also lower the amount of acquired knowledge. 
In addition, the assessment of high relationship quality may ensure the availability of 
resources when they are needed and reduce the motivation for prior acquisitions. 
In contrast to these findings, focal companies in this study seem to develop increased 
levels of trust with the formation of high value alliances. Balanced business cases for 
joint benefits from Zed’s co-marketing alliances, and MSN’s open-minded approach to 
jointly develop products with later distribution of pay-offs clearly illustrates the trustful 
interaction with partners. Intensification of relationships to remaining content suppliers 
for Lycos and Zed might be another indication of growing trust in intensifying 
partnerships. Therefore, growing relationship quality in combination with shared 
behavioral norms has a positive impact on learning (Proposition # 6;Proposition # 7). 
Following this perspective, Kale, Singh et al. (2000) find a positive relationship 
between strong ties based on trust and the degree of learning in inter-firm alliances. 
Similarly, Tsai (2000) argues that trust has a very significant effect particularly on the 
exchange of intangible resources, which requires a more complex communication 
process.  
(3) On the issue resource similarity, Lane and Lubatkin (1998) showed that a firm’s 
capacity to recognize, assimilate and exploit external knowledge is determined by the 
similarity between partners’ knowledge bases, organizational systems and dominant 
logics. New knowledge with a certain level of familiarity is easier to acquire than 
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knowledge about an unrelated area. Unrelated knowledge will be difficult to acquire 
and may, in fact, have limited value because a language to understand the knowledge 
is lacking (Inkpen 1998). It is difficult to create a linkage for resource exchange 
between two unrelated actors due to the lack of shared language and common interests 
which are important for the effectiveness of their communication. As a result, 
technological distance between partners as an indicator for reduced absorptive capacity 
is negatively correlated with innovation performance (Lane and Lubatkin 1998; Stuart 
1998). 
In the subsequent implementation of acquired resources, Cohen and Levinthal (1990) 
suggest that the degree to which external knowledge is targeted towards the resource 
needs of the firm will determine the ease of knowledge utilization. 
Therefore, internal resources and learning from alliances are never substitutes, but 
rather important and required complements. Internal capability is indispensable in 
evaluating research conducted outside while external partnerships provide access to 
knowledge and resources that cannot be generated within firm boundaries (Powell, 
Koput et al. 1996). Therefore, external ties are not only a means of gaining fast access 
to external knowledge, but also a test of internal resources and learning capabilities. To 
stay up-to-date in a high-technology industry environment, firms must actively 
participate in the R&D process by conducting cutting-edge internal research and 
development as well as accessing external sources of knowledge. 
This pattern highlights two important enabling conditions of internally developed 
resources: Growing operational resources improve the technological relatedness, which 
in turn enhances the capability to learn from external resources (Proposition # 7). 
Internally acquired resources represent a feedback mechanism for a more targeted and 
appropriate selection of alliance formation opportunities (Proposition # 16). A more 
selective approach in future alliance formation ensures complementary resource 
offerings from external partners. 
As an effect of knowledge acquisition, Yli-Renko, Autio et al. (2001) suggest that 
learning enhances new product development and innovative capabilities in three 
different ways: By enhancing the breadth and depth of relation-specific knowledge 
available to the firm with a positive effect on the new innovative combinations, by 
enhancing the speed of product development through reduced development cycles, by 
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motivating the new technology-based firm to develop new products for its customer. 
Externally acquired knowledge is important for the development of technology and 
end products that can be distinguished from those of competitors. Learning in inter-
organizational relationships can be seen as an important option to develop 
technological competencies. 
Network evolution processes facilitating learning 
In a review of previous research on inter-organizational learning and an analysis of 
Toyota’s supplier networks, Dyer and Nobeoka (2000) have identified mechanisms to 
motivate members to participate and openly share valuable knowledge (while 
preventing undesirable spillovers to non-members), prevent free-riders and reduce 
costs for information search and access of valuable knowledge as three elements of 
successful knowledge sharing in the network. For the efficient tacit information 
transfer in manufacturing and supply chain best practices, Toyota in its final stage has 
created a highly interconnected network with strong ties (Coleman 1988). This 
network is well suited for the diffusion and exploitation of Toyota’s and suppliers’ 
production know-how. To address all challenges of explicit and tacit knowledge 
transfer, Toyota has established a variety of bilateral and multilateral processes. 
After creating initially weak ties with its suppliers to share explicit knowledge, Toyota 
later extended its relationships in both frequency and intensity by deploying 
consultants to transfer valuable, more tacit know-how regarding the Toyota Production 
System. Toyota consultants were the catalysts for creating the norm of reciprocal 
knowledge sharing, sense of commitment and creating openness with the supplier 
network. Apart from becoming familiar with knowledge transfer activities, suppliers 
also first-handedly experience the economic benefits associated with knowledge 
sharing. Further establishing the norm of reciprocity, suppliers as beneficiaries were 
obligated to allow visits from other suppliers in the network. 
With the careful selection and assignment of suppliers to learning teams, in a final step 
Toyota has maximized the willingness and ability of suppliers to learn from each other 
(keeping direct competitors separate and rotating group membership to maximize the 
diversity of ideas). These sub-networks have been utilized to support strong ties among 
suppliers as a requirement for tacit knowledge sharing. In this transformation process, 
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knowledge sharing evolved from the exchange of only explicit knowledge to the 
additional transfer of more valuable tacit knowledge in a bilateral and later multilateral 
setting. 
Dyer and Nobeoka (2000) study illustrated that the network can be more effective than 
a firm in generating, transferring and recombining knowledge, because the network 
contains a greater diversity of knowledge, also referred to as ‘variety generation’ 
(Kogut 2000). To also be successful in knowledge management, the focal actor must 
set up principles and infrastructure that support coordination among specialized firms 
and curb opportunistic behavior. Studies suggest that highly interconnected strong tie 
networks provide the best basis for sharing and exploiting existing knowledge rather 
than exploring new knowledge (Dyer and Nobeoka 2000; Rowley, Behrens et al. 
2000). In line with these arguments, a highly interconnected strong tie network is 
effective in the transfer of tacit knowledge because missing structural holes makes it 
easier for network actors to locate potentially valuable information and previously 
established strong ties generate trust to support the sharing of tacit knowledge. 
However, a closely connected network runs the risk of diminishing knowledge 
diversity over time. As network actors’ resources develop into similar resource bases 
through imitation, the network may lose its effectiveness in generating new knowledge 
(Kogut 2000). As Afuah (2000) suggests, closely connected networks become so 
focused on internal issues, that actors reduce their ability to react to technological 
innovations in the environment. A highly connected network structure seems ideally 
suited for the diffusion of existing knowledge in a mature industry rather than 
generating new knowledge in a fast-paced, technologically dynamic industry 
environment. 
The evolution of a knowledge-sharing network takes time to develop processes and 
ties that facilitate effective learning. As a large firm with a good reputation and a stock 
of available resources, Toyota is in the position to select partners from among the most 
capable in the world. In a second step, strong focal actors face the challenge of 
developing strong ties with and among selected partners. 
Dyer and Nobeoka (2000)’s case study illustrates that establishing norms of trust and 
reciprocity has to be well coordinated with structural changes on the level of the 
network. Only after establishing active and fruitful operational working relationships 
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with the central hub Toyota, have selected suppliers been grouped into learning teams. 
The establishment of learning teams further increases relationship intensity between 
Toyota and its suppliers and the density of the overall network with relationships 
between suppliers. These transition processes require time and the adaptation of firm 
behavior. At all times, the role of the triggering entity remains important. Although 
much of the learning in the highly embedded network is performed by direct resource 
exchanges between suppliers, the tacitness and value of the knowledge as well as 
continued attention to norms of reciprocity requires Toyota’s capabilities as the 
integrating entity. 
The Elisa and Tropolys cases clearly illustrate that the transition from the group of 
minority stakes in city carriers to a heavily integrated network can be accompanied by 
discussions and a loss of valuable personnel resources. The established norms of 
reciprocity and trust could have prevented this initial level of conflict. To some extent, 
the investment in majority stakes as an enforcing mechanism represents the price to 
pay for more ‘forceful’ top-down than more ‘emerging’ integration. Without any 
doubt, this integration process requires Tropolys as a strong triggering entity at any 
time of the network transition process. 
Theoretical perspectives  
 249
3.5 Longitudinal model of focal firm and alliance network resources 
The following chapter merges all theoretical perspectives discussed in the previous 
chapters into one consistent framework. This framework is used in the second section 
to assess the validity of the derived set of propositions. 
Combing relevant theoretical frameworks: 
Integration of strategic network theory and resource-based view of the firm 
As this study focuses on the transformation of alliance networks and evolution of focal 
firm resources, advantages and disadvantages of alternative network structures 
represent the key to explore both the motivation and formation of network evolution. 
At any stage of network evolution, the why, what and how of this change process show 
dynamic interaction effects. Two factors make the exploration of these transformation 
processes very difficult: Multi-level longitudinal change processes pose difficult 
challenges for data availability about network structures, resources and individual 
relationships. In addition to limited data access, continuous instead of discrete changes 
provide limited reference points for data measurement (Powell, Koput et al. 1996). To 
fully explore the embeddedness and temporal interconnectedness of this longitudinal 
change process despite these challenges, this study aims at providing case studies with 
rich context for qualitative research, which has the capability of exploring the 
empirical phenomenon on the alliance network and firm level (Pettigrew 1990). 
However as discussed above, an analysis of advantages and disadvantages of 
alternative network structures on multiple dimensions described in Exhibit 3-3 
represents a starting point to better understand the inducements (‘why ?’) behind 
transformation (‘how ?’) between two alternative network forms. 
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Theoretical 
construct 
Structural hole rich network 
(Burt 1992) 
Densely interconnected 
network (Coleman 1988) 
Objective ? Explorative brokerage and self-interest 
? Collective problem 
resolution and exploitation 
of common interest 
Trust ? Low due to information arbitration 
? High supporting shared 
behavioral norms 
Information 
exchange 
? Diverse access due to 
structural holes 
? Intense, joint and efficient 
sharing due to close ties 
Resource and 
knowledge 
exchange 
? Explicit ? Explicit and tacit 
Control benefits ? High due information arbitration 
? Low due to lean hierarchy 
and information dispersion 
Hierarchical 
structure ? Steep ? Flat 
Moral hazards ? High ? Low 
Exhibit 3-3 Network structures: Comparison of characteristics and 
benefits 
Regarding the analysis of the how and why, described transition along these multipe 
dimensions towards more densely interconnected networks t observed in many case 
studies requires time-consuming change processes. Shared behavioral norms, as well 
as intense, efficient information sharing require development recurrent cycles (Dyer 
and Nobeoka 2000): The positive experience of learning or resource acquisition from 
inter-firm cooperation only gradually extends current and forms novel relationships for 
closer cooperation. Besides these given and inherent cycles, firm- and network-level 
factors influence inter-organizational level learning that merit further discussion in this 
chapter. 
Both alternative network structures in Exhibit 3-3 align goals of network actors for 
either brokerage or collective problem resolution. In all instances of alliance formation, 
network participants or firms recognize a certain level of environmental 
interdependence (Aiken and Hage 1968; Pfeffer and Nowak 1976a, b; Pfeffer and 
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Salancik 1978; Berg and Friedman 1980; Duncan 1982). This exogenous driver to 
either access resources or mitigate uncertainty aligns the interests between current and 
future network actors. Aligned interests reduce the need for the triggering entity to 
‘artificially’ establish a domain consensus within the web of inter-organizational 
partnerships. However, divergent interests and structural holes between potential 
partners require an appropriate activity level of a triggering entity. 
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Exhibit 3-4 Relationship: Environmental interdependence and role of 
triggering entity 
Although low strategic interdependence requires a triggering entity, a very high 
intensity of relationships with an integrating focal actor could result in an overly strong 
dominance (described as ‘over triggered’), which may have detrimental effects on the 
relationship quality in the alliance network (Exhibit 3-4): 
Tropolys’ major role during the launch of the network represents a good example of 
this behavior. Rapid integration in a consolidating group with implications for a range 
of internal company processes requires majority stakes to ‘artificially’ reinforce the 
relationship to the triggering entity. Relatively high levels of conflict with former 
stakeholders and loss of senior management proves that the cycle time needed to build 
up shared behavioral norms and efficient information sharing for collective problem 
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resolution has not been provided. However, either the unawareness of partners’ needs 
or the need for rapid changes may have resulted in the more dominant focal firm 
involvement. Applying a different approach of ‘self-induced’ and later intensifying 
cooperation, both Zed and MSN clearly state that they initiate cooperation, await results 
and share potential benefits at a later stage. This shared behavioral norm might apply 
to range of high-technology companies, which have to cope with the uncertainty of 
technology applications and market changes. These examples clearly illustrate the need 
for balance between the intensity of relationships to the triggering entity and the level 
environmental interdependency. Although a high intensity of relationships to the 
triggering entity (Tropolys case study) can force the integration process, this 
transformation towards a densely interconnected network is paid with detrimental 
effects on the relationship quality. Both the relationship quality and intensity during 
the described transformation between the two alternative network structures have 
implications for focal firm learning: 
Studies suggest that the reliance on recurrently evolving learning processes, which 
facilitate efficient and trustful information sharing, require the positive experience of 
mutual pay-offs. Facilitated additionally by certain firm level factors (Powell, Koput et 
al. 1996; Dyer and Singh 1998; Yli-Renko, Autio et al. 2001), inter-organizational 
learning in the alliance network mainly depends on (1) the intensity of relationship, (2) 
quality of cooperation and the (3) similarity of resource bases. (1) With increasing 
levels of relationship intensity, the ability to recognize relevant knowledge and 
motivation to exchange information increases (Cohen and Levinthal 1990; Larson 
1992; Dyer and Singh 1998; Lane and Lubatkin 1998). Learning by recurrent 
cooperation (Ring and Van de Ven 1992) may also be less costly than learning 
generated from a large number of unrelated parties. 
(2) In addition to the relationship intensity, the quality of the relationship in terms of 
trust and reciprocal obligations also represent important factors for inter-organizational 
learning. Since the complexity of the partnership network increases with alliance 
formation activities, an increasing potential for conflict due to moral hazards can have 
detrimental effects for inter-organizational learning (Gomes-Casseres 1994). 
According to Dyer and Singh (1998), informal norms of reciprocity and trust represent 
self-enforcing governance mechanisms against moral hazards as the value of the 
relationship, the rate of cooperative actions increases and the likelihood of violation 
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decreases. Shared norms also reduce the need for formal monitoring and bargaining, 
which leaves more resources for knowledge acquisition. However as described above, 
the development of self-enforcing governance mechanisms requires time for the 
internalization of learning experiences along with the network transition process (Dyer 
and Nobeoka 2000). 
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Exhibit 3-5 Relationship: Learning and relationship quality 
As both relationship quality and intensity increase, Exhibit 3-5 shows that learning 
potential for the focal firm improves especially in the areas of the more valuable tacit 
knowledge (Larson 1992; Kale, Singh et al. 2000; Tsai 2000). In addition to 
deliberately and openly available explicit and tacit knowledge, increasing the 
relationship intensity over a certain threshold can force additional resource transfer 
towards the focal actor due to strong formal governance mechanisms (Proposition # 
15). In the case of Elisa and Tropolys, these governance mechanisms have been 
established as majority equity stakes. 
Although this forced access represents a temporal option for the focal company 
knowledge acquisition, dominant ‘over-triggered’ firm behavior gradually diminishes 
the relationship quality and the openly available learning potential. Although this may 
provide the basis for creative exploration, relying too much on the ‘engineered’ 
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process of network formation suffers from lower expectations of continuity and leads 
to the perception of this alliance network as only one among many other options (Doz, 
Olk et al. 2000). Besides missing commitment from network firms to invest enough in 
the respective collaboration opportunity, a strong central firm as a stimulus to intensify 
interaction in a weak alliance network might lead to dissatisfied partners in the longer 
term. Because a dense network of firms in its final stage is expected to perform 
processing and screening functions (Leonard-Barton 1984), dissatisfied network 
partners have detrimental effects for the network’s information processing, absorption 
and classification capabilities. Due to unfavorable effects for network partners’ 
underutilized resources, an overly dependent ‘satellite’ firm may fail to bring relevant 
innovations to the focal firm’s attention. Therefore, highly involved triggering entities 
may not only diminish the relationship quality, but also the final potential of the 
converging densely interconnected network. 
(3) After any form of focal firm learning, the growing focal firm resource base has a 
beneficial impact on capabilities for knowledge acquisition. The firm’s absorptive 
capacity to recognize, assimilate and exploit external knowledge (Lane and Lubatkin 
1998) grows with knowledge gains that establish an increasing resource similarity of 
the focal firm’s resources with firms in the alliance network. 
Due to the effects of learning for further alliance formation, focal firm learning 
influenced by the described three factors has another effect on emerging resources. 
Functioning as positive vicious and accelerating feedback mechanism, an attractive 
resource base generates a greater number of high-quality partnership opportunities 
(Ahuja 2000b). Studies integrating the concepts of strategic network theory and 
resource-based view of the firm (Shan, Walker et al. 1994; Dutta and Weiss 1997; Lee, 
Lee et al. 2001), show clear interaction effects of internal capabilities and changing 
patterns of alliance formation. In a high-technology environment, Powell, Koput et 
al.’s findings (1996) suggest that the formation of R&D and non-R&D alliances 
provide an entry point for developing the capability to manage partnerships. R&D 
alliances directly or through increased alliance management experience provide the 
access to more diverse types of partners. Since the formation of additional alliances 
increases the firm centrality in the overall network, access to diverse information and 
learning enables firm growth and fosters the establishment of additional R&D 
partnerships, which reinitiates the described cycle. In any reiteration of this cycle, the 
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diversity of the alliance portfolio increases and introduces non-R&D and commercial 
alliances to the entire portfolio. Since Ahuja’s results (2000b) suggest no diminishing 
returns of further alliance formation with size of the network, iteration cycles may 
continuously increase the diversity of the entire partner network. 
Only the ample availability of both commercial and technical focal firm resources has 
a negative impact on the alliance formation rate. This saturation in focal firm resource 
levels might be due to the environmental context of Ahuja’s study. The commodity-
oriented chemicals industry shares resources mainly to consolidate its core businesses. 
However, all available entrepreneurial opportunities and an explorative strategic 
orientation call for utilization of internal resources to access an increasing number of 
valuable partnership opportunities over time. Regarding the dissimilar impact of 
various resources, Ahuja’s results (2000b) suggest that alliance network, technical and 
commercial resources have an increasingly positive impact on alliance formation 
activities. This differentiated effect of focal company resources on the alliance 
formation rates calls for their further classification and operationalization. 
As resource-based arguments can obviously be used to explain the differences in 
strategic firm behavior (Kraatz and Zajac 2001), all case study firms with emerging 
alliance management resources achieve growing stability in their alliance relationships 
and smooth the progress of high value alliance relationships. Since alliance 
management skills as a comparable set of activities (Nelson and Winter 1982; 
Amburgey, Kelly et al. 1993) are developed with a higher alliance formation rate, they 
are expected to keep up with the increasing availability of partnership opportunities. 
According to related research (Gulati 1999; Anand and Khanna 2000), increasing 
sophistication in this capability is clearly associated with higher value appropriation 
from partnerships and gradually developed through experience from the entire 
portfolio. Interestingly, the diversity of partnerships does not seem to have a beneficial 
effect on their development. However, increases in resource exchange intensity – 
expected during the formation of either simple licensing contracts or complex joint 
ventures – have a positive impact on alliance management resource development 
(Anand and Khanna 2000). 
Since learning gradually develops operational resources, which attracts more valuable 
partnership opportunities as described above, the sophistication of alliance 
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management resources has to be aligned with upcoming partnership challenges. 
Underdeveloped alliance management resources lead to unstable relationships 
(Proposition # 3), higher levels of conflict and unbalanced resource exchanges. 
Increased levels of disagreement diminish the relationship quality with detrimental 
effects on learning potential. On the other side, highly developed alliance management 
resources confronted with inferior partnership opportunities constitute a waste of 
scarce resources. Supporting this view, a number of case study companies indicate the 
scarcity of personnel resources in screening, selecting, embedding and maintaining 
novel partnerships. 
Over the course of developing focal firm resources and convergence towards densely 
interconnected alliance networks, the need for additional explorative initiatives 
increases: When focal firm resources are enhanced through inter-organizational 
learning, similarity in the resource bases across the network might reduce the need for 
collaboration, which reduces the desirable stability of the entire network (Lorenzoni 
and Lipparini 1999). Caused by densely interconnected networks, disadvantages of 
increasing saturation (Kogut, Shan et al. 1992) result from only marginal increases in 
partnership benefits (Harrigan 1985), search for limitations of novel alliance 
opportunities and reductions in variety (Walker, Kogut et al. 1997). As behavioral 
norms spread across a dense network structure, deviant firm behavior and innovation 
to generate variety are suppressed (Coleman 1988). To maintain sustainability of the 
entire network structure, the converging alliance network requires the addition of 
explorative partnerships to extend the capabilities of both the focal actor and network 
firms. This rationale also explains the balance of weak and strong ties that has been 
suggested by a number of scholars: 
The right balance of dense firm networks and weak dyadic partnerships leverages 
central capabilities throughout the whole alliance network and generates variance 
(Uzzi 1997b). Advantages of cohesive networks and structural holes complement each 
other and serve the focal actors in different strategic contexts. Therefore, maturing and 
converging networks with intense relationships should be open to the integration of 
new actors driving innovativeness of the whole system. The redundancy of externally 
added competency and knowledge creates different and optional inputs, which then 
generates innovation and change (Nonaka 1994). Especially relevant in high-
technology industries, this change towards novel partnerships reinstates the need for a 
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triggering entity and introduces novel sources of knowledge to both network 
companies and the focal actor. 
Although converging networks tend to follow the ‘emergent path’ of network 
formation more closely with positive effects on the relationship quality and cost of 
maintaining the relationships, shifting distribution of rents represents a disincentive for 
the focal actor (Doz, Olk et al. 2000). According to theoretical predictions, dense 
relationships facilitating close monitoring and coordination generate a Coleman rent 
for both the focal actor and network firms (Coleman 1990). Based on contributions 
with a proportional reward, a Coleman network assumes that benefits of superior 
coordination must be distributed in ways to assure continuing participation. 
The undesirable prospects of shared benefits and rents may induce the focal actor to 
introduce entrepreneurial opportunities to converging and densely connected network 
partners. Implementation of innovations requires the addition of dyadic partnerships 
and a more pronounced role for the triggering entity, which both provide a higher level 
of information diversity. 
Environmental 
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Relationship intensity 
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∆ Relationship 
quality=
Focal firm 
resource base
Network firms’ 
resource base
Degree of 
similarity=
Relationship intensity 
to focal actor Relationship quality Learning=+
Partnership 
opportunities
Alliance management 
resources ∆ Stability=
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Exhibit 3-6 Summary: Integration of theoretical constructs on network 
evolution and focal firm resources 
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In integrating all perspectives and research results on the converging alliance network 
evolution and focal firm resources, three related constructs have to be balanced for a 
successful alliance network evolution (Exhibit 3-6) 
(1) Relationship intensity as the indicator for the ‘hierarchical’ orientation and strength 
of the triggering entity in comparison with environmental interdependence perceived 
by all network partners has an effect on the quality of relationships in the network. 
‘Over-triggered’ dominance discourages partners with implications for learning and 
the long-term potential of inter-organizational networks. Both quality and intensity 
contribute to focal firm learning. 
(2) An increasing degree of resource similarity, although beneficial for the absorptive 
capacity of the focal firm, reduces environmental interdependence in the network. The 
resource procurement motive as an inducement for aligning objectives and further 
cooperation may gradually lose its relevance, which results an decreasing stability of 
the network. 
(3) Developing focal firm resources attract more valuable partnership opportunities, 
which require appropriate alliance management resources to turn options into alliances. 
The number and type of historical alliances contribute to developing this capability. As 
defined in Proposition # 3, well-developed capabilities ensure stability of the 
partnership with implications for a low level of conflict and unintended resource 
exchanges. Harmonized relationships also have a positive impact on the future quality 
of the relationship. 
As the resource-based view of the firm in this study regards the firm as a bundle of 
operational, alliance management and alliance network resources (Penrose 1959; 
Wernerfelt 1984; Barney 1991; Amit and Schoemaker 1993), the accumulation and 
deployment of these valuable, rare and inimitable capabilities generate synergies and 
rents (Wernerfelt 1984; Barney 1986; Dierickx, Cool et al. 1989; Barney 1991; 
Mahoney and Pandian 1992; Peteraf 1993; Barney 2001). 
Regarding the issue of sustainability to this competitive advantage, resource 
characteristics of tacitness, complexity, and specificity create barriers to inimitability 
(Reed and DeFillippi 1990). As partnership structures converge towards more densely 
connected networks, the mere nature of knowledge and resources exchange clearly 
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fulfills the requirement of tacitness. Complexity and specificity can be closely linked 
to the path-dependent and idiosyncratic character of network evolution as described in 
Exhibit 3-6. All activities needed to maintain the described balance on three 
dimensions constitute multi-level, evolutionary processes, which clearly establish 
complex path dependencies (Levinthal and Fichman 1988; Gulati 1995b; Walker, 
Kogut et al. 1997; Gulati 1999). Complex relationship structures, various dependencies 
between network relationships, required organizational principles are also very much 
idiosyncratic to the specific partnership network (Kogut 2000). All presented resource 
characteristics impose high barriers to limitability for alliance network resources and 
the operational resources that are accessed.  
Reviewing tentative propositions 
In this stage of the study, the combined theoretical framework is fully confronted with 
the set of tentative propositions derived in chapter 2.5. Besides the comparison of 
theoretical concepts with the empirical accounts and case study findings in the sections 
preceding chapter 2.5, this confrontation with the developed framework represents the 
second step of theory review. 
The value of this confrontation depends on improving the internal validity of this study 
as an important component of qualitative research. At this stage, the set of tentative 
propositions is compared with the described framework summarized in Exhibit 3-6, 
which assesses the generalized theoretical concepts against empirical accounts from all 
case studies. 
This assessment can then identify and thus support what the framework does explain in 
an unambiguous manner. Equally significant, the comparison can show where the 
developed framework remains vague or where it does not hold explanatory power. For 
a simplified comparison with the framework of the previous chapter, Exhibit 3-7 
provides an overview of the tentative proposition as presented in chapter 2.5. 
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Tentative 
Proposition 
Definition 
Proposition # 1 Determined by an assessment of a focal firm’s operational resources, more selective alliance network objectives as guidelines in the alliance formation process have a negative effect on the alliance formation rate. 
Proposition # 2 
With an increasing number of accumulated alliance formation activities under constant alliance network 
objectives, the focal firm develops valuable alliance management resources of refined selection criteria and 
processes to successfully screen, form and advance alliances in its network. 
Proposition # 3 Better-developed alliance management resources contribute to higher stability in alliance relationships between the focal company and its alliance partners. 
Proposition # 4 More stable alliance relationships reduce the magnitude of unintended resource exchange and the level of conflict in partnerships. 
Proposition # 5 Lower magnitude of unintended resource exchanges reduces the focal firm’s level of innovation and exploration beyond the originally defined alliance objectives. 
Proposition # 6 A higher level of conflict and unintended resource exchange in alliance relationships increases the learning potential for partners involved in the alliance. 
Proposition # 7 Higher learning potential and closer resource base relatedness of alliance partners with the focal firm have a positive impact on focal firm learning. 
Proposition # 8 Initial alliance formation for the support of technical processes across the alliance network aims only at the availability and narrow exchange of operational resources. 
Proposition # 9 The growing base of internally developed and externally acquired focal firm resources creates additional and more valuable alliance formation opportunities. 
Proposition # 10 Emerging alliance management resources facilitate the selection of high-value alliance formation opportunities and their beneficial transformation into partnerships of higher resource exchange intensity. 
Proposition # 11 Alliances of higher value and resource exchange intensity mandate a higher degree of customization and complexity in resource exchange. 
Proposition # 12 Focal firm learning through changed alliance network objectives represents a valuable feedback mechanism for refined selection criteria as a component in alliance management resources. 
Proposition # 13 Initial and less resource intensive alliance relationships face value reviews in their comparison to internally developed and externally available focal firm resources. 
Proposition # 14 Value reviews may lead to the internalization of resources, rebalancing of resource exchange or the discontinuation of the relationship based on efficiency considerations. 
Proposition # 15 An increase in the relationship intensity over a certain threshold allows for the transfer in addition to learning about network company resources. 
Proposition # 16 
Motivated by a transformation from exploration to exploitation in alliance network objectives, an adaptation to 
the resource exchange between the focal firm and other network firms requires more intensive alliance network 
relationships to the focal firms and between network firms. 
Exhibit 3-7 Overview: Tentative propositions 
The development of alliance management resources (Proposition # 1;Proposition # 
2;Proposition # 12) is widely reflected in the developed theoretical framework. 
However, the merged model provides an important extension for Proposition # 2: Not 
only the number of partnerships forged, but also the type of alliance relationship 
determines the contribution to a growing level of alliance management resources. The 
merged framework remains unspecific, however, as to whether various alliance types 
contribute either to screening criteria or process capabilities. Also, the impact of 
changing alliance network objectives on the value of alliance management capabilities 
remains unexplained. 
Proposition # 3 suggests higher stability in alliance relationships between the focal 
company and alliance partners with a developing level of alliance management 
capabilities. As a conceptual exception, this relationship in the merged framework has 
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only been based on empirical accounts from firms in this study to establish a sound 
system of relationships between the theoretical constructs. This link remains an issue 
for subsequent research. 
Related to the topic of inter-organizational learning (Proposition # 4;Proposition # 
5;Proposition # 6), various notions on the impact of conflict on inter-organizational 
learning have been discussed. Although some scholars argue that open domain 
consensus and diverse interaction have beneficial effects on learning (Doz, Olk et al. 
2000), overwhelming literature underlines the favorable effects of trust and reciprocity 
on knowledge exchange. Therefore, the merged framework contradicts the set of 
tentative propositions in this area. Further research on a limited, acceptable and 
favorable level of conflict and diverse interaction as stimulus for innovation processes 
may prove to be valuable in this context. In comparison to the merged model, 
Proposition # 7 on focal firm learning has been confirmed and can be extended: Not 
only resource similarity, but also the quality and the intensity of the relationship have a 
positive effect on focal firm learning. 
To establish a starting point for alliance formation, Proposition # 8 suggests the 
availability of a basic operational infrastructure with the initial support of inter-
organizational alliances. The developed theoretical model offers no explanatory power 
due to missing research in this area. With regard to this aspect, Powell, Koput et al. 
(1996) only suggest that technically oriented R&D alliances serve as a starting point 
for a cycle of network formation. Due to the unspecific research results, classification 
and operationalization for the resource base and alliances remain two important areas 
for further research. Further complicating this issue, the set of resources are of 
industry-specific value to and relevance for focal firms. 
Proposition # 9 on growing alliance formation opportunities receives clear support 
from the merged model. Besides the discussed issue of operationalization, the value of 
certain operational resource types for providing alliance formation opportunities 
represents a promising area for further research. According to Proposition # 10 and 
Proposition # 11, more valuable alliance formation opportunities require the 
customization of arrangements and more complex combination of exchanged 
resources. Since the combination of resource exchanges in the network have not be 
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covered so far in related research, also this area leaves compelling and open research 
questions. 
Discontinuation of partnerships (Proposition # 13;Proposition # 14) has been covered 
in the merged model through reduced environmental interdependencies. The options of 
rebalancing these relationships and the factors relevant for choosing between these 
alternatives remain open issues for further research. The same applies to the issue of 
forced resource transfer (Proposition # 15), which has been introduced to the merged 
model to complement the system of propositions.  
The transition from exploration to exploitation (Proposition # 16) with effects on the 
entire network structure has been fully reflected in the merged model and is fully 
compatible with relevant research cited in this study. 
The objective of this chapter was to validate the newly developed model with the case-
based tentative proposition in order to increase the model’s internal validity. The 
model has achieved this by utilizing the grounded theory approach on the foundation 
of cases and theoretical deliberations. The preceding comparison of the developed 
framework with the set of tentative propositions has proven the explanatory power of 
the new framework. Since all of the tentative propositions were derived directly from 
empirical accounts of all cases, the overwhelming majority of their aspects despite 
contradictions in some areas can be thoroughly explained by the new model. 
As expected after concluding grounded theory research, some tentative propositions 
could not be adequately explained. The detection of shortcomings and the exploration 
of needs for future refinement and research are discussed in the subsequent chapter 1. 
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4 Conclusion 
In a final review of this study’s results, the concluding chapter 4 summarizes 
managerial implications and issues for further scientific research. Managerial 
implications should recognize the complexity of interaction effects between 
developing resources, emerging networks and changing performance. Further research 
issues should simultaneously cover alliance-, firm-, and network-level factors of 
network and resource evolution. The breadth of factors and multiple interaction effects 
only further complicates already existing issues of resource and network 
operationalization. 
As implications for daily management practice, executives should aim at anticipating 
the effects of network participation and seek partners with rich learning opportunities. 
In designing their networks, managers should consider all consequences of future 
alliance formation and their impact on the entire alliance network. This ‘forward-
looking’ approach is – for example – supported by Powell, Koput et al.’s path-
dependent cycle of learning (1996), although certainly not all collaboration 
consequences can be foreseen during the early formation of one specific partnership. 
However, some firm- and network-level factors can be used for managerial decision-
making: For example, the informational benefits of ties to central actors represent an 
important corresponding decision criterion in alliance formation. Major strategic 
initiatives should be directed by the alliance formation with centrally located firms that 
facilitate further development of future partnerships. This basic understanding of the 
targeted network structures and anticipation of network dynamics then allows for path 
creation strategies (Gulati 1999). On the firm level, higher absorptive capacity, 
developing alliance management skills, increasing awareness for alliance opportunities 
and a growing reputation as a valuable partner can result from existing alliances and 
also contribute to future collaboration. Revolving alliance benefits continue to 
motivate firms for further – although also more selective – partnership formation. 
The set of tentative proposition suggests that learning from external operational 
resources results in a more selective approach of choosing future alliance partners for 
the entire network. To prevent a decrease in innovativeness and exploration across the 
network, alliance management resources should be confronted with a sufficient share 
of ‘experimental’ partnerships adding a more diverse set of resources to the network. 
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When additional actors in the network contribute entrepreneurial orientation and keep 
the system alert, the overall potential of the entire network may increase as well. Intel’s 
technology roadmap described in the first case study can serve as an appropriate 
approach for benchmarking current and detecting missing technological capabilities. 
In a mature stage of network development, alliance management resources facilitate 
the transfer of partnership opportunities into active alliance relationships. However, 
alliance management resources should be kept in balance with the level of alliance 
opportunities. Lacking skills in this area may result in not generating all potentials 
from available alliance opportunities. Centralized bundling of management 
capabilities, systematic screening of alliance opportunities, defined key performance 
indicators and strong awareness for multiplicity of interests across the partner network 
represent good examples for enhanced alliance management resources. The ‘trilogy’ of 
rich alliance opportunities contributing new resources, developed alliance management 
resources and a leveraged combination with already existing internal company 
resources finally generates the potential for enhanced company performance. 
From a management research perspective, contributing factors on multiple levels 
illustrate the complexity of alliance network and resource-based research with a 
simultaneous focus on firm performance. Covering all relevant areas in a longitudinal 
setting imposes significant definition and measurement challenges. However, 
longitudinal data on all relevant units of analysis could help to explore the sources of 
dynamic relationships between internal capabilities, alliance networks and 
performance. Sufficiently detailed data sets could also be useful to explore whether 
external networks facilitate the repetitive accumulation of internal capabilities, which 
as a result leads to the formation of additional ties with more valuable partners. 
In the area of resource acquisition, further research could cover the more detailed 
definition of alliance management resources. Both process skills and screening criteria 
offer valuable areas of further exploration. In the event of network objective change, 
an open question also remains whether current capabilities in alliance management can 
be transferred to new industries and technological domains. Across all case studies, 
developing alliance management capabilities seem to have a positive impact on 
partnership stability. Further research could cover the issue of alliance stability and its 
impact on potential benefits for alliance performance. Higher levels of stability could 
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on one hand facilitate a timely execution of earlier defined alliance objectives, but may 
on the other hand also limit the search for new entrepreneurial opportunities beyond 
the immediate scope of collaboration. 
Powell, Koput et al.’s (1996) path-dependency of alliance formation results in the open 
question what nucleus should be chosen as the set of initial alliance relationships that 
later potentially triggers mutually beneficial effects of emerging resources and more 
valuable alliance opportunities. Justifying a trial-and-error approach, utilization of an 
alliance network does not always guarantee performance improvements. More research 
is therefore needed to fully understand the heterogeneous pathways firms take in 
learning from partnership experience and improving performance. 
These pathways are determined by the rate at which firms enter into alliances of a 
particular type depending on attributes such as position in alliance networks or industry 
conditions. As another extension, scholars could also assess the value or resource 
contribution of the firm’s strategic partners (Stuart 2000). The set of propositions 
suggests a growing complexity of more valuable resource contributions. Industry-
specific definition, operationalization and complexity measurement of exchanged 
resources also represent promising areas for further research. The magnitude of 
resource contributions also links to the question, whether a certain threshold allows for 
resource access instead of resource learning. ‘Forced’ resource access may later have a 
detrimental effect on relationship quality with impact on the future network path. 
Since performance consequences seem to be tightly connected to partner 
characteristics, further research should also explore the factors that enable valuable 
partnership opportunities. In addition to performance implications of particular types 
of alliances options, which have been the primary focus of past research, the overall 
composition of an alliance network may contribute significantly to firm performance. 
Several factors, including partner redundancy, the described internal conflict or the 
mentioned complexity may influence the effectiveness of the entire alliance network 
configuration. 
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Various factors influencing alliance network performance across multiple units of 
analysis, open question of resource measurement, broad scope of either direct or also 
indirect alliances in partnership portfolios as well as multiple contributions of certain 
resources types make progress in alliance network research a complex and challenging 
endeavor. To cover all mentioned areas in a longitudinal setting and to establish links 
to firm performance only further complicates the detailed data requirements for future 
studies. 
However, shortening innovation cycles, increasing competitive pressures and limited 
availability of dispersed knowledge in high technology industries require the intense 
collaboration across multiple partners. Although some trends in the information and 
communication technology industry mandate further consolidation and cost 
efficiencies, innovativeness and exchange of entrepreneurial opportunities remain on 
the top of executive agendas. Restricted company resources only underline the strong 
necessity to achieve more innovation through actively involving appropriate partners 
in alliance networks. 
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